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ABSTRACT 
It is well understood that psychoanalysis began with Freud’s encounter with 
hysteria and his work with illnesses of the mind which manifested in bodily terms. 
However, despite its close connection to the body and the understanding that 
psychoanalytic theory and practice develop hand-in-hand, psychological conflict 
that expresses itself in physical terms and more especially the role of the two 
bodies in the therapy room has received relatively little attention. The topic of this 
research project is captured in its title: “Minding the Body”, and the four journal 
articles it presents interrogate the relationship between the mind and body of both 
the patient and therapist. The thesis begins with two published papers which focus 
on the body of the patient, rehearsing and extending the psychoanalytic theory of 
bodily psychopathology and the implications that the different understandings of 
the relationship between body and mind in different forms of psychosoma have for 
clinical interventions. The second two papers examine what the analyst’s 
interpretation of her somatic responses to the patient, and the patient’s 
engagement with the analyst’s body, can reveal about the dynamics of the 
therapeutic dyad. The project concludes with a discussion of the clinical 
implications of a greater focus on the two bodies in the room, suggesting that the 
techniques developed to make sense of the patient’s physical symptoms can be 
usefully applied to decode the somatic countertransference as it manifests in a 
particular therapeutic dyad. That process, coupled with an awareness of the 
patient’s engagement with the therapist’s body, can create conditions under which 
the analyst’s body may become an analytic object and this can add significantly to 
the analytic repertoire. 
 
  
 8 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT 
Psychoanalysis was born through Freud’s search for ways to explain the physical 
symptoms he observed presenting in hysterical patients which appeared to have 
no biological cause, and thus the foundational moment of psychoanalysis was in 
relation to the body. A key underpinning principle of the field of psychoanalysis was 
thus the idea that an illness that is purely psychological can express itself in 
physical terms; and consequently a theory was built that distinguished human 
suffering that is physical from that which is mental (Breuer & Freud, 1893; Freud, 
1912d, 1917a). This idea that the mind expresses itself through the body is 
anticipated in Freud’s much quoted statement that “The ego ... is first and foremost 
a body-ego” (Freud, 1923a). It is in his early encounters with hysteria that Freud 
developed psychoanalysis as a theory of psychopathology accompanied by 
practice, and it is in these founding principles that the key ingredients of this 
research project emerge.  
The practice that emerged following Freud’s work with hysteria is essentially the 
verbal interpretation of symptoms and their meaning, which is intimately connected 
with the notion of psychoanalysis being a ‘talking cure’. The practice is therefore 
located in language, both as a site of the production of meaning and as the 
instrument by means of which the cure is effected. The curative practice of 
psychoanalysis is therefore not only closely connected to speech but is also based 
on an understanding that the very idea of the kind of meaning that this interpretive 
practice uncovers is one in the register of language and talking (Sirois, 2012).  
While speech may be emitted from the mouth of one individual and be intended for 
the ear of another, it is necessary for it to be structured by language in order to 
communicate a message. Doing so conveys large amounts about the culture, 
history, and society of the speaker. Consequently, speech and language may be 
produced by a body, but they exist more widely and independently than the bodies 
that create and convey them.  At the core of the psychoanalytic endeavour is the 
wish to understand the processes by which the embodied self comes to create and 
be created by language (Lichtenstein, 2012). 
However, while the practice of psychoanalysis is in the domain of language, the 
understandings of the nature of the pathology have to do with the relationship 
between psychic objects which the patient is conscious of and can give meaning 
to, and principles and forces that are still in the patient’s unconscious mind. 
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Psychoanalysis has at its foundation an underlying drive theory which proposes 
that humans have biological and psychological needs which they are driven to 
meet. If these needs are not met, the individual will experience discomfort, tension 
and sometimes internal conflict. An individual’s task is to balance these internal 
needs with their own internal value system as well as behaviour deemed 
appropriate by society (Freud, 1923a). Symptoms may manifest in the body as a 
result of the interaction of these bodily and ‘non-bodily’ phenomena. The very 
reason that these symptoms present in this physical way is because it is not yet 
possible for the patient to make psychic sense of them and to put them into words. 
What can be concluded is that that both practically and conceptually, the 
relationship between questions of the body and questions of practice and 
technique in treating the psychopathology of the body, are going to be complex – 
precisely because the practice is in the domain of language, while bodily symptoms 
occur in an altogether different domain.  
One of the ways in which psychopathology with an explicitly bodily dimension is 
connected to the core metapsychological theory of symptom formation is through 
the concept of mentalization, which is defined as the process of making meaning 
and expressing conflicts and experiences in language (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 
2008; Fonagy, Gergley, Jurist, & Target, 2004). The issue of mentalization is 
fundamental to psychoanalysis, and remains central to both the theory and the 
practice of psychoanalysis and is based on the relationship between the body (i.e. 
drives, instincts and affects) and that which it is possible to mentalize. 
Mentalization is therefore a process that unites implicitly psychoanalytic 
psychopathology as a theory and that which is a goal for clinical practice, and is 
consequently vital to the project of ‘minding the body’.  
Unsurprisingly, the body that was the focus in early psychology was the body of the 
patient. More recently however, contemporary writings have highlighted the 
influence that the person of the analyst has on the therapy. This theoretical 
development consequently brings another body into focus: the body of the analyst.  
The body of the analyst and the role that it plays in a treatment has received 
relatively little attention. However, the analyst’s physical response to the patient 
can be a source of useful information about therapeutic dynamics. Similarly, how 
the patient engages with and refers to the analyst’s body provides valuable insights 
into the transference-countertransference forces at work. 
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The specific and primary focus of this research is to draw attention to the benefits 
of paying attention to, and in that way ‘minding’, the fact that both members of the 
therapeutic couple are in fact embodied beings. With this in mind, attention can be 
paid to how those bodies convey valuable information about internal conflicts, 
psychopathology and transference-countertransference dynamics. 
The secondary focus of the project is to describe the mechanisms involved in 
bodily pathology and bodily responses and then to describe ways in which these 
can be worked with and mentalized in order that they might become available to 
language and in that way made use of in the therapeutic encounter. 
This thesis arose out of my work as a psychoanalytically-informed clinical 
psychotherapist with a special interest in body-mind link and disorders of the body. 
In the course of my work I became aware that in contemporary psychoanalytic 
writing there is a tendency to consider the body metaphorically, rather than a 
concrete, physical presence (Barratt, 2010). It seemed to me that this tendency 
resulted in a loss of remarkably useful and revealing information, and the idea for 
this project began to evolve.  
RATIONALE FOR THE PROJECT 
The history of concentrated focus on the body in psychoanalytic thought and 
practice is a complex one. Over the years, even though it was where 
psychoanalysis began, the body has come to occupy less and less of a central role 
in psychoanalysis. In more modern psychoanalysis where the object-relations 
school has increased in influence, references to the body are often understood as 
being metaphorical and thus the body’s physicality seems to holds decreasing 
importance. There is also diminishing focus on the Freudian theory of the body and 
its drives (Paniagua, 2004). The history of psychoanalysis has shown alternating 
trends (Swartz, 2000) from explicit concerns with the body expressed in the original 
drive theories, to a preoccupation with other the elements and ingredients of the 
so-called talking cure such as the patient’s inner world or the relationship between 
patient and therapist.  
Yet, even in those psychoanalytic schools of thought where the body does not 
receive direct focus, most psychoanalytic theories are still concerned with the 
regulation, dissociation, and integration of affective states, which are in fact 
theories of an embodied self as these states are all registered, recorded, and 
sustained in some form of bodily inscription. Thus, even if contemporary 
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psychoanalytic theories privilege the social or interpersonal side of the 
psychotherapeutic work, the subject remains an embodied being and therefore the 
bodily element of psychotherapeutic processes cannot be ignored if the therapy is 
to be successful (Lichtenstein, 2012). 
There does appear to be a renewed interest in the body in psychoanalysis (Gubb, 
2013a; Paniagua, 2004). However, where the body has been included in clinical 
practice, the focus has usually emphasised the body of the patient. What is 
emerging strongly more recently though, is the understanding that there needs to 
be concentration on the bodies of both the patient and the therapist, as well as on 
the need to foster the ability of both of these individuals to mentalize their somatic 
experiences.  
This study consists of two parts which reflect the dyad of the analytic couple. The 
first part of the study focuses on the body of the patient, while the second part 
concentrates on the body of the therapist. The thesis was conceived of in this 
format in order to emphasise the presence of two bodies in the room and to 
highlight the fact that they both contribute and ‘speak’ during the therapy process. 
This PhD including publication and its prerequisite four papers presented an ideal 
opportunity to discuss various aspects of ‘minding the body’ in detail. Each of the 
four papers focuses on a different aspect of what psychological dynamics can be 
revealed (and hidden) by the body. By making use of individual cases it is possible 
to explore and contrast processes and mechanisms in depth, and this allows for a 
deeper understanding of not only the processes involved in somatisation, but also 
the therapeutic interventions required to access and transform these into mental 
elements.  
The aims of this research enterprise then are to advocate for minding the body, 
emphasise the two bodies in the room, and explicate the role of mentalization in 
psychoanalytic practice and how this aids in transforming somatic manifestations of 
psychological origin into mental objects which can be processed and worked 
through by means of the talking cure. The quest to ‘mind’ the body is not a new 
quest, but an old one that is worth revisiting. What this research project aims to 
contribute to that quest is an understanding of the mechanisms behind conflicts or 
psychological responses that take a somatic route, and a clinical application of how 
to make use of these in the therapy room. 
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THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
This research is located within the broad psychoanalytic paradigm which offers a 
theoretical understanding of human behaviour that emphasises unconscious 
motives, anxieties and conflicts. The focus of the research is related to 
psychoanalytic psychopathology and the clinical interventions characteristic of an 
analysis or a psychodynamic psychotherapy.  
Psychoanalysis is a theory of human development and psychopathology as well as 
a treatment technique for patients suffering from psychological disorders. The 
psychoanalytic theories of personality development which are of significance to this 
research are those found in Freud’s work (1910a, 1912b, 1912d, 1915c). Equally 
important is the work done on attachment by, amongst others, Bowlby (1969) and 
Fonagy (Fonagy, et al., 2004; Fonagy & Target, 2007). Attachment theories 
emphasise the impact of the caregiver on an infant’s developing sense of 
themselves and their relation to their own body. Most importantly for this project, 
however, is the work done by these attachment theorists on the concept of 
mentalization and what role this plays in the individual’s ability to translate physical 
sensations into psychological objects with meaning (Allen, et al., 2008; Fonagy, et 
al., 2004; Fonagy & Target, 2007).   
Fundamental to psychoanalytic psychopathology, and to this thesis in particular, is 
the understanding that symptomatology which is essentially mental in origin may 
take a route to the body and may manifest in physical terms. This idea originates 
from the very early understandings of psychoanalytic psychopathology, particularly 
the concept of hysteria which emphasises somatic symptoms and the mechanisms 
involved when mental suffering is expressed in bodily terms. The most important of 
these mechanisms is that of the repression of unconscious fantasies and wishes 
(Breuer & Freud, 1893; Freud, 1912d, 1917a). In addition, the early work on 
hysteria involved another concept that is of significance to this project, and that is 
the idea that the form that the patient’s physical symptom takes, has significance 
and is essential to understanding the psychic conflicts which were at work in the 
development of that symptom (Freud, 1912d).  
As stated above, psychoanalysis is also a treatment modality for psychological 
difficulties. It is a ‘talking cure’ that emphasises the interpretation of the patient’s 
unconscious material. In classical psychoanalytic treatment patients are 
encouraged to say whatever comes into their mind in the order in which it comes to 
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them. This process is known as free association and it is believed that this will 
reveal the unconscious conflicts which lie beneath the patients’ symptoms and 
character problems (Freud, 1910a, 1917a). The analyst then interprets any 
underlying conflicts revealed by the material to the patient in order for the patient to 
understand the meanings behind their symptoms. Developing such an insight 
around their conflicts allows for the repression of the associated wishes to be lifted 
and the symptoms to resolve (Freud, 1914).  
Further important and fundamental psychoanalytic concepts which are relevant to 
this project are those of ‘transference’ and ‘countertransference’. Transference is 
the redirection of the patient's feelings about a significant person from the patient’s 
past onto the therapist (Freud, 1912a; Klein, 1952). The manner in which the 
transference is expressed by the patient must be analysed in order to reveal the 
unresolved conflicts the patient has with figures from their childhood, and other 
parts of their life. Equally important is the idea of ‘countertransference’ which are 
the feelings that the analyst has towards the patient. These countertransference 
feelings can give the analyst valuable insight into the relationship between 
themselves and the patient (Heimann, 1950; Lemma, 2003).  
AIMS OF THE PROJECT 
The overriding aim of the study was to argue for, and substantiate the need for  
working with, and focusing on, the physical body in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 
and to give meaning and to mentalize the symptoms and reactions that occur in the 
physical dimension, whether it be the body of the patient or the body of the 
therapist. Against this background, and in light of the literature discussed in the 
following chapter, the study aimed to highlight the advantages of attending to both 
the bodies in the room.  
As suggested by the title, the main aim, therefore, is to argue for the benefits of 
‘minding of the body’ in psychoanalysis, and there are four specific dimensions, 
divided into two parts, which are explored:  
1. The first half of the thesis concentrates on the symptomatic body of the patient 
• The study reflects on the most widely accepted theories explaining how 
the patient’s body manifests psychopathology (e.g. conversion hysteria 
and psychosomatic illness) and provides a comparative overview of this 
body of theory in psychoanalytic literature with the aim of paying particular 
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attention to how each of these pathologies is linked to a particular type of 
failure of mentalization.  
• The study further aims to explore one particular form of bodily 
psychopathology (i.e. psychosomatic illness) in more detail and to 
compare and contrast existing and emerging schools of thought about 
psychosomatosis through a focus on the underlying difficulties in 
mentalization that the particular illness demonstrates. 
2. The second half of the thesis concentrates on the body of the therapist 
• The third aim of the study is to demonstrate the usefulness of paying 
attention to the second body in the room: that of the analyst. The analyst 
may have a number of physical responses to the patient, and the aim here 
is to explore how attending to, and understanding and mentalizing around 
these physical responses might give the therapist insight into the 
therapeutic dynamics at work in a particular therapy.  
• The final aim of the study is to give attention to moments when the patient 
observes and comments on physical aspects of the therapist during a 
psychotherapy in order to gain insight into what such moments might 
reveal about the transference-countertransference dynamics occurring 
between the psychoanalytic couple. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The research questions that the study addresses include: 
THE PATIENT’S SYMPTOMATIC BODY 
• What are the different ways in which psychoanalytic theory has understood the 
patient’s symptomatic body? 
• Which psychological anxieties and conflicts can be seen to underpin the main 
theories of the symptomatic body of the patient in psychoanalysis?  
• How are failures of mentalization conceptually linked to physical symptoms in 
psychoanalysis? 
• What implications do different understandings of the process of somatisation 
have for treatment of psychosomatic illnesses? 
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THE THERAPIST’S BODY 
• What information about the therapeutic dynamics are revealed by the 
therapist’s physical response to the patient, and how can this be used in the 
treatment? 
• What might the patient’s references to the therapist’s body reveal about the 
therapeutic dyad, and how can this information be used therapeutically? 
THE EMBODIED ANALYTIC PAIR 
• What are the potential benefits of paying particular attention to the 
embodiedness of both members of the therapeutic pair? 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is presented in two volumes. The first of these is the thesis proper which 
contains the papers which are presented as chapters as well as a linking and 
uniting overall argument. The second volume contains the three papers which have 
already been published, in their published formats. 
VOLUME I: THESIS 
The study is made up of two parts which reflect the dyad of the analytic couple. 
The first half of the study focuses on the body of the patient while the second half 
focuses on the body of the therapist.  
The structure of this PhD thesis including publication following this introductory 
chapter is as follows: 
CHAPTER 2: LOCATING THE RESEARCH IN THE LITERATURE 
The first two published papers included in this thesis are in themselves reviews of 
the historical and more contemporary literature which is relevant to the overall 
topic. The second two papers also include selected literature which is reviewed in 
order to place the argument presented in each paper in context. In order to avoid 
repetition only a few crucial points are highlighted in this chapter which is a brief 
orientation to the literature which is relevant to the thesis. 
CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this chapter the data collection and analysis methods which were used in the 
study are described. Any relevant ethical issues are discussed, as well as the 
steps taken to address these. 
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The next four chapters of the thesis take the form of the four journal articles which 
were a requirement for the degree to be conferred. All four of the stand-alone 
papers were submitted to peer-reviewed psychoanalytic journals. Three of the 
manuscripts have been published, and the fourth has been provisional accepted 
pending some minor changes which are being processed. Submission of the thesis 
with three accepted papers and one which has been submitted is in accordance 
with the guidelines of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of the 
Witwatersrand PhD programme. Each article was written to conform to the specific 
requirements of the journal to which it was submitted. In order to contextualise the 
papers and to make the relationships between the papers more explicit each of 
these chapters includes a brief introductory section. These additional sections 
highlight the argument being presented by the thesis as a whole and identify the 
research questions being addressed by each paper.  
The first two papers discuss the subject of psychosoma in the patient, but with a 
specific emphasis on clinical implications.  
CHAPTER 4: THE QUESTION OF PSYCHOSOMA 
The paper included in this chapter is entitled “The Sense of Bodily Symptoms” and 
was published in Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South Africa in 2011. The 
paper explores the relationship between psychological illness and physical 
symptoms. It reviews the concepts of conversion and somatisation and compares 
and contrasts their genesis, the possible meanings that the form of the symptoms 
might reveal, and the therapeutic task related to the treatment of each type of 
symptom. The two types of pathology are contrasted in terms of the patient’s 
mentalizing capacity.  
CHAPTER 5: PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS 
A brief introduction links this paper to the previous one. 
The paper then follows and is entitled “Psychosomatics Today: A Review of 
Contemporary Theory and Practice” and was published in The Psychoanalytic 
Review in March 2013. This paper is a review of recent literature on the topic of 
psychosomatic illness. It suggests that there are two theoretical approaches in the 
literature: the first is the well-defined French school of psychosomatics, and the 
second which the paper proposes: the Attachment approach.  The paper explores 
in detail how each of these approaches understands the concept of mentalization 
and how this in turn informs the theorisation of the mechanisms involved in 
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psychosomatic illness and consequently its treatment. The paper ends with some 
comments about the clinical implications resulting from the different theoretical 
approaches. 
When this paper was published, the editors called for comments on the paper, and 
those which are relevant are included in the Discussion chapter of the thesis. 
The focus of the second half of the thesis shifts to the other body in the room: that 
of the therapist.  
CHAPTER 6: THE THERAPIST’S PHYSICAL RESPONSE TO THE PATIENT 
The chapter will begin with some introductory comments which link it to the 
previous papers. 
The paper in this chapter was submitted to The British Journal of Psychotherapy in 
May 2013 and is entitled “Craving Interpretation: A Case of Somatic 
Countertransference”. The paper argues that it is the unique details of each 
therapeutic relationship which are of interest when an analyst experiences a 
somatic countertransference reaction. It suggests that in order to make sense of 
the rich information that this unique response provides, the therapist must 
mentalize and make meaning of her particular somatic experience as this somatic 
reaction is in response to unspoken material in the room, and the form that it takes 
can be used very productively in the therapy if it is mentalized, analysed and 
interpreted by the therapist. 
The moment you start returning focus to the two bodies to the room, questions 
arise about the patient’s relation to the therapist’s body. 
CHAPTER 7: THE TWO BODIES IN THE ROOM 
The chapter begins with a brief introductory section. 
This paper included in the chapter was published by Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy in South Africa in June 2013 and was entitled “Re-embodying the 
Analyst”. The paper focuses on comments patients make about the body of the 
analyst in therapeutic exchanges, and which are characterised by a theoretically 
based asymmetry between analyst and patient. Having explored the nature of this 
asymmetry and its theoretical foundations in psychoanalysis, the question is posed 
as to whether considering some of the specific features of the form and timing of 
the references to the analyst’s body in light of this asymmetry, may help therapists 
to understand the dynamics of particular therapeutic dyads. The paper concludes 
 18 
 
with some thoughts on how comments of this kind can be made use of to illuminate 
aspects of the particular patient’s transference-countertransference and thus the 
dynamics of any particular therapy more widely, as well as how they affects levels 
and kinds of disclosure by the therapist. 
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION  
The contributions made by, and the relationship between, the four papers is 
clarified in this chapter which also synthesises the previous chapters and 
demonstrates how together they add to the body of knowledge in the field. It 
reflects on the research process and any noteworthy limitations. The implications 
of the research for theory and practice are considered, and limitations of the study 
as well as recommendations for further research are discussed. 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
This chapter is a personal reflection and offers some concluding thoughts. 
REFERENCE LIST 
A comprehensive list of all the references used in the study is included in this 
section. 
APPENDICES 
This section includes: 
i. The consent forms sent to subjects of the study 
ii. The ethical clearance certificate from the University of the Witwatersrand 
VOLUME II: PUBLISHED PAPERS1 
The three papers of this thesis which have already been published are included in 
their published form in this volume.  
                                                          
1
 During the time that the thesis was being examined, the final paper was published and the 
published version of the article is now included in the second volume. 
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CHAPTER 2: LOCATING THE RESEARCH IN THE 
LITERATURE 
This project is closely connected to, and informed by, literature which gives an 
account of the fundamental features of psychoanalytic psychopathology, 
particularly the early psychoanalytic concept of pathology that is expressed in, or is 
related to, the physical body. This chapter briefly reviews some of the earliest 
Freudian concepts of bodily psychopathology and then goes on to examine how 
various aspects of Freud’s work have been expanded and developed by different 
theorists. Since the project has both a theoretical and a clinical focus, literature that 
informs psychoanalytic practice related to questions of the body is also included. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
The way in which physical symptoms are conceived of and worked with in this 
project has its foundations in the very earliest psychoanalytic theorisations, and for 
that reason it is useful to rehearse some of those concepts here. 
A central tenet of the first of the four papers making up the body of the thesis is the 
intimate connection between the notion of psychosoma and the fundamentals of 
psychoanalytic thought. The first paper of the thesis, “A Sense of Bodily 
Symptoms”, outlines in detail the history of psychoanalysis which is relevant to this 
research, and the ideas explored in that paper then form the foundations of the rest 
of the project. The paper makes the point that the way in which Freud ‘minded the 
body’ in his pioneering work with hysterics marked the beginnings of 
psychoanalytic theory and practice. It was while working with hysterical patients 
who presented with physical complaints that did not seem to have an underlying 
biological origin, that Freud began to map the mechanisms involved in such 
psychopathology (Breuer & Freud, 1893; Freud, 1912d, 1917a; Swartz, 2000). The 
physical body of the patient has therefore always occupied a crucial place in 
psychoanalytic theory and practice.  
However, although hysteria may have been the initial understanding of how 
psychopathology might manifest physically, it is now a part of a wider 
conceptualisation of pathology in psychoanalysis which is based on one of the key 
foundational concepts of psychoanalysis: the unconscious. The notion of the 
unconscious was developed by Freud (1912b) during his experiences of the 
psychoanalytic treatment of patients in which he came to see that not all the 
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contents of the psyche are conscious, and that certain psychic material only 
becomes available to the conscious mind when resistances to that material are 
removed by means of psychoanalytic treatment. It was though his interactions with 
patients that he observed that the mind holds many ideas which are active yet at 
the same time are not known to the individual. He proposed that it was from these 
unknown, unconscious yet active ideas that symptoms arise.  
Freud (1917a) further theorised that patients who present with hysterical symptoms 
are in fact experiencing intrapsychic conflicts even though they might be presenting 
with bodily symptoms, and that these conflicts are the result of previous traumatic 
experiences during which their sense of self was threatened, and where they had 
consequently experienced unpleasant emotions such as shame or guilt. He 
suggested that the memories of these events and the associated emotions were so 
unbearable that the hysterical patient would attempt to manage their discomfort by 
means of a process of active forgetting or ‘repression’ which would push the event 
and its related feelings and thoughts into their unconscious.  
Freud (1926) understood repression as a psychological activity in which an 
individual endeavours to fend off thoughts or feeling which are connected to a 
biological instinct, and repel these into the unconscious. Repression is a form of 
defence which an individual may use in order to manage the situation that arises 
when there is a desire to satisfy an instinctual drive which takes the form of a wish 
(and which will be experienced as pleasurable) but which will at the same cause 
the individual intense unpleasure because of other (usually superego) psychic 
requirements. While repression is particularly manifest in hysteria, it is in fact a 
universal mental process and is what separates the unconscious domain from the 
rest of the psyche (Freud, 1926; Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006). 
In summary, the Freudian understanding of the connection between 
psychopathology and repression can be described in the following way: A patient 
will experience an internal conflict in which they desire or wish for an object or 
experience. This desire often develops following a trauma in which they become 
aware that their wish is in fact not acceptable to themself. Freud did not use the 
word  ’trauma’ here in the usual way to mean an actual bodily or physical event, 
but rather as the experience of unacceptable thoughts and feelings (Freud, 1917a). 
An internal conflict develops between the part of the individual’s psyche that 
desires that which is unacceptable and the part of the psyche which is appalled by 
the desire. In order to manage the conflict, the patient will repress the wish so that 
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the conscious part of their mind does not need to know about the desire (Freud, 
1926). However, repression is imperfect and never completely holds the desire at 
bay. As Freud (Freud, 1915b) explains, this is because the contents of the 
unconscious are indestructible and have a tendency to re-emerge into 
consciousness if the instinctual pressure increases (e.g. in puberty) or if events in 
the present re-awaken the repressed material. Symptoms form when the repressed 
material returns (Freud, 1915b) and when the individual attempts to strike a 
compromise between those unacceptable id-driven ideas which were repressed 
and those super-ego ideas that prompted the repression (Freud, 1896). The 
symptom is this compromise made manifest and is a way for the patient to satisfy 
their desire while at the same time allowing themselves to believe that they are not 
doing so. In order to achieve the compromise, the symptom will satisfy the 
underlying wish in a disguised form which enables the patient to not consciously 
‘know’ that they are in fact satisfying their unacceptable wish. This disguised, 
compromised version of the wish can never fully satisfy it and so the symptom is 
sustained as the patient repeats it over and over in order to achieve as much 
satisfaction as possible (Freud, 1915b). 
Fundamental to the Freudian concept of symptoms is the understanding that the 
form that a symptom takes has an important, unique and personal meaning to the 
patient. The manifestation of the symptoms and its link to the repressed wish or 
original trauma is a symbolic one, and psychoanalytic treatment emphasises 
interpreting how the symptom relates to the patient’s personal experience (Breuer 
& Freud, 1893). The original, repressed wish was originally formulated in language 
and was understandable to the patient consciously in language prior to the act of 
repression. It would not have been necessary to repress the wish unless the 
individual understood it on the level of the ego, and was ashamed of it via 
superego sanctions (Freud, 1915b). The unique symbolic meaning of a patient’s 
symptom needs to be unravelled during the psychoanalytic treatment (Freud, 
1893b). 
Freud developed the psychoanalytic method as the treatment for hysterical 
symptoms and his treatment practice closely followed his theoretical understanding 
of the symptoms and their genesis. This treatment occurred through language and 
aimed to reveal the meaning of the form that the symptom took. The patient was 
asked to free associate (Freud, 1900a, 1900b) and in that way say whatever came 
to their mind, and the analyst’s response took the form of interpretations which 
were intended to reverse and lift both the repression of the memories of the trauma 
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and the transformation of these and their related wishes into symptoms, and in that 
way bring these back into consciousness. In other words, the treatment aimed to 
make the meaning of the symptom mental. The free association of the patient 
reveals to the analyst what the symptom disguises, and the analyst then interprets 
that latent, disguised meaning back to the patient with the aim of identifying the 
repressed wish behind the symptom. The analyst’s task is thus to decipher how the 
symptoms disguised the wish from the patient while at the same time fulfilling the 
very same wish (Freud, 1893b, 1900a, 1900b, 1905).  
The psychoanalytic method therefore aims to aid the patient to develop an insight 
into the symptom and the meaning behind its form, which was once known and 
conscious but which has been repressed into the unconscious (Freud, 1905; Sirois, 
2012). Once the patient has developed this insight they are able to work through 
the symptom, and through that process, overcome the resistance to the idea or 
wish which was originally so unpalatable to them and which they had needed to 
repress. The working through of a symptom frees the patient from the need to 
partially satisfy the wish by repeating the symptom (Freud, 1914). 
The Freudian conceptualisations of the unconscious, repression, symptom 
formation and the meaning of symptoms are all very important themes which are 
referred to in this research. The connection between unconscious anxieties and 
physical symptoms also remains a central topic in the contemporary 
psychoanalytic understandings of bodily symptoms and underpins all the papers 
included in this thesis. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOSOMA 
Having reviewed some fundamental psychoanalytic psychopathology concepts and 
theories more generally, attention will now be turned to bodily symptoms in 
particular.  
Current psychoanalytic thought continues to have a sustained interest in, and 
preoccupation with, questions around the body. This reflects the origins of 
psychoanalysis which was built on Freud’s drive theory and work on hysteria.  
Recent work in psychoanalysis concerned with the body includes, in particular, the 
field of neuropsychoanalysis which addresses the biological bases of mental life. It 
is a discipline interested in psychopathology and how that relates the functioning of 
the brain (see for example Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000).  
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There have also been advances in other areas of psychoanalysis which pay 
attention, in one form or another, to the physical body. These include concerns with 
sexuality and gender (Dimen, 2011a, 2011b), race (Dalal, 2006; Harris, 2011; 
Swartz, 2012) and questions of affect regulation (Schore, 2011, 2013). Further 
areas of psychoanalytic research which include a focus on the body are the work 
done on dissociation (Bromberg, 1996, 2001, 2003a, 2003b), the impact of trauma 
(see for example Benjamin, 2011, 2013) and the relational and intersubjective 
engagement with the physical body in psychoanalytic treatment (Aron, 1996, 
1998). 
However, as the focus of this study is on psychosoma in particular, an area which 
has not received as much attention of late, and the physical body that is of interest 
in this study is specifically the symptomatic body, literature which discusses the 
body more generally has not been included. There are points in the study where 
some of these ideas are included where appropriate, such as dissociation in the 
third paper and relational ideas in the final paper, but they are not covered in any 
great detail.  
Of particular interest in this project is the manner in which the early understandings 
of physical symptoms with a psychological origin have been developed and how 
these theoretical advances implicate the treatment of these symptoms by means of 
the ‘talking cure’ and the interpretive nature of psychoanalytic practice. 
THE FREUDIAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF PSYCHOSOMA 
While Freud described various forms of hysteria, each having symptoms that 
manifest in different ways, he proposed that patients suffering from conversion 
hysterias in particular satisfied their unpalatable desires and wishes in indirect and 
disguised ways in the form of physical symptoms rather than psychological ones 
(Freud, 1893b). In other words, patients with hysterical conversions were suffering 
from an illness of the mind, but were presenting with symptoms of illness in their 
body. This early work in psychoanalysis therefore emphasised a strong link 
between the mind and the body. The concept of the link between body and mind 
has been very important for the ideas presented in this thesis, and is also an idea 
which was expanded on by later theorists working with the concept of mentalization 
– another key notion in this project which is discussed below. 
Freud understood hysterical conversions in economic terms, and described how 
conversion symptoms develop when the libido is detached from an idea during 
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repression, and how this libidinal energy is consequently transformed into a 
somatic symptom (Freud, 1894b, 1909; Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006). The physical 
conversion symptom that develops during this process is the compromise 
formation which patients use to satisfy their unacceptable desires, while at the 
same time allowing themselves to believe that they were in fact not doing so 
(Freud, 1912d, 1917a).  
As with all hysterical symptoms, the physical symptoms of a conversion hysteria 
have a particular meaning in that the symptom is an indirect and figurative 
representation of an unconscious idea, conflict or wish (Freud, 1893b, 1909, 1926; 
Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006). The implication of the physical symptom having an 
individual meaning is that the manner in which the symptom manifests (e.g. pain or 
anaesthesia) as well as the bodily location in which it presents, is not arbitrary but 
has a unique and specific meaning to the patient and their underlying conflict, and 
which is linked to the nature of the traumatic event and the associated repressed 
memories at the origin of the pathology.  
The psychic meaning of the physical symptoms of hysterical conversions is related 
to the way in which the body is often mapped in the mode of language according to 
its external or functional form, and in that way the body can be understood to be 
‘signing’ the mind (Breuer & Freud, 1893). The symbolic mapping of the mind onto 
the body is what allows for the symptoms to take a disguised form, but despite 
being hidden, the connection between the physical symptom and the traumatic 
experience will remain a close and symbolic one. Comprehending the concealed 
meaning behind the form in which the symptom manifests holds the key to 
unravelling the unconscious conflict behind the symptom (Freud, 1893b). 
Freud differentiated between the physical presentations of patients with hysterical 
conversions from those with other psychosomatic symptoms. He identified an 
alternative set of symptoms which he defined as ‘actual’ neuroses and which he 
proposed included the intense physical symptoms that accompany or conceal fear 
such as paralysing attacks of anxiety. He hypothesised that actual neuroses are a 
direct outcome of absent or inadequate sexual satisfaction (Freud, 1894a) and he 
distinguished these from psychoneuroses in which the physical symptoms are 
symbolic, have meaning in their form and have their source in an original trauma. It 
was his view that the aetiology of the actual neurosis is somatic rather than 
psychical and that for this reason these symptoms of actual neuroses do not have 
a meaning that can be elucidated by means of psychoanalysis and the task of 
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interpretation that is central to it (Freud, 1905; Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006; Sirois, 
2012). Since the physical sensations of the actual neuroses do not originate in the 
mind, the form that the symptom of an actual neurosis takes has no symbolic 
meaning (Freud, 1894a) and therefore interpretations about the symptom’s form 
(which was fundamental to psychoanalytic practice) would not be therapeutically 
helpful. Freud concluded therefore that the physical symptoms of actual neuroses 
are beyond the scope of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1894a, 1912d).   
This question which was first posed by Freud in his work with actual neuroses 
about which somatic ailments were and were not treatable by means of the 
psychoanalytic talking cure was picked up by theorists who followed Freud, and 
who worked in the area of ‘psychosomatic illness’.  
PSYCHOSOMA AFTER FREUD 
As described in the previous section, during the earliest moments of 
psychoanalysis the understanding of psychopathology was fundamentally 
constituted at a bodily level. Freud’s work with conversion had initially established 
an understanding of psychosoma that is predicated on the principle of the physical 
symptoms being the disguised expression of unfulfilled psychological wishes. 
Theorists working in the field of psychosoma after Freud expanded on this idea 
and proposed new understandings of psychosoma by focusing on different aspects 
of Freud’s work and by following various theoretical trajectories. The first paper 
“The Sense of Bodily Symptoms” tracks the development of the concept of 
psychosoma in psychoanalysis in detail but a few important points are highlighted 
here. 
Freud’s work on conversion was expanded by theorists such as Rangel (1959), 
Engel (1968), Sperling (1973) and Fox (1959) who posed questions that Freud had 
not considered, such as what level of psychological development patients 
manifesting with conversion symptoms had achieved and whether or not internal 
organs could also be objects of conversion. These thinkers understood both 
conversions and actual neuroses differently from Freud and began to question his 
hypotheses about the close relationship between the form of the symptom and its 
specific unconscious, personal meaning. Their extension of Freud’s ideas paved 
the way for the development of the theory and practice of another form of 
psychologically related physical symptom: psychosomatic illness. 
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Work concentrating specifically on psychosomatic illness was begun by theorists 
such as Sándor Ferenczi (1928), Felix Deutsch (1939), Georg Groddeck (1977), 
and Helen Flanders Dunbar (1938, 1943), and the development of this work is 
discussed in more detail in the paper in Chapter Five: “Psychosomatics Today”. 
The particular elements of the theory of psychosomatic illness that are of particular 
interest to this research are the mechanisms at work that determine which type of 
physical symptoms an individual will present with, as well as the idea that in 
patients suffering from psychosomatic illness the functioning of the mind is 
bypassed and the illness is thus played out in the body instead.  
This research explores two specific schools of thought about the origin, genesis 
and treatment of psychosomatic illness. The first of these is the well-established 
Paris School of Psychosomatics, and the second is an emerging school which is 
identified, named and argued for in the paper in Chapter Five: “Psychosomatics 
Today” and is named the ‘Attachment approach’ in this project. Both of these 
paradigms have foundations in, and are compatible with, Freudian understandings 
of metapsychology and psychopathology. 
The theorisation of psychosomatic illness represented by the Paris School is based 
upon a biological understanding of the nature of the relationship between the body 
and mind. This approach appears to be an extension of Freud’s concept of the 
actual neuroses since it is theorised that the form in which the physical symptoms 
manifest in a psychosomatic illness has no unique and specific meaning and does 
not need to be interpreted in treatment (Aisenstein, 2006; Aisenstein & Smadja, 
2010).  
I would make the argument that the French understanding of psychosomatic illness 
is still, however, fundamentally in accordance with Freudian metapsychological 
principles. This approach maintains the basic Freudian economic understandings 
in that it is concerned with the preservation and discharge of libidinal energy. 
However, the Paris School of Psychosomatics does not pay attention to the 
dynamic or topographical elements which are present in Freud’s explication of 
hysteria i.e. it does not focus on different parts of the psyche setting up conflicting 
demands which need to then be managed by the ego by means of repression.  
In contrast, the Attachment approach, which generally accepts the notion that there 
is a specific meaning behind the form in which the physical symptoms manifest, is 
closer to Freud’s understanding of conversion hysteria than it is to that of the actual 
neuroses. It could be argued therefore that this school retains the Freudian 
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topographical principles in so far as there is an interest in the relationship between 
the psychic agencies and an understanding of how the unconscious works in 
opposition to the ego at the bidding of the superego, even if these ideas are 
phrased in different terms by the writers who form part of this approach.  
Another useful theorisation of psychosomatic illness, but one which is not covered 
in detail in this project, comes from the more recent work on dissociation. With this 
work’s specific focus on how trauma impacts affect regulation, it appears to have 
some common understandings with the French School’s theoretical foundations 
concerning psychosoma and how an individual may hold the self and emotions in 
mind.  
Bromberg’s (1996) work on dissociation in particular, has proposed new ways of 
understanding hysteria and hysterical symptoms. Bromberg (1996) proposes that 
the human psyche is shaped by traumatic experiences, and that dissociation is a 
defence against these traumas, and in this is also a way to maintain personal 
continuity, coherence and integrity of the self. This view is based on the idea that 
one’s early experience of the self originates in relatively unlinked self-states, each 
of which is coherent in its own right, and that the experience of a unitary self is an 
acquired, developmentally adaptive illusion. Dissociation as a defence becomes 
pathological when it begins to limit and foreclose on an individual’s ability to hold 
and reflect on all the different states of mind that occur within a single experience. 
Bromberg (1996, 2001) concluded that although a hysteric may appear to be 
dramatising their feelings in what appears to be a performance or ‘act’, they are in 
fact telling the ‘whole’ truth of their dissociated reality.  
It is Bromberg’s (1996) view that when Freud wrote that pains might be determined 
either organically or by the memories of past psychic pains, that he was 
anticipating the work of later authors who suggest that, following trauma, a 
dissociative split occurs between the psyche and the soma which forces the body 
to store sensory experiences physically, and these are revealed as symptoms. In 
such a dissociation, the psyche is disconnected from the body in order to protect 
an individual’s illusion of a unitary and cohered selfhood from an event which is 
potentially so threatening that it cannot be processed cognitively. Thus, 
dissociation can result in a form of psychosomatic illness, where the relationship 
between body and mind is disturbed, and then suffering is enacted rather than 
thought, understood or cognised. 
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As in both the Attachment approach and the French School, those working in the 
field of dissociation see the task of therapy as helping the patient to mentalize their 
physically suffering (Bromberg, 1996) and thereby develop the capacity to 
symbolise previously and unconscious mental states in oneself as well as in 
others. 
Pierre Marty (1968), who was one of the founding members of the Paris School of 
Psychosomatics, coined the term ‘mentalization’ following his work with somatising 
patients during which he observed that these patients often show a lack of psychic 
representations and psychic processing, and presented as though their minds were 
empty. His theory of mentalization had its foundations in the Freudian principle that 
thought exists between the instinctual demands of the body and the actions taken 
to satisfy those bodily demands. Based on this Freudian foundation, Marty (1968) 
understood mentalization as a process of working mentally to interpret and 
respond to the body’s demands. It is now generally accepted that the problem of 
psychosoma is related to a failure of the mental apparatus to work over or bind 
somatic excitations, and the result is that phenomena that are unmentalized remain 
unconscious and are expressed by the language of the body rather than the 
language of the mind (Gottlieb, 2013). 
The term ‘mentalization’ is also used extensively in the area of attachment theory 
where it is conceived of as an interpersonal mental process in which an individual 
perceives and interprets their own and others’ behaviour (Fonagy, et al., 2004). 
Attachment theorists place particular emphasis on early infancy and the caregiver’s 
ability to foster in the child the capacity to endure and make sense of their affects 
and other internal states. Of particular importance here is the general 
understanding that mentalizing is dependent not only on resonance and imitation of 
the states of others, but also on the knowledge of one’s own body. Indeed, most 
theorists working in the field of mentalization emphasise that mentalization begins 
in the body at the point when an individual begins to engage with, and understand, 
their drives and affects (Allen, et al., 2008; Fonagy, et al., 2004; Fonagy & Target, 
2007). For an individual to be able to mentalize at a sophisticated level, they are 
required to recognise that not everyone shares the same desires, emotions, and 
thoughts that they do, and to be able to interpret and understand the similarities 
and differences between their own mental and bodily states and those of the other 
(Sletvold, 2012). 
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Despite the differences in the understandings of the origins of mentalization, the 
concept is now commonly used in contemporary psychoanalysis to denote the 
process of understanding and giving meaning to affects and experiences which 
were previously outside of the language of the mind. Mentalization is therefore the 
mind’s attempt to grapple with, organise, modify and bind all energies that it is 
confronted with (Gottlieb, 2013).  
Mentalization is one of the uniting concepts that runs through the four papers of 
this thesis and is explored thoroughly at various points. A model of levels of 
mentalization based on Freudian topographics is discussed in depth in the paper 
“The Sense of Bodily Symptoms”, and the second paper “Psychosomatic Today” 
then tracks the genesis of mentalization according to the two different schools of 
thought of psychosomatic illness described above. Both papers make the point that 
should the ability to mentalize be compromised, it is likely that higher order mental 
processes might also fail and psychosomatic processes may thus develop. Further, 
it is argued that the level of mentalization achieved by a patient will influence the 
form of the psychopathological symptom, and nature of the therapeutic task.  
Various definitions of the concept are discussed in the papers “A Sense of Bodily 
Symptoms” and “Psychosomatics Today”, but in this project the term is specifically 
understood as the process of verbalising and/or making meaning of somatic 
experiences in particular so that they might move from the body and enter into the 
realm of the mental. The process of mentalization therefore aids an individual to 
achieve control over intense affects, particularly those of a bodily origin. The idea 
has its roots in Freud’s concepts of binding, linking and other secondary processes 
where there is an emphasis on building connections between instinctual or bodily 
drives and mental processes (Freud, 1915c). In other words the act of 
mentalization moves that which begins in the body, or which manifests in bodily 
terms, back to the mind. This understanding of the concept of mentalization 
highlights the intimate connection between the diagnostic and clinical aspects of 
the treatment of physical symptoms in psychoanalytic practice. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICE 
A previous section highlighted how the theory of psychoanalytic psychopathology, 
and in particular symptom formation, is intimately connected with the 
psychoanalytic task as a whole i.e. the interpretation of that which is repressed 
based on the understanding that symptoms are manifestations of unconscious 
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material. Consequently the psychoanalytic method or ‘talking cure’ aims to make 
the unconscious conscious through the use of free association and interpretation.  
There are further aspects of psychoanalytic practice which are referred to, and 
made extensive use of, in this research project and which are therefore introduced 
here.  
The psychoanalytic method aims to make repressed, unconscious material mental, 
thereby bringing it into language and giving it meaning. In this thesis this is 
conceived of as the analyst facilitating the process of ‘mentalization’ based on the 
assumption that symptoms (especially physical ones) may be psychic objects 
which are not yet in the realm of the mental. In psychoanalysis, speech is used as 
both the bearer of messages and the tool which performs the therapeutic task. An 
interpretation which is mutative gives evidence to the analyst’s witnessing of the 
analysand as well as capturing the patient’s state of mind in words and giving it a 
functional meaning (Sirois, 2012). It is speech then, which enables symbolization 
and mentalization in psychoanalysis. 
In order to provide a setting in which effective interpretations can be made, the 
prerequisite for a successful psychoanalytic treatment is related to an adherence to 
the psychoanalytic frame and the attendant roles of analyst and analysand. The 
term ‘analytic frame’ refers to the place and time at which therapy occurs. This is 
consistent and unchanging with the sessions beginning and ending on time and for 
which the analysand pays an agreed upon, set fee. The purpose of the analytic 
frame is to create an environment which will encourage the development of the 
transference (Freud, 1917a). 
The requirement of the patient within the analytic setting is that they submit to the 
‘fundamental rule’ (Freud, 1910b) of psychoanalysis and reveal the contents of 
their free associations spontaneously. This method was designed to reveal 
unconscious aspects of the patient’s psyche which are then interpreted by the 
analyst. 
The equivalent and counterbalancing requirement of the analyst is that she 
engages in the therapy from a position of analytic neutrality which means that she 
should be neutral in terms of religious, ethical and social values and must not direct 
the treatment according to any of her own ideals. It was Freud’s (1913) view that 
the establishment of a successful transference was dependent on this analytic 
neutrality and, further, that the most important aspect which the analyst must be 
 31 
 
neutral is in regards to the form that the transference takes (Aragno, 2008; 
Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006; Renik, 2007). Analytic neutrality is an important 
concept in the paper presented in Chapter Seven: “Re-Embodying the Analyst”.  
Closely associated with the idea of analytic neutrality is the psychoanalytic concept 
of ‘evenly suspended attention’ (Freud, 1900a, 1900b). This is the manner in which 
the analyst should listen to the analysand’s material and requires that the analyst 
should not pay particular attention to specific parts of the patient’s discourse, or 
read particular meanings into it. She should, instead, allow her own unconscious to 
operate freely and suspend the motives which would usually direct her attention. 
This way of listening to the patient is the complement of the rule of free 
association. Freud suggested that making use of this way of listening allows the 
analyst to discover unconscious connections in the patient’s material, and his goal 
in suggesting its use appeared to be direct communication between the 
unconscious of the patient and the unconscious of the analyst (Bollas, 2001; 
Freud, 1923c; Laplanche & Pontalis, 2006). 
The concept of evenly suspended attention was expanded by Bion (1962) who 
suggested the idea of analytic ‘reverie’. This idea was then further elucidated by 
Ogden (1994b, 1997a, 1997b, 2004a), and in this more modern conceptualisation 
of reverie, emphasis is placed on a more active engagement with the contents of 
the analyst’s mind and, importantly for this thesis, also includes a focus on somatic 
responses. While the analyst’s reverie is broadly a part of the literature on 
technique, I am proposing that it is also an instrument of mentalization. In other 
words, reverie is the instrument and mentalization is the outcome. These ideas are 
explored in detail below, as well as in the in the paper in Chapter Six: “Craving 
Interpretation: A Case of Somatic Countertransference”.  
The notions of free association and evenly suspended attention are particularly 
important in this project as they underpin the interpretive work required to move 
somatic experiences into the domain of the mental and thus give them meaning. 
This is the beginning of the process of mentalization, which is a crucial integrating 
theme in this research and which makes it possible to apply psychoanalytic 
principles to somatic experiences and in this way hold the body in mind. 
Remembering that an important aim of this research project is to draw attention to 
the fact that there are two people (and thus two bodies) in the therapy room during 
a treatment, the thesis seeks to mind both of these bodies.  
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Contemporary object relations literature and its focus on countertransference has 
already done significant work in bringing awareness to the presence of the figure of 
the analyst in the room. Much of this literature prefigures what is now known as the 
intersubjective paradigm. Intersubjective ideas have always been implicit in 
psychoanalysis, but the term ‘intersubjectivity’ was introduced to the 
psychoanalytic lexicon by Jacques Lacan in 1953. It was, however, only introduced 
to American psychoanalysis in 1978 by Robert Stolorow (Schwartz, 2012). The 
roots of explicit intersubjective thought can be found in the expansion of the 
understanding and use of countertransference by Kleinian theorists. Research on 
the development of infants and the observation that communication between 
mothers and infants is bi-directional also focused on and expanded ideas about the 
important effects of interpersonal interaction. This work has been assisted and 
facilitated by work done by attachment theorists such as Fonagy on the process of 
mentalization (Schwartz, 2012).  
The emphasis of this research is on the therapeutic dyad but not the intersubjective 
exchange as it is in the established intersubjective paradigm. In this study the term 
‘intersubjectivity’ is used in the descriptive or interpersonal sense rather than to 
mean the method of practice or school of thought it has come to denote in which 
the patient is no longer the only object of observation, and instead the co-created 
occurrences in the here-and-now become the focus of the therapeutic exchange. 
This research’s focus remains on the more classical elements of the exchange and 
on the transference-countertransference dynamics.  
The position on the nature of the dyadic exchange taken in this research most 
closely resembles that of Christopher Bollas (2001) who suggests that Freud 
offered his clearest explication of the psychoanalytic method when he stated that 
psychoanalysis took place when the two functions of the analysand’s free 
associations and the psychoanalyst’s evenly suspended attentiveness were linked 
(1923c). Bollas terms this level of interaction the “Freudian Pair” (2001), and goes 
on to explain that the Freudian analyst’s presence is not without influence or 
contribution, but does afford an energy and influence which simultaneously actively 
assists the analysand to explore their mind and its internal objects while at the 
same time allowing them to do so freely. 
It is Bollas’s view that in the Freudian Pair the mutative aspects of the interpersonal 
interaction are located in the transference-countertransference dynamics and how 
these are both formed and transformed by the patient and the psychoanalyst in 
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turn. He emphasises not only the importance of what each member of the Freudian 
pair says, but also the manner in which it is said, and concludes that Freud’s vision 
was to create an environment which encouraged and interpreted unconscious 
communication (Bollas, 2001). The particular form of unconscious communication 
that is of interest in this thesis is somatic communication originating in either the 
body of the patient or the body of the therapist.  
Throughout the history and development of psychoanalysis there has been a 
tension around whether focus should be placed on the internal or the external, on 
the drive or the object, on the intrapsychic or on the therapeutic relationship 
(Schwartz, 2012). Writers such as Ogden (1994a) with his concept of the analytic 
third, have highlighted the importance of maintaining the patient’s psyche as an 
integral part of the work (Schwartz, 2012). Ogden conceived of the analytic third as 
being formed by the transference-countertransference relationship of an analysis. It 
is a space which is created by the unique combination of the two members of the 
therapeutic dyad. Importantly for this research, Ogden was of the opinion that it 
can only be accessed through the analyst’s reverie or physical sensations. In 
Reis’s (1999) paper about Ogden’s theoretical development, he links Ogden’s work 
with that of the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, as they both suggest that the individual 
begins in an interpersonal world and then develops an individual subjectivity. Both 
these theorists pay particular attention to the idea that this original subjectivity is 
seated in the body rather than the mind. These ideas highlight the importance of 
paying attention to the body and the information it holds, and are at the heart of this 
study. 
In order to make use of what bodily communications are revealed through the 
interpersonal interaction, Ogden expanded on Bion’s (1962) concept of reverie and 
explained that reverie occurs when the analyst becomes aware of the other (i.e. 
the patient). Ogden’s reverie takes the form of “a motley collection of psychological 
states that seem to reflect the analyst's narcissistic self-absorption, obsessional 
rumination, daydreaming, sexual fantasying, and so on” (Ogden, 1994b, p. 74). In 
his clinical work, Ogden (1994b) attends to what are at times barely perceptible 
experiences in both mind and body to access a level of functioning he calls “being-
in-sensation” (p. 174). In Ogden’s view, the analyst's reverie represents unthought 
and unfelt experiences of the patient which are sensation-based but which 
eventually take form in the space between the patient and the analyst, or what he 
called the ‘analytic third’ (Reis, 1999). This thesis locates itself clinically in the 
space of the analytic third and with those unthought experiences (especially those 
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of the body) and has the objective of exploring, interpreting and eventually 
revealing their meaning.  
In order to interpret those unthought experiences, Bollas (1987) suggests that the 
analyst should remain with her countertransference for extended periods before it 
can be properly processed and the unconscious communications within it made 
sense of. He is opposed to the analyst reporting their undigested experiences to 
the patient (Gerhardt & Sweetnam, 2001) which is in accordance with Ogden’s 
(1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2004a, 2004b) suggestion that analysts should first engage 
with and interpret their reverie before bringing any of the contents thereof into the 
therapy. In this study I argue that while attending to any intersubjective aspects 
which might arise is fundamental, these do also raise the key issue of the extent to 
which the therapist’s understanding of the multiple dimensions of the practice of 
psychoanalysis require that these understandings should be shared by the analyst 
with the patient and in that way made explicit.  
This issue of the extent and nature of the patient’s involvement in the interpretive 
process has emerged since the beginning of psychoanalysis, since Freud first 
proposed that the best interpretation is enabled by the therapist but made by the 
patient (Freud, 1914). The ideas are linked to questions of how to interpret a 
countertransference response and what of it should be revealed to the patient, and 
are explored further in the paper entitled “Craving Interpretation: A Case of 
Somatic Countertransference”. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICE AND MINDING THE BODY 
It is argued here that fundamental to, and providing the coherence between, the 
two parts of the thesis as a whole (i.e. the first concerned with the body of the 
patient and the second concerned with the body of the analyst) are, at the most 
basic level, the contemporary contributions made by two particular bodies of 
literature: the literature on countertransference, and the literature on mentalization. 
Changes in the understanding of the notion of countertransference and an 
increased emphasis on the role of mentalization have had practical consequences 
for psychoanalytic practice, and particularly on the central topic of this research: 
minding the body. 
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COUNTERTRANSFERENCE: CONCEPTUAL CHANGES 
Gabbard (1995) proposed that a point of commonality and convergence between 
different paradigms in contemporary psychoanalytic thought has emerged through 
the understanding of the concept of countertransference. 
A quote by Ogden (1994b) clearly expresses the now widely accepted 
interconnectivity of the analyst and the analysand, an idea that underpins this 
study: 
“There is no such thing as an analysand apart from the relationship with the analyst, 
and no such thing as an analyst apart from the relationship with the analysand.” (p. 
63) 
Ogden’s quote emphasises how the pair are inextricably linked in every way. While 
the particular focus here is on the bodies of the two players in the psychoanalytic 
relationship, the important point for the work here is that the intrapsychic and 
interpersonal aspects are equally important in an analysis.  
Contemporary writings on countertransference bring the presence of analyst firmly 
into the room, and the analyst is no longer the tabula rasa of old. This 
demonstrates how the understanding and use of the term ‘countertransference’ 
has changed significantly since it was first introduced by Freud in 1910 to denote 
the  analyst’s transference to the patient’s transference, originating in the analyst’s 
own unconscious material, and therefore as an obstacle which analysts must work 
to overcome (Freud, 1910b). 
Following the work of theorists including Winnicott (1958), Little (1951), Racker 
(1957, 1968) and Heimann (1950) the countertransference is now seen as a tool 
which can be used to gain a better understanding of the patient (Epstein & Feiner, 
1979; Zachrisson, 2009).  
I propose that yet another shift can be seen in the concept of countertransference 
in that the more contemporary intersubjective view of countertransference does not 
look for the origin of a countertransference in either the therapist or the patient 
alone, but instead understands that it is the unique material that develops in that 
particular therapeutic dyad which results in the specific countertransference 
manifestation. Gabbard explains the intersubjective understanding of 
countertransference by suggesting that the patient draws the therapist into playing 
a role that reflects the patient’s internal world, but that the specific dimensions of 
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that role are coloured by the therapist’s own personality and life history (Gabbard, 
1995, 2001). 
Gabbard (1995) further describes the interplay between the analytic couple as the 
analyst being pulled into the patient’s world through a succession of enactments 
which serve to displace the analyst from the blank screen aimed for in traditional 
psychoanalysis. During these enactments the patient arouses particular responses 
in the analyst, while the analyst’s own psychic constitution determines how that 
countertransference response will eventually manifest. 
Ogden (1992) sees this interplay slightly differently by saying that the dialectic 
created by the patient and analyst entering into a relationship is one in which they 
are at the same time separate while also being ‘at one’ with each other. What 
these ideas have in common is that they emphasise that the results of a 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy are a product of the two individuals which constitute 
the analytic pair and the work that they do together in making sense of and 
mentalizing the unconscious material that arises. 
It can be argued that countertransference’s new status is a precondition for an 
enquiry into psychoanalytic practice and into psychosoma in particular. These 
changes and developments in the concept of countertransference are important for 
this study in two ways. The first of these is that they bring the analyst firmly into the 
room and pose questions about the relatively different roles of the participants of 
the dyad. This move opens the door for a focus on the physicality of the analyst 
which is the object of attention in the second half of the study. The second 
important point is that these new understandings implicate practice (Swartz, 2000) 
and these implications  are also explored in the second two papers – “Craving 
Interpretation: A Case of Somatic Countertransference” and “Re-Embodying the 
Analyst”.  
MENTALIZATION IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICE 
An important way in which the mentalization literature plays an integrative and 
linking role here is that it unites psychopathology to the practice of psychotherapy 
and underscores that the therapist’s role is to assist the patient to mentalize when 
those things represented by the patient’s body are still unavailable to the patient’s 
mind. 
In practice, what it means to help a patient to mentalize is, amongst other things, to 
put them in a new relation to that which is of the body. To make something ‘mental’ 
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is to make something conscious, and to make something conscious is to make it 
meaningful. If the psychic material remains unmentalized it cannot be processed 
and made sense of and may therefore manifest in symptomatic ways (Gottlieb, 
2013). There is an element of the body-to-mind relationship which is fundamental 
to being human, and mentalization is thus a phenomenon which has a 
metapsychological status, an implication for pathology, and an implication for cure. 
This view is consistent with the founding principles of psychoanalysis which state 
that once something is brought into the realm of the mental and given meaning it 
can be processed and worked through, and in that way its pathological grip is 
loosened. An important question which is raised by this study is how an enquiry 
into the body in psychoanalysis raises debates about mentalization. The response 
is that mentalization allows individuals to verbalise and express those things which 
are not yet mental such as unconscious material, affects and bodily experience, 
and in doing so move the experiences from the arena of the unconscious to the 
sphere of the conscious, and should therefore be a goal of treatment (Swartz, 
2000).  As explained previously, in individuals with poorly mentalized structures it is 
likely that one might see a meaningless discharge of psychic energy in the form of 
senseless actions or into the somatic field rather than into thought. This idea is 
discussed further in the paper “Psychosomatics Today” which describes two 
specific understandings of psychosoma and how these are related to different 
conceptualisations of mentalization.  
This project aims to extend the clinical use of the concept of mentalization by 
proposing the idea that somatic phenomena as experienced by the analyst, and 
the role and presence of his or her body in the therapeutic endeavour, could also 
be understood in terms of mentalization, and to argue that the process of 
mentalization should also be applied by the analyst to him- or herself. The 
approach argued for in this study opens up the capacity for the analyst to think 
about, and through, their own body as seen by the patient. By applying an 
understanding of the original principles of psychosoma and relating these to the 
interpretation of somatic countertransference, an analyst may be able to develop a 
deeper understanding of the transference-countertransference dynamics of the 
dyad. This idea is then further developed when it is proposed that the analyst 
should think about their own body not only as an object of their own free-floating 
attention or reverie, but also as a potential object of meaning making and 
transferential sense-making in the eyes of the patient as suggested in the paper 
“Re-embodying the Analyst”.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research project makes use of qualitative research methods and is broadly 
located within the critical, interpretive tradition in combination with clinically based 
material.  
Qualitative research focuses on and interprets human and social experiences and 
processes, and is particularly interested in how meaning is made of these. This 
broad research approach usually investigates experiences and processes in their 
natural settings (as opposed to experimental ones), and this may mean that the 
researcher plays a role in shaping the research - a role that is acknowledged in 
research practice (Edwards, 2007). The kind of material that is obtained in 
qualitative research is gathered with the aim of understanding the subject matter in 
a complex, nuanced and rich manner and generally does not report on trends or 
statistics. Qualitative research data may hold multiple, and perhaps even 
contradictory, meanings and these are commonly seen to add to the depth and 
richness of the material rather than rendering it meaningless (Kelly, 1999; Mertens, 
2005). It is commonly acknowledged that there are problems with the 
generalisability of qualitative research in general, but it is equally important to state 
that generalisable results are not an aim of qualitative research (Darlington & Scott, 
2002), but instead there is an interest in what a particular phenomenon might 
reveal about both itself and something wider than itself. In response to the criticism 
that qualitative research methods lack objectivity and generalisability (Willig & 
Stainton-Rogers, 2008), the point is made that this particular qualitative research 
study aims to investigate specific cases in an in-depth manner rather than the 
general population, and to understand each particular and unique case through 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Three of the study’s four published papers were developed out of research 
methods which draw on aspects of the case study method and were based on 
material derived from psychoanalytic clinical practice. The specific clinical material 
included in the study was chosen as it served to illustrate the points being made 
about clinical practice. This is in accordance with the psychoanalytic tradition, 
which is distinct from other kinds of qualitative analyses seen in the social 
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sciences, such as narrative or discourse analysis. The fourth paper took the form 
of theoretical research in the psychoanalytic tradition. 
The clinical material that was used to ground and illustrate this research was 
selected in order to reinforce and provide evidence for the overall argument or 
point of view. A distinctive feature of practice-based clinical research relates to the 
fact that the data itself is not generated for research purposes, but is instead 
mined, investigated and selected in the interests of providing material which 
reflects on both theory and practice. This is in line with the longstanding 
psychoanalytic tradition (Greenwood & Loewenthal, 2005; Hinshelwood, 2010; 
Midgley, 2006).  
In the case of research that makes use of clinical material such as in this project, 
the ‘epistemological’ and the ethical are intimately connected, in that the pressing 
ethical demands of confidentiality and protecting of the patient may require that the 
data be presented in a way which may raise epistemological concerns. 
Psychoanalytic practice places the ethical treatment of clinical material at the 
centre of practice, and it therefore follows that research in the psychoanalytic 
tradition would do the same. The manner in which the clinical material was 
selected, interpreted, disguised and presented as well as the researcher reflecting 
on her own clinical practice and the extent to which the clinical material colleagues 
was made use of, all reflect an emphasis on ethics and confidentiality. This first 
section describes how these ethical questions were integrated with the research 
methods used. A section is included below, addressing further ethical concerns.  
As is customary in research of this kind, the project draws on a number of research 
instruments. Since most of the data was derived from psychoanalytic clinical 
practice and is in the form of clinical material from the treatment of particular 
patients, the methodology used here is what would be referred to by writers in the 
field of qualitative methods as clinical case study research.  
THE USE OF CLINICAL CASE MATERIAL 
Case study methodology is a specific form of qualitative research design that 
examines cases as they occur naturally (Edwards, 2007). Case studies are in-
depth, usually long-term, examinations of a single instance phenomena and are 
typically used for descriptive purposes (Whitley, 2002). Case study research 
generally makes use of relatively few cases, instances or subjects, but explores 
each of these in a very detailed manner (Yin, 1993), using qualitative methods to 
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analyse the data with the aim of maintaining the holistic and meaningful character 
of the real-life information (Mertens, 2005). This methodology does not aim to 
prove or disprove hypotheses, but the rich and in-depth data is rather used to test 
theories, or to make new discoveries (Bromley, 1986). In this research 
methodology, it is precisely the uniqueness of the data rather than its 
generalisibility that is of interest (Mertens, 2005). A researcher may choose to 
make use of the case study method when they are interested in studying a 
particular phenomenon in context, and based on the understanding that a well-
motivated choice of example may also reveal information about the class of 
phenomenon to which the example belongs (Bromley, 1986; George & Bennett, 
2005; Midgley, 2006; Yin, 1993).  
Research using case studies is considered an appropriate method of inquiry within 
the social sciences as it allows the researcher to understand rather than control the 
material, and is the research method best suited to investigating particularly 
complex social and psychological phenomena (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; 
Whitley, 2002). The use of case material was selected as a research method for 
this study as it is the method that reflects most closely how the material presented 
occurred in the therapeutic setting and in line with Yin’s (1993) assertion that this 
form of research is the method of choice when it is not possible to distinguish the 
phenomenon being studied from its context. The information gathered was 
interpreted within existing psychoanalytic theory and conclusions were drawn 
about how what was observed relates to that theory, with a focus on the material 
and theory related to the particular aims of the study. 
Clinical case studies in particular, have been used to explore particular therapeutic 
processes in any of a number of clinical settings outside of medicine, such as their 
wide use in the development of psychoanalytic theory and clinical psychology 
practice (Bromley, 1986). Although this research method has been criticised for not 
being sufficiently ‘scientific’, it is still the basic unit of applied psychological practice 
and is the best bridge of the gap between theory and practice in certain areas of 
clinical psychology especially, as it is in the therapeutic setting that these two 
mutually influencing aspects come together (Edwards, 2007). Each therapeutic 
dyad could in fact be thought of as representing an experiment where hypotheses 
are continually tested. Describing cases echoes the in-session process of 
hypothesis testing and allows for greater rigour and care in elaborating and 
exploring such clinical hypotheses.  
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Since the time of Freud who generated his psychoanalytic theories from what he 
observed during clinical practice (Greenwood & Loewenthal, 2005; Midgley, 2006), 
clinical case studies have been the main method of presenting, discussing and 
exploring psychoanalytic clinical material in particular. This research method 
contributed to Freud’s ground-breaking discoveries of the unconscious and the 
Oedipus complex (Bromley, 1986), and continues to be used widely by 
psychoanalysts. Psychoanalytic knowledge has evolved to a large extent through 
the development of a meta-theory predicated largely on the practice of examining 
case studies, as this method allows for both depth and specificity. Consequently 
psychoanalytic clinical case studies have historically been employed to cast light 
on diagnostic and psychopathological phenomena and to enrich both theory and 
technique (Bromley, 1986). 
A psychoanalytic clinical case study highlights the interaction between the clinical 
view (i.e. what happens in the room), and the theory of what people do, think and 
feel. The psychoanalytic account of a case must fit with the accepted theory and 
practice of psychoanalysis. Examining a single case can thus help a therapist to 
think through other cases, as well as to develop both clinical and conceptual 
understandings of specific psychoanalytic phenomena. These observations and 
thoughts can then be applied more widely in psychoanalytic clinical practice (Eells, 
2007). The case study method does not attempt to identify causal relationships, but 
is rather used to explore therapeutic practice using reflection and observation, 
identifying themes and patterns, and in this way develops theory and practice 
(Edwards, 2007).   Psychoanalytic case studies aim to understand the meaning of 
the described phenomena rather than determining their cause (Edelson, 1985). 
A psychoanalytic case study usually includes relevant patient history and may 
include some session material (Bromley, 1986). It pays specific attention to 
unconscious communication as well as to the role of the transference and 
countertransference, and through the examination of these elements, inferences 
are drawn about the dynamics of the case and therapeutic work. A psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist plays a significant role in the generation and analysis of 
therapeutic data, and therefore in psychoanalytic research it is important that this 
role is processed and understood appropriately. This type of self-reflexivity is part 
of the fabric of psychoanalysis, and a therapist’s countertransference is in fact a 
fundamental tool. This research study was extremely cognisant of the role played 
by the therapist, and this is borne out by the dedication of an entire chapter to the 
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subject (Chapter Six: The Therapist’s Physical Response to the Patient), as well as 
the focus throughout the project on the interactions of the therapeutic dyad. 
Since its inception, psychoanalysis has received criticism for not reaching the 
requirements identified by Popper (1959) of a scientific epistemology  and for 
therefore being unfalsifiable and unscientific. The practice of psychoanalytic data 
collection has also been criticised for being so tied to theory that it renders the data 
unable to prove or disprove theory (Miliora & Ulman, 1996). 
Traditionally psychoanalytic research has made use of the clinical case study 
method (Greenwood & Loewenthal, 2005). However, in response to criticisms of 
this kind, there is currently much debate in the psychoanalytic literature regarding 
the type of research method that is most suitable for the examination of 
psychoanalytic hypotheses. There are two main methods proposed as best suited 
to researching psychoanalytic concepts. The first of these is the traditional case 
study (as introduced by Freud) which focuses on meaning, interpretation, and 
narration of phenomena arising in the treatment room. The second is a standpoint 
more interested in ‘hard facts’ and statististical statements, and which makes use 
of experimental and quasi-experimental methods (Luyten, Blatt, & Corveleyn, 
2006). 
In recent years psychoanalytic theories and concepts have been increasingly 
tested using empirical studies. These have shown not only that the quasi-
experimental study of psychoanalytic hypotheses is possible, but that there is also 
solid evidence which supports many psychoanalytic assumptions (Luyten, et al., 
2006). However, it is often suggested that creative psychoanalytic thought arises 
primarily through the analyst-patient interaction in the traditional psychoanalytic 
session, and the case method of presenting these ideas continues to play an 
important role in theory-building (Luyten, et al., 2006). 
In addition to a debate about the most appropriate research methodology, the 
focus of psychoanalytic research and theory-building has also experienced a shift 
in focus over the years. Even though Freud (1912d, 1917a) stressed that 
symptoms are overdetermined, psychoanalysis initially followed a model which 
emphasised cause and effect in the development of symptoms (Chrzanowski, 
1987). It is often argues that contemporary psychoanalysis no longer follows such 
a model, but instead refocuses on the crucial role of the overdetermination of 
symptoms and underscores a complex interaction between the causations, motive 
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and meaning of symptoms, with a particular emphasis on meaning (Gabbard, 
2007). 
The empirical data used in this study have much in common with the 
psychoanalytic case study as outlined above, however it is important to point out 
that none of the published papers are based on a sustained case study in the 
traditional form, but are rather in the form of clinical case vignettes which are 
shorter versions of a clinical case studies.  
A clinical case vignette is a very brief case report which is used to illustrate the 
type of case being referred to, and describes just the kernel of the case (Bromley, 
1986). Clinical case vignettes do not usually include a detailed history of the 
subject, and neither do they include word-for-word case material or a sustained 
account of the unfolding of a treatment. This methodology was selected for this 
project for ethical reasons and in order to protect the patient’s confidentiality as 
less intimate, personal material is revealed in vignettes than in full case studies. 
The clinical material in the form of vignettes was used to explore and examine how 
the two bodies in the therapeutic room express, reinforce, and communicate the 
interactive dynamics at work in any particular psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It was 
intended to contribute to an understanding of these phenomena in such a way that 
a more general appreciation of this aspect of clinical presentation and 
communication in psychoanalytic psychotherapy could be developed. More 
specifically, the research was conducted on the assumption that learning 
something about how the body is used by a particular patient might lead to a 
deeper psychoanalytic understanding of how it is used more generally in 
psychopathology and in psychotherapy.  
THE USE OF THE CLINICAL MATERIAL OF COLLEAGUES  
Unlike traditional case material research, this research project takes the form of a 
combination of material based on the researcher’s own clinical practice as well as 
that of other clinicians. There were two reasons why this research required the 
interviewing of other clinicians. The first was to source more clinical data on the 
topics under discussion and to gain an understanding of how this material was 
being worked with and understood by other professionals and in that way checking 
and validating the ideas being put forward. The second reason was to create an 
extra layer of anonymity over the sensitive case material in order to protect the 
identity of patients even further and thus to maintain ethical standards. This 
technique provides another layer of separation between the researcher and the 
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patient in question. The identities of these patients were not revealed to the 
researcher by the treating clinician, and the use of ‘thick disguise’ (Gabbard, 2000) 
was also used. This was done in conjunction with the treating therapist to ensure 
that any disguise used did not distort the nature of the case.  
The data from the other clinicians was derived from something approximating a 
face-to-face ‘expert interview’ but more precisely resembling an interview-like 
discussion conducted with a single professional in a collegial structure. The 
primary emphasis here was to explore clinical material and practice-based data.   
THE USE OF EXPERT INTERVIEWS / DISCUSSIONS  
Interviews as a research method allow a researcher to collect data, explore that 
data with the interviewee and also to determine the acceptability of the research 
(Whitley, 2002) all at the same time. The advantages of using interviews to collect 
data is that the immediacy and relational quality of the process creates significant 
flexibility both in terms of areas explored and the theoretical direction that the data 
collection takes (Darlington & Scott, 2002). Interviewing experts also allows the 
researcher to check some of her hypotheses and conclusions and in that way 
validate the empirical data to some extent. The use of interview-based data 
collection allows the researcher to get a wide range and depth of material. It also 
allows for a relationship between the researcher and the participant to develop that 
supports data collection (Mertens, 2005). 
In this project, the other clinicians interviewed were five psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists in good standing and with many years of experience. They were 
all engaged in academic activities and work in private psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy practice. 
DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The data collection of the clinical material used in this study occurred in two steps: 
Firstly the particular cases to be examined were selected, and secondly the 
material from within each of those cases that was relevant for the study was 
decided upon.  
CASE SELECTION 
The case material selected for the research was from patients who presented for 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy treatment to the researcher’s or her colleagues’ 
private practices. The selection of cases was classically purposive (Fossey, 
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Harvey, McDermott, & Davidson, 2002) in that it  was chosen from a range of 
clinical work on the grounds of its relevance and appropriateness to the research 
topic and was illustrative of what the research was trying to argue.  Specifically, 
clinical material that paid particular attention to, reflected upon and appropriately 
provided greater insight into both the understanding of, and clinical practice 
associated with, symptomatology related to the body was drawn on. Cases were 
selected if they raised questions, were of interest to, or were related to, questions 
around bodily symptoms in clinical practice, be they those of the patient or the 
therapist, even if the material had not yet been completely interpreted and 
understood.  
The selection of the clinical case material was an area where ethics and 
epistemology were closely intertwined. Ethical issues were borne in mind 
throughout the process of choosing case material which was relevant to the 
research topic: Material was chosen from patients who were ethically eligible in 
terms of age and stage of therapy and only singular moments or very small parts of 
the treatment were used. 
All the participants in the study were over the age of eighteen years, and no 
patients who were currently in therapy with myself or my colleagues were 
approached to be in the study. This decision was made based on the knowledge 
that such a request may contaminate the therapy, which was something that I was 
determined to avoid. One patient who had terminated therapy but who remained in 
touch with me as she made the transition to life in another country was 
approached, and the project was explained to her. She perused and considered 
the information contained in the Information and Consent form (See Appendix 1), 
and then agreed to participate in the study. It is her case material that is discussed 
in the paper in Chapter Six: “Craving Interpretation: A Case of Somatic 
Countertransference”. 
Patients who were identified as being appropriate for the study but whose therapy 
had been terminated were not contacted as it is well known that this might be 
harmful and distressing, especially since they no longer have the space to process 
the feelings that such a request might provoke. (See the Ethical Considerations 
section below for further details). Case material was therefore only used from 
patients who had terminated therapy more than six years previously.  
When using the clinical material of the other five psychoanalytic psychotherapists, 
the aims of the study were outlined to them, and the clinicians were then asked if 
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any of their cases (which met the ethical criteria describe above) came to mind. If 
so, semi-structured interviews were used to collect data pertaining to research 
questions. Careful notes were taken during the interviews.  
Once the cases were sampled in the method just described, the material within 
each case was sampled so as to select the most relevant patient-therapist 
interactions. 
SELECTION OF CASE VIGNETTE DATA 
In the clinical case study research method, the researcher is the instrument for 
collection of the data (Mertens, 2005) and this remains true in this project. The 
clinical material used for the study was the recollections and clinical observations 
of the therapist and her colleagues, as well as the case notes that were kept during 
the therapy. These notes were made within twenty-four hours of each therapy 
session and were between one and two typed pages in length. These notes 
included information such as: 
• the verbal content of the session as verbatim as possible 
• observations that were made about the patient’s presentation, tone of voice, 
emotional state 
• observations about the patient’s physical behaviour in the session 
• any of the therapist’s relevant thoughts, reflections or fantasies 
• countertransferential responses (both physical and psychological). 
During the process of therapy, the therapist alternates between being thoroughly 
immersed in a session, and having a more distanced view while reflecting on the 
material and thinking their own thoughts. This process is added to when the 
session notes are written up, and the therapy session thought about and 
processed at a more abstracted level. 
Patient material of the researcher’s own cases was discussed in clinical 
supervision which allowed for a ‘third eye’ to help to evaluate the more difficult 
aspects of the countertransference. In the case of the vignettes of the researcher’s 
colleague’s patients, it was the discussion with both their own supervisors and the 
researcher herself which allowed for this evaluative process to occur. Notes that 
were generated by the researcher during supervision sessions incorporated the 
supervisors’ thoughts on how to formulate the case, her theoretical understanding 
of the case, as well as any transferential or countertransferential enactments that 
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she observed might be occurring and these were included as part of the ‘data’ for 
the research.  
There have been suggestions that the most accurate way to collect data is through 
audio or video recording, but the negative therapeutic effects of this are well 
documented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stajner-Popvic, 2001; Tuckett, 1993), and for 
this reason, no recording of therapy sessions was undertaken. While it could be 
argued that recordings would have produced more data than the therapist’s 
recollections, it is extremely likely that it would have contaminated the therapeutic 
process. Data collection was therefore restricted to case and process notes.  
From these notes, only specific moments were chosen to be included in the 
research. From the methodological point of view, these moments were selected as 
they were illustrative of a point under discussion or an argument being made, but 
this form of data selection also has an ethical dimension, in that small moments 
from an entire therapy do not reveal too much about the individual patient involved. 
This protects the patients’ identity and ensures that they will not be recognised by 
anyone who may know them. This technique will also further reduce any potential 
harm to the patient in the unlikely event of them reading the papers. In fact, due to 
the use of the method of ‘thick disguise’ (Gabbard, 2000) discussed below, it is 
likely that many of the patients may not even recognise themselves, especially 
where the focus of the research is on the therapist’s response to the patient, and 
this will mitigate against them feeling exposed.  
The clinical data extracted in this way became the object of the research process 
and was then analysed and interpreted. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
As stated above, the clinical material investigated in the study was analysed and 
interpreted within a psychoanalytic framework. This paradigm explores 
unconscious dynamics, anxieties and conflicts as they are demonstrated in the 
therapy room by observing what is manifested in the patient’s verbal material, 
behaviour, appearance and physical presentation as well as the therapist’s 
psychological and physical responses to the patient’s communications (Lemma, 
2003).  
In my primary role as therapist, I was initially and continuously analysing the data 
as it manifested in the therapy room using psychoanalytic principles. In a 
 48 
 
psychoanalytic treatment everything the patient does in their world is understood to 
have a (usually unconscious) meaning, so even while the data was being gathered, 
due to the very nature of the psychoanalytic technique, meaning was looked for in 
the patient’s affect and levels of arousal, verbal material that was included or 
excluded by the patient, the nature of the interaction between the therapist and 
patient, any observed shifts in countertransference or transference, the effect of 
psychoanalytic clinical interpretations on the patient and any relevant observable 
behaviours or physical presentations (Rustin, 2003). 
This case material was then analysed using a number of different theories which 
were relevant to the overarching aims of the study, including classical Freudian 
drive theory, the object relations theory of both the Kleinian and Independent 
schools, as well as more contemporary attachment theories. This is part of 
common practice due to the fact that psychoanalytically informed clinicians make 
use of an interpretive rather than purely descriptive approach as they attempt to 
understand material as it is revealed in the therapy room. 
While data analysis began as the material was generated, it continued at a second 
level following the therapeutic session when the information (including session 
material, the researcher’s reflections, countertransference responses, thoughts, 
feelings, observations and reverie that manifested during the session) were written 
up, organised and developed. I then reflected on ways in which bodily pathology 
manifested in the therapeutic encounters as it has been described in the literature, 
or as my own body entered the therapy (either implicitly by means of a somatic 
countertransference or explicitly via the patient’s comments). Other 
psychodynamics demonstrated by the patient were also recorded. This process of 
analysis was not rigid, but was rather systematic and comprehensive. What this 
demonstrates is that a reflective process is part of psychoanalytic therapy and is 
therefore a fundamental part of the analysis of psychoanalytic research data.  
 An essential part of clinical psychoanalytic practice is the clinician’s engagement 
with a clinical supervisor (Watkins, 2011). This knowledgeable and experienced 
practitioner will think through the dynamics of practice with the treating therapist. 
The supervisor assists the therapist to check their interpretations of the patients’ 
material during practice. This built-in check reflects on the process of interpretation 
in practice and assists to maintain the authenticity of the clinical material.  
During the period of research the clinical data was discussed with three clinical 
supervisors who were all experienced psychoanalysts, and this provided a further 
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level of analysis to the ones described above. This process is part of good clinical 
practice and aids the understanding and interpretation of the data while still 
maintaining its authenticity. Clinical supervisors do not, however, clarify the 
material epistemologically, because, as stated previously, the data generated from 
practice is not generated for the purposes of research. However, as the idea for 
this project began to develop, some of the clinical material jumped out as being 
research-worthy. As I became intrigued by some of the material – driven by an 
interest in the research topic – I began to establish links with psychoanalytic theory 
and previous data from earlier experiences with the patient or from other cases.   
Data was then selected for the research according to the process described in the 
previous section. The selected material was then read through, discussed and 
reflected upon for the nature of the research project. The patient’s history, session 
notes and supervision notes were read through a number of times, and notes were 
made of any associations or thoughts that arose. In some situations the 
contributing clinicians returned to their notes and completed this phase, and a 
second interview was then held. The focus at this point in the research was to 
move from reading the data as a whole to breaking it down into smaller and more 
meaningful units. The data analysis was inductive in that the research questions 
were used to guide the analysis, but additional themes were allowed to emerge as 
the data was reviewed and discussed. The material that arose was constantly 
analysed theoretically and notes were made about where it conformed with and 
intersected the existing literature. My research supervisor had an important part to 
play in ensuring that at this level of analysis attention was paid to upholding the 
veracity and legitimacy of the material.  
In addition to input from my research supervisor, this PhD programme also 
involved regular seminars with other PhD candidates (all experienced clinicians) 
and a faculty of five professors (all predominantly clinically informed practitioners) 
during which all research was reviewed, analysed and discussed.  
Yet another level of critique, analysis and review of the material occurred in the 
peer review process after the papers were submitted to the journals for 
consideration for publication. 
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EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH 
Qualitative research methods were appropriate for this study as they allowed for 
the investigation of the psychotherapeutic process in a way that was as close to 
the real setting as possible. These methods also make it possible for the complex, 
multifaceted and sometimes conflicting themes relating to aspects of clinical work 
to be depicted and explored in a detailed and thorough manner, and for these to 
then be elaborated in terms of psychoanalytic theory (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). 
It would not be true to the principles and tenets of qualitative research to try to 
evaluate it by means of positivist, scientific measures. Instead, qualitative research 
needs to be assessed by more appropriate methods which ensure that the results 
reflect a version of reality that is trustworthy, credible, coherent and reflexive 
(Midgley, 2004). It is generally accepted that the procedures used by a researcher 
should be transparent and accountable, and that readers should be able to track 
how theory is used, and illustrations are chosen, in order for arguments to be made 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989). 
This research project has attempted to maintain the credibility, validity, viability, 
appropriateness and authenticity of its data selection and interpretation processes 
in a number of ways.  
Firstly, Guba and Lincoln (1989) propose that the concept of credibility is in fact a 
measure of the plausibility of the research findings and data interpretations, and 
suggest that there are three steps involved in establishing credibility: 
i. The researcher must engage with each of the subjects (i.e. psychotherapy 
patients) for an adequate time. Almost all of the subjects included in the study 
were in treatment for over a year. Mr C described in the paper included in 
Chapter Seven: “Re-embodying the Analyst”, was a fairly new patient, but the 
behaviour described occurred consistently in more than eight sessions. The 
study therefore fulfilled the requirement that the researcher engages with each 
subject for an adequate time. 
ii. Each subject must be sufficiently observed. This involves prolonged 
consideration of each subject and their material. Since all of the subjects were 
in weekly (or in some cases, twice-weekly) therapy, it can be agreed that all 
subjects were observed regularly. 
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iii. Member checks refer to the process of checking with the patient that they feel 
adequately understood by the therapist and her interpretations and comments. 
This is in fact an integral part of psychoanalytic psychotherapy which consists 
of a constant interaction between the therapist and the patient. Psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy can be considered to be an on-going process of the therapist 
presenting hypotheses to the patient in order to check them, and then the 
patient and therapist working together to develop those ideas. ‘Triangulation’ is 
the process of verifying the data with different investigators who provide 
alternative viewpoints to be considered. In this study the researcher made use 
of a number of senior analysts and clinicians as clinical supervisors. All the 
other clinicians whose material was made use of, were similarly in clinical 
supervision. An added layer of this form of examination occurred when other 
clinicians’ material was discussed by the researcher and the treating clinician 
and all hypotheses debated and checked, and again with the professors who 
were the faculty of the PhD programme. A further significant way in which 
‘member checks’ occurred was in the peer review process during the 
consideration of the papers for publication. 
Criticisms which are levelled against the use of the qualitative case study method 
in particular include the claim that it makes use of argument by authority, it often 
presents an incomplete presentation of evidence, the narrative is designed to 
persuade the reader (who is also often excluded from the process of analysing the 
research data) (APA guidelines cited in Midgley, 2004) and finally that it makes use 
of anecdotes (Edwards, 2007). In other words, this research method is sometimes 
criticised for being vulnerable to what is called researcher bias (Whitley, 2002) with 
the claim that this contaminates the data and affects the objectivity of the study. 
This critique may be particularly relevant when case vignettes are used as the 
researcher chooses to reveal only parts of the material.  
This challenge is responded to here by the proposition that in using the clinical 
case material in a research project, the researcher’s subjectivity in fact becomes a 
valuable tool – just as it is in the therapy room. However, it is important that there is 
transparency and self-reflection about the researcher’s investment in the study 
(Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008). This point received significant attention, and in 
fact, one entire paper (“Craving Interpreting: A Case of Somatic 
Countertransference”) was dedicated to the subject of the therapist’s role in the 
process and outcome of a treatment. 
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The problem of researcher bias fundamental to qualitative research is probably 
more appropriately described in this study as a concern around the integrity and 
authenticity of the data used. Maintaining the strength and appropriateness of the 
data was in tension with some of the ethical concerns relevant to clinical material, 
and can be seen to have been checked by a number of procedures which were a 
part of the way in which the research data was selected and interpreted as well as 
the way in which the PhD programme functioned: 
1. The project grounded its arguments and methods in psychoanalysis, and this 
is in line with the suggestion that grounding the research in a specific 
theoretical framework can help to avoid researcher bias (Guba & Lincoln, 
1989).  
2. In order to protect the identity and confidentiality of the patient, use was not 
made of a sustained case history, and relatively little of the case’s clinical data 
was used. This meant that the clinical data is presented in the form of 
vignettes consisting of data that was selected for the extent to which it would 
provide credible and useful information for the discussion without revealing 
identifying facts about the patient.  
3. In order to maintain some sense of the authenticity of the data and the integrity 
of the interpretation, discussions were held between the researcher and her 
clinical supervisor. The cases were all clinically supervised, the research 
process was supervised, and all the research (i.e. the case studies and the 
thematic analysis) was subjected to a peer review during the publication 
process which also mitigated against the potential bias of the researcher.  
4. Since the integrity and authenticity of the data were so intimately connected 
with ethical considerations, a certain level of disguise of the data was required. 
Those patient details that were revealed were partially disguised in ways which 
were believed not to vitiate their authenticity. It is clear that the integrity of the 
data could potentially have been at risk because it required some level of 
disguise, but in this case the particular built-in checks related to the research 
being carefully supervised by a  clinical supervisor who would discuss the 
integrity of the material, discussion of some of the material with the group of 
clinicians that formed part of the PhD programme itself, as well as with 
individual members of that group who shared their own case material would 
have mitigated this risk by ensuring that the changes made did not have a 
material impact. Perhaps even more importantly though, the ingredients of the 
case that were changed were in fact of the kind that were in the interests of 
 53 
 
protecting personal identification (such as the age or profession of the patient) 
rather than the description of the psychodynamics of the case or the nature of 
the interaction that occurred in the examples (Kantrowitz, 2004). 
5. Once the papers were written, the contributing clinician read the paper and 
confirmed that the description of the case material was accurate and that any 
conclusions drawn were plausible and a fair reflection of the unfolding of the 
case. The examples provided by these clinicians were compared with the 
researcher’s own data to check that the theory was consistently applied. 
6. Yin (1989) has commented that the greatest concern about the use of case 
material in research is the lack of rigour applied. A good practice in order to 
reduce the effects of a lack of rigour and potential bias is to discuss the case 
material with a colleague. As already stated, the case material in this study 
was discussed with clinical supervisors, the colleagues who were interviewed 
for the study and the five professors on the faculty of the PhD and the 
requirement of rigour was therefore satisfied in this project. Guba and Lincoln 
(1989)  suggest that if a qualitative research study is deemed reliable and 
authentic by professional and competent peers who have appropriate 
knowledge of the subject, then it is considered to be ‘confirmable’. The use of 
a number of other qualified and experienced psychologists and 
psychoanalysts to triangulate the data in this study have served to confirm the 
results achieved and the conclusions drawn. Additionally, and similarly to the 
point made above, all the papers presented the in chapters went through a 
stringent peer review process before being accepted for publication. This 
would also have served to further confirm the results.  
These methods are appropriate and sufficient as quality control in qualitative 
clinical case studies. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Further to the ethical considerations and safeguards already discussed a few 
additional reflections are included here. 
Research participants have the right to privacy, and researchers must protect that 
right by keeping information provided confidential – especially when the information 
is personal and potentially embarrassing, as in the case of material discussed in 
therapy. Writing up psychotherapy case material almost by definition involves 
some degree of confidentiality breach (Whitley, 2002). There is therefore 
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somewhat of a philosophical impasse when a clinician publishes clinical material 
even if it is in the interest of education. On the one hand, as the patient’s treating 
clinician, it is incumbent on the therapist-researcher to protect the patient’s privacy 
and confidentiality.  On the other hand, sharing some of what occurred with that 
patient in the therapy room serves to illustrate concepts and add to existing 
knowledge (Stajner-Popvic, 2001) 
With respect to the clinical subjects (i.e. patients), confidentiality is a core ethic in 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy and is a requirement for ethical research. In order to 
minimise the effects of any such breach in confidentiality, permission (i.e. informed 
consent) to include their material in the study was requested from case study 
participants where appropriate. For consent to be regarded as informed, the 
subject must be given sufficient information about the study in a way that is 
deemed appropriate for that particular subject (HPCSA, 2008a). In this instance, 
the patient who formed the primary focus of the paper in Chapter Six: “Craving 
Interpretation: A Case of Somatic Countertransference” was approached and 
asked for her consent. It was eventually decided by the researcher that despite 
having permission to write about the patient, in order to protect her identity as 
much as possible, the aspect of the treatment focused on would be the therapist’s 
reaction to the patient, thereby revealing more about the researcher than the 
patient. 
Even when informed consent is received, the researcher still has further ethical 
duties. The participant may be surprised or hurt to hear about how the therapist 
experienced her, as the material may have been interpreted in a more digested 
way in the therapy room, or the dynamics may be emphasised in a different way in 
the writing up in order to make the theoretical point clearer (Gabbard, 2000). The 
impact on the patient of reading the work was held in mind and all papers were 
written as sensitively as possible. The patient who was discussed in most detail 
and from whom informed consent was sought was presented from the point of view 
of the researcher’s countertransference and reverie.  She may thus not even be 
clear that the paper is about her should she ever read the paper, which should 
minimise any potential impact.  
In all other cases, the treatment of the patients of the researcher included in the 
research had all been terminated at least six years previously. The HPCSA 
guidelines state “permission should be sought wherever possible”. The words 
‘wherever possible’ should not be seen as a loophole, but should only be relied 
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upon when there is no way to contact the patient or where contacting the patient 
may result in more harm than simply protecting their identity and confidentiality. 
With consultation with an experienced clinical supervisor, the researcher decided 
that contacting these patients suddenly and unexpectedly would be harmful to 
them. In these cases, all identifying details were changed by means of ‘thick 
disguise’ in order to maintain the highest degree of confidentiality, and only brief 
moments of the therapy (i.e. vignettes) which did not include information that 
revealed the patient’s identity were made use of. When thick disguise was used, 
the researcher took care not to change any identifying detail that would be material 
to the case, in order to ensure that the integrity of the data was not compromised 
(Gabbard, 2000).  
The material from patients who received therapy from other clinicians was treated 
in a similar manner: they were all patients who had terminated treatment a long 
time previously, their identities were not revealed to the researcher, and their 
details were changed appropriately so that they could not be identified. It is, in fact, 
likely that they would not even be able to identify themselves as they would not 
look for themselves in a patient described by the researcher. These processes are 
is in keeping with the ethical requirements of the University of the Witwatersrand, 
the HPCSA and the American Psychological Association, participants’ written 
permission will be stored in a safe place together with case records. Where such 
permission was requested it was ensured that the patient was receiving some form 
of therapy at the time so that if any difficulties arose from the request they would 
have immediate access to help. The patient’s emotional safety and the protection 
of the therapy are of the utmost importance. All use of case material also complied 
with the Professional Code of Ethics of the Professional Board for Psychology of 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA, 2008b) as well as with the 
ethics code of the South African Psychoanalytic Confederation (Silove, Schön, 
Berg, Green, & Levy, 2011). 
This research was consequently conducted within the guidelines of the Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC – non-medical) of the University of the 
Witwatersrand and was granted ethical clearance by the HREC. The clearance 
certificate is attached as Appendix II.  
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CHAPTER 4:  THE QUESTION OF PSYCHOSOMA 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, and the three which follow, are structured in two parts: in the 
short, preliminary section the reader is provided with a background against 
which the stand-alone manuscript that constitutes the remainder of the chapter 
can be read. In order to locate the paper in the broader thesis, the reader will 
also be informed about which of the research questions the paper intends to 
address.  
The manuscript that constitutes the remainder of this chapter was submitted to 
the accredited Journal “Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South Africa”, a bi-
annual publication (http://ppsajournal.co.za/). It was accepted for publication in 
2010 (Gubb, 2010).  The paper is re-printed here with the journal’s permission. 
The paper is also presented in its published format in the bound second volume 
of this thesis. 
The paper is entitled “A Sense of Bodily Symptoms” and introduces and 
illustrates one of the overarching themes of the thesis, namely that conflicts in 
the mind can manifest as symptoms in the body even though they have no 
medical or biological origin. Following the rationale and aims of this research 
which were outlined in Chapter One, the history and development of the role 
played by physical symptoms in psychoanalysis warrants both investigation 
and documenting. A logical place to start that endeavour would be to track how 
the understanding of physical symptoms with a mental origin has developed 
and changed, and what sorts of classifications these symptoms are now 
divided into. The paper contrasts the origins and genesis of two different types 
of psychosomatic symptoms (i.e. conversion and somatisation), and illustrates 
the similarities and differences in the pathologies by making use of three case 
vignettes. It also engages with another of the major themes of the thesis, being 
the meaning behind the form of a physical symptom. Finally, the paper also 
suggests that different types of somatic symptoms may reveal different levels of 
mentalization that have been achieved by the patient. In doing so it prepares 
for the idea that what the practice of psychoanalysis as a curative method 
includes, is the interpretation of repressed unconscious material, and asks how 
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the therapeutic task might differ depending on the type of physical symptom 
involved.   
This paper was intended to answer the first three of the identified research 
questions namely:  
• What are the different ways in which psychoanalytic theory has understood the 
patient’s symptomatic body? 
• Which psychological anxieties and conflicts can be seen to underpin the main 
theories of the symptomatic body of the patient in psychoanalysis?  
• How are failures of mentalization conceptually linked to physical symptoms in 
psychoanalysis? 
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PAPER 1: THE SENSE OF BODILY SYMPTOMS2 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the psychology of physical symptoms; how they present in the 
psychotherapy room and their underlying dynamics. From the beginning of 
psychoanalysis there has been an interest in those physical symptoms that do not 
seem to have a biological origin and, in particular, those physical illnesses that appear 
to be related to the patient’s psychopathology. In order to explore such symptoms and 
illnesses further, this paper reviews the concepts of conversion and somatisation. The 
two concepts are compared and contrasted with specific attention paid to their 
genesis, to the meaning in the particular form that the symptoms take and to the 
therapeutic task associated with treating patients who present with these two types of 
pathology. Illustrative case material is introduced and the paper concludes that the 
distinction between the two pathologies can be understood in terms of relative 
mentalizing capacity. This understanding, it is argued, is clinically useful as it helps 
the therapist to make sense of the presenting problem as well as any shifts and 
changes occurring in the presentation of the physical symptoms during the course of 
therapy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Psychoanalysis is often described as having its origins in Freud’s encounters with 
hysteria. This early association between hysteria and psychoanalytic thought and 
practice means that conversion symptoms underlie psychoanalytic interest in the 
symptomatic body and what it can tell the therapist about psychic life. In fact, 
Freud’s development of the discipline of psychoanalysis began by exploring bodily 
symptoms for which no organic cause could be found (Breuer & Freud, 1893). 
The object of enquiry in this paper is the symptomatic body and the focus includes 
all bodily symptoms that are associated with mental functioning. Historically in 
psychoanalytic theory, symptoms of these kinds have fallen into two broad 
categories: conversion and somatisation. However, there has been a lack of 
precision around the use and meaning of these concepts, and the terms 
‘conversion’ and ‘somatisation’ are on occasion used interchangeably, sometimes 
to refer to partially differentiated phenomena and, at other times, used to describe 
significantly different forms of pathology (Avila, 2007; Taylor, 2003). 
This paper will begin by tracing the development of the theory concerning, and the 
lack of precision around the theorisation and use of, the two concepts in the 
                                                          
2
 Copyright for this manuscript resides with the publisher: Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South 
Africa.  
Citation: Gubb, K. (2010). The sense of bodily symptoms. Psycho-Analytic  Psychotherapy in South 
Africa. 18(2), 32-56. 
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psychoanalytic literature. A particular focus will be on the meaning or personal 
psychic significance of the form that the symptoms take at the point of interface 
between the psyche and the soma. The paper will address the implicit and explicit 
similarities and differences of the two forms of bodily symptoms in order to make 
suggestions about implications for clinical practice. Particular attention will be paid 
to the cause of such symptoms, how severe or intractable the psychopathology is, 
and what the implications are for analytic treatment. 
Further to this, the paper will suggest that the patient’s attainment of differing levels 
of what is now called mentalization impacts on the forms of symptomatology and 
explains the differences between these forms. Recognising that there are 
distinctions is clinically useful in that the presentation and the underlying dynamics 
of a symptom may change during the course of therapy and thus the therapeutic 
task and interaction with the patient need to be adapted accordingly. 
Clinical material will be used to illustrate how these two pathologies might present 
in the therapy room, and to support the claim that by understanding the level of 
mentalization at work in the symptom, the therapist is better able to respond 
therapeutically to the shifts and vicissitudes of bodily symptoms and their 
meanings. 
FREUDIAN BEGINNINGS: THE QUESTION OF CONVERSION 
In his work Studies on Hysteria, published with Breuer (1893) and in later works 
such as Types of Onset of Neurosis (1912d) and The Sense of Symptoms (1917a), 
Freud explored the mechanisms underlying the pathology in patients who 
presented with physical illnesses that did not seem to have an identifiable 
biological cause. 
Freud suggested that although these patients were presenting with an illness in the 
body, they were in fact experiencing intrapsychic conflicts, or in other words, an 
illness in the mind (Breuer & Freud, 1893). A cornerstone of Freud’s early 
conceptualisation of conversion is the idea that a patient presenting with a 
particular range of symptoms did so as the result of the experience of a psychic 
trauma which threatened their sense of self (rather than their body) in substantial 
ways. Such events were experienced as traumatic because they involved some 
form of humiliation, shame or moral conflict. This conflict was initially managed by 
the patient by means of a process of ‘active forgetting’, or repression, where the 
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thoughts and anxieties related to the conflict were expelled from the mind at the 
behest of the superego. 
In accordance with what became a fundamental feature of psychoanalytic 
psychopathology, Freud came to view the physical symptom that resulted from the 
psychic trauma as a substitute or indirect way of expressing and satisfying some of 
the libidinal and vengeful wishes associated with the traumatic experience (Freud, 
1917a). On this basis, the conversions closely associated with hysteria came to be 
seen as representations of psychic pain and conflict in bodily terms. 
Freud’s early work on conversion was based on three important tenets. The first of 
these related to the fact that the form the trauma took stood in a particular relation 
to the form of the symptom. The second was that the development of symptoms 
represented a way in which traumatic events could be both simultaneously 
forgotten and remembered because the origins of symptoms are disguised (Freud, 
1917a). Finally, and because of their capacity to function in disguised forms, 
conversions were understood by Freud to satisfy two conflicting wishes 
simultaneously. It is this function of conversion symptoms (as is true of other 
symptoms) that led to them being described as compromise formations. While the 
second and third tenets of classical Freudian theory on conversions came to be 
characteristic of psychoanalytic psychopathology more broadly, it is the first point 
that is of particular interest to the field of psychosomatics. 
It is the nature of the relationship between the psychical form of the trauma and the 
physical form that the symptom takes that distinguishes Freud’s explanation and 
understanding of a conversion from later commentaries. Freud and Breuer reveal 
in Studies in Hysteria (1893) the extent to which conversion requires individually 
specific interpretation precisely because the form of the physical symptom cannot 
be explained in medical (i.e. physiological or anatomical) terms. Rather, the form of 
the symptom must be understood via a process of retrieval of the patient’s 
particular repressed memories of the traumatic events. 
Thus, throughout Freud’s writing, his work maintains a strong sense of the 
fundamental premise that symptoms have meaning. This emphasis on the 
meaning of psychic symptoms is especially vivid in the case of conversion, where 
the body is often mapped in the mode of language according to its external or 
functional form. In conversions, the connection between the body and the traumatic 
experience is always a close and symbolic one. Anna O’s phobia is a hydrophobia 
because water is linked to the traumatic experience of seeing her nurse allow her 
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dog to drink from her glass (Freud, 1893b). Elisabeth von R experienced severe 
pains in her legs for which no organic cause could be determined. Through her 
psychoanalytic treatment she associated these to the place she had rested her 
father’s leg while redoing his bandages when he was very ill. She came to see that 
the pains had started after she had left her father’s bedside to go on a date and her 
father had taken a turn for the worse in her absence. The guilt she felt over that 
made her determined not to leave his bedside again and the pains facilitated her 
remaining at home. The pains were also revealed to have other layers of meaning, 
such as her fear that she would never find a partner and would always ‘stand 
alone’, and further guilt at having taken a walk with her brother-in-law to whom she 
was very attracted (Freud, 1893a). In these cases the symptom was a re-
enactment of the original trauma and treatment emphasis was placed on 
interpreting how the symptom related to the patient’s personal experience. 
In the case of hysterical conversion, then, the work is to interpret the patient’s 
symptoms in order to reveal the repressed traumatic memory that is manifested in 
disguised form by the symptom. The aim of the intervention is to return the memory 
to the ego and thereby to lift the repression. This is done by following and creating 
the links that are revealed during the patient’s free associations. Bringing the 
meaning of the symptom to consciousness in this way lifts the repression and 
allows the patient to remember the traumatic memory. This allows patients to 
choose new ways of behaving as they are no longer compelled to keep responding 
in the same unconscious manner. The conversion symptom disappears after the 
repressed memory is retrieved and discussed in therapy (Freud, 1905), and this is 
significantly different to what is seen in the treatment of physical illnesses. Stated 
differently, the aim of the ‘talking cure’ is to reunite the affect and the idea of the 
trauma and to interpret that which already has meaning and which the body of the 
converter has already ‘spoken’ about (Taylor, 2003). 
The following case synopsis of a patient, who I will refer to as Ms A, demonstrates 
the particular and specific nature of the form that a conversion might take, and also 
illustrates the therapeutic task when treating a symptom of conversion. 
Ms A was an orthodox woman who had divorced her husband due to his 
continuous infidelity. She had needed to start working full time following her divorce 
in order to take care of her four children. Ms A developed a symptom of profuse 
foot sweating. This caused her great distress and embarrassment. She took all 
kinds of powders and sprays with her to work for fear that her feet might smell and 
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that others would notice. She also frequently washed her feet in the basins at work. 
She wore open-toed, often inappropriate sandals to work even when it was cold, in 
the hope that this would minimise the sweating. In therapy, I asked her about the 
way in which the symptom manifested, including the times and places that it 
seemed worse. In thinking about the symptom in this way, she realised that the 
sweating of her feet started at two o’clock every afternoon. She associated this to 
the time her children finished school and began to walk home. She eventually 
understood her symptom result from her hatred towards her ex-husband, whose 
behaviour had caused her to get divorced (which was against her religion) and 
forced her to start working. Holding down a job meant she was no longer able to 
fetch her children from school and walk them home. Her symptom represented her 
desire to ‘walk out’ of work and walk with her children. Furthermore, although she 
knew that she could not leave work, her getting up to wash and powder her feet 
allowed her to leave her desk. Her symptom provided her with a vehicle through 
which she would act out her wish to leave her work and be with her children as 
they walked home. The symptom also served to placate her superego, which left 
her feeling like she was a bad and absent mother, as it gave her a way to ‘leave’ 
her work with the constant trips to the bathroom, and yet still fulfil the financial 
obligations she now had, by not going home. When the idiosyncratic meaning of 
the form of the symptom was analysed and understood by the patient, the 
symptom quickly resolved, as would be predicted by a Freudian formulation. 
The therapy with Ms A was successful in a relatively short period. I would argue 
that this can be attributed to the clearly symbolic form of her symptom. In terms of 
Ms A, this suggests an already well-established capacity to symbolise and 
mentalize. I am going to develop the idea that such a capacity is central to the 
dynamics underlying the development of a conversion. As a result of an 
interpretation strongly driven by the patient, it became apparent that the symptom 
was related to the many symbolic associations to walking: her husband walking out 
on her, her desire to walk out of her job, and her wish to walk with her children in 
their walk home from school. There is an implicit question in this: Why did Ms A 
develop the symptom in the first place when her previous level of functioning, her 
capacity for mentalization and her ability to read bodily symptoms in psychological 
terms suggest more resilience? I would postulate that the context of Ms A’s divorce 
and its negative impact on her religious standing and financial situation, together 
with the resulting threat to her self representation overwhelmed her ego resources. 
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This led to a regression to conversion symptoms and an earlier developmental 
organisation. 
This case provides evidence that it is still useful to employ Freudian ideas of the 
mechanisms involved in conversions, namely that there is symbolic meaning in the 
form that the symptoms takes, that repression plays a role and that there is value 
in interpreting the symptom’s form and the conflict it hides. Implicit in all of this is 
that a conversion reveals the patient’s ability to symbolize and to produce a 
symbolic re-enactment of the trauma. By following the links and association made 
by Ms A, the symbolism behind her symptom was revealed, the associated 
emotions expressed and the symptom resolved. 
CONVERSION AFTER FREUD 
Freud’s examples of conversion suggest he understood that conversion symptoms 
occurred mainly in bodily sites innervated by the voluntary motor nervous system 
(Freud, 1905). Authors such as Rangell (1959) and Engel (1968), who 
reinterpreted the notion of conversion, broadened this definition when they 
proposed that parts of the body innervated by the autonomic nervous system (i.e. 
the visceral organs) and a number of conditions not previously considered in the 
concept of conversion, should also be included in the category. Engel (1968) 
stated that organs involved in a conversion are unconsciously targeted on the 
basis of the potential for these organs to link with mental representation through 
innervation, perception and fantasy. Thus, any bodily experience perceived by an 
individual leaves behind memory traces which have the potential of becoming 
associated with other types of mental content and thereafter being used in a 
psychopathological way. He therefore proposed that perceptions of bodily 
processes which are not under voluntary control can also come to represent 
repressed wishes. 
Implicit in the Freudian view is the idea that a conversion is a regression from a 
previously achieved Oedipal level of development (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010). 
This assumption results from linking the idea that the superego is an integral part 
of the conversion mechanism, with an understanding of the superego as heir to the 
successful resolution of the Oedipus complex. Engel (1968) challenged this 
Freudian view by stating that conversion mechanisms can occur at pre-genital 
levels. 
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Sperling (1973) theorised that the ego and superego structure of a patient with a 
conversion hysteria will not allow forbidden aggressive and sexual impulses to be 
gratified in reality, so when the repression of these impulses is about to fail, the 
impulses and actions are acted out physically as conversion symptoms. In his 
view, patients who develop conversion symptoms are defending against Oedipal 
level fantasies and wishes by regressing to a pre-genital level. Fox (1959) 
suggested that the process is used most especially in times of regression when 
other defences are ineffective. 
Work on the subject of conversion after Freud foregrounded questions such as the 
depth of pathology that conversion represents and the sexual developmental level 
associated with it. Freud neither raised nor addressed such issues. Commentators 
on the topic of conversion also seemed to focus less on the symbolic and sexual 
aspects of the symptoms than Freud did except when trying to differentiate which 
mechanisms underlie which types of bodily symptoms (Taylor, 2003). Writers who 
followed Freud in this area of psychopathology, whether they were contesting or 
supporting Freud’s ideas, were all paving the way for contemporary questions 
concerning the distinction or overlap between conversion and somatisation. 
THE QUESTION OF SOMATISATION 
The term ‘somatisation’ is attributed to Steckel who coined it in the early 1920s and 
defined it as ‘the conversion of emotional states into physical symptoms’ (Kellner, 
1990, p. 150). In terms of this early definition, the concept was initially equivalent to 
Freud and Breuer’s concept of ‘conversion’. Steckel eventually departed from 
Freud’s position, arguing that all neuroses, including what Freud had called ‘actual 
neuroses’ were caused by psychological conflict. Steckel also understood 
psychological conflict to be the underlying cause of somatic complaints which 
Freud had thought purely somatic or organic (Taylor, 2003). 
Much of the understanding of the divisions between conversion and somatisation 
turn on the early debates around the mechanisms underlying what Freud called the 
‘actual neuroses’. By ‘actual neuroses’ Freud was referring to the intense physical 
symptoms such as paralysing attacks of anxiety (which he called ‘anxiety 
equivalents’) that accompany or mask fear. He proposed that these are as a result 
of physical sensations which cannot access the mind. This explanation stands in 
contrast to that offered in relation to the development of conversion symptoms, in 
which psychic stimulation occurring as a result of internal conflict is repressed and 
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after being ejected from the mind is expressed as an organic symptom (Freud, 
1894a). 
In his paper Types of Onset of Neuroses (1912d) Freud explained that the actual 
neuroses are not caused by an original trauma, nor do they have a particular 
symbolic meaning (as in conversions) in terms of the form that they take. Freud 
argued that the actual neuroses were brought about as a reaction to real, everyday 
tension and, in particular, to the frustration of libidinal satisfactions. Since the 
symptoms of the actual neuroses were principally somatic and without symbolic 
meaning, interpretations made about their form were unnecessary and unhelpful 
(Freud, 1912d). For Freud, the actual neuroses were part of the ordinary 
unpleasant experience of being human, as opposed to the pathological misery of 
hysteria and obsessions, and would resolve when the libido was satisfied. They 
were therefore outside the scope of what could be treated by psychoanalysis. It 
can thus be concluded that, according to the Freudian model, a person suffering 
from an actual neurosis is showing ‘less’ psychopathology than someone in the 
grips of a neurosis proper. 
Authors such as MacAlpine (1952) and Taylor (2003) theorised that somatisation is 
a variant of the actual neuroses, and understood the anxiety symptoms to be 
caused by rudimentary or partly expressed emotions. This could be understood as 
being one of the forerunners to the theories of mentalization which are discussed in 
more detail below. As with Freud, they did not see these symptoms as being 
symbolic or having meaning. They put forward the idea that neuroses are not the 
only objects available to psychoanalytic investigation, and in their extended 
understanding, they included actual neuroses as well as other illnesses previously 
considered purely organic. In contemporary terms, they see the treatment of these 
symptoms as developing the patient’s ability to mentalize and to make sense of the 
bodily sensations they experience. These experiences can then be contained by 
other people and eventually by language, which will ultimately allow the patient to 
develop a capacity to tolerate bodily unpleasantness. 
Since Freud saw the ‘actual’ neuroses and other somatic illnesses as having purely 
organic origins – related to libidinal frustration rather than psychological trauma – 
he believed these to fall outside the realm of psychoanalysis and consequently did 
not work specifically in the area of somatisation. Instead this endeavour fell to other 
authors, including Pierre Janet. 
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Janet worked extensively to understand the genesis of somatic symptoms. He 
proposed a model of hereditary mental weakness in those who presented with 
such symptoms and suggested that if an individual experiences sufficiently intense 
trauma, the binding of the internal psychic elements that constitute the personality 
becomes weakened regardless of the trauma’s meaning. The fragments of a 
traumatised psyche can then cause somatic symptoms. One of the implications of 
Janet’s understanding is that in the psychogenesis of physical symptoms, thought, 
and more generally the mind itself, is bypassed in the initiation of somatic 
symptoms and consequently there is no sense, symbolism or meaning in the form 
that the symptom takes (Gottlieb, 2003). This means that the symptoms are not 
intelligible, lacking reason or meaning. Consequently, interpreting their form during 
therapy would serve no purpose. 
This idea of the sidestepping of the mind is developed in the work of many 
psychosomatic theorists since Janet, including Marty and de M'Urzan (Gottlieb, 
2003). Pre-genital conversion theorists such as Steckel and Groddeck did read 
primary symbolic meanings in the symptoms of many somatic diseases (including 
ulcerative colitis and bronchial asthma); however, Reiser and Weiner have argued 
that bodily events in autonomically innervated organs and tissues can become 
secondarily linked with fantasies and affects. This suggests that the symbolisation 
frequently uncovered in therapy may have played no role in initiating the disorder in 
the first place (Taylor, 2003). 
McDougall proposed a combination of the views of both the French Janetian 
school advocating ‘mind-free’ theories, and the Freudian view which stressed the 
meaning of the symptoms (Gottlieb, 2003). Her view in the 1970s was that 
psychosomatic symptoms were a result of troubled early backgrounds, which 
resulted in difficult emotions not entering the mind but rather being expressed by 
the body in the form of symptoms of physical illness which appear to have no 
psychological meaning. In this thinking (which was in line with the views of Janet) 
she proposed that psychosomatic patients were unable to process their 
experiences mentally or put their feelings into words. This is usually demonstrated 
by their alexithymia and ‘operational thinking’ – a term coined by the French 
psychosomaticians to describe patients’ inability to recognise or express affective 
states, and to indicate a lack of vitality and delibidinised ways of relating. Implicit is 
the idea that feelings are absent and are thus not represented in the individual’s 
language (Avila, 2007; McDougall, 1974). 
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However, by the late 1980s, McDougall (1989) no longer felt that this explanation 
was adequate as she saw many patients with serious psychosomatic illnesses who 
were able to express their feelings and/or did not demonstrate the operational 
thinking described by the French psychosomatic school. She concluded that an 
‘archaic’ form of symbolic mental activity occurs in some of these patients, but that 
it is different to that seen in hysterical conversions. The symbolism seen in 
psychosomatic patients is not verbal, but is processed by the mind to give it some 
intelligibility before its outcome is revealed in the body. Although the illnesses may 
appear to have no apparent symbolic significance, they are nonetheless linked with 
the patient’s psychic structure, life circumstances and history. It is concluded 
therefore that there is some psychological link to the form that the symptoms take. 
The symptom does have some intelligibility and relates to a developmental arrest. 
Analysing the form of the symptom of a somatic illness, however, does not 
represent a productive therapeutic intervention and will not reveal hidden clues to 
the patient’s psychological conflicts. McDougall’s thesis lends itself to an 
explanation that is concerned with different levels of development and different 
points of fixation in individual patients. When somatisation arises as a result of 
developmental deficits it appears to be reflected in points of fixation. By contrast, 
conversion reflects a regression from a previously achieved developmental 
milestone. 
Whatever the position taken regarding the intelligibility, mental status and symbolic 
meaning of somatic symptoms, the current thinking does not give importance to the 
form that the symptom takes in somatisation, and contemporary authors have 
moved away from the idea that there is a specific retrievable meaning in the 
symptom’s form. The genesis of somatic symptoms is also not linked to particular 
causal trauma as is the case with conversion symptoms. It is likely that this is 
because the origin of somatic symptoms is now understood to be a sustained, 
continuous set of experiences that result in arrested emotional development 
(Fonagy, et al., 2004; Mitrani, 1993). 
The case of Ms B will be used to demonstrate some of the points made above. 
Two of McDougall’s ideas will be illustrated: firstly, that there does appear to be 
some form of psychological significance to the form that some somatic symptoms 
take and, secondly, that interpretation is unhelpful in treating the symptoms 
because the level of mentalization in patients who present with somatisation is not 
sufficiently developed. 
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Ms B presented for therapy with severe anxiety and career and relationship 
difficulties. She had experienced a serious vaginal infection for many years and 
had consulted many doctors about it. Several doctors had suspected various STDs 
while others diagnosed Candida. Ms B suffered great discomfort and the infection 
had a profoundly negative effect on her sexual life with her husband. While that 
sometimes distressed her, it also appeared to have had some secondary gain in 
that the symptoms appeared after her husband had cheated on her. Her discomfort 
having sex, and the consequent reduction in its frequency, may have been a way 
to unconsciously punish him for his betrayal. She had also been sexually abused 
by a teacher as a child, and I suspected that the infection held some meaning 
associated to that event. Her doctors had prescribed everything from antibiotics to 
a diet change, but very little seemed to make a difference. It was eventually 
recommended that she go into psychotherapy. 
Ms B’s therapy ended prematurely after she took a job in another city, and 
although her anxiety was considerably reduced and she was seriously considering 
leaving her husband, there was very little change in the status of the infection. Any 
attempts in therapy to understand or interpret the meaning of Ms B’s symptom – 
such as suggesting that it was a way to punish her husband or a reflection of her 
rejection of her sexuality following the sexual abuse – were met with blankness. 
She was not able to free associate or make links about her illness and merely 
suggesting that the symptom may have meaning led to expressions of frustration 
on Ms B’s part. She would respond to such suggestions with long details of the 
research she had done on her physical illness and would regale me with medical 
facts. If she felt unwell in any way, even if it was as a result of anxiety before an 
event such as a work presentation, she would go to the doctor and insist on having 
blood tests or other medical investigations. She would become very defensive of 
her symptoms and tell me about the results of these tests, as though my 
suggestion that there was any psychological meaning behind the symptom had 
somehow minimised the symptom’s genuineness. Her reluctance to consider that 
there may be another way of understanding her symptoms appeared to be an 
inability to think symbolically rather than an unwillingness to do so. 
It seemed that at some points her range of symptoms would bypass her mind and 
she struggled to think about or conceptualise them in a symbolic way. I would 
contend that Ms B demonstrated some ‘operational thinking’, although the form of 
her symptom suggested that there was an archaic symbolism in its development. 
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What does seem to be at the heart of the development of bodily symptoms in all 
the theories reviewed is the collapse of higher-order psychological systems. From 
a Freudian perspective, a well-functioning mind can bind, organise and structure 
inputs from the body, the mind and the external world, and can allow an individual 
to operate according to secondary processing principles, while a failure of these 
processes can result in symptoms ruled by primary processing. Janet (in Gottlieb, 
2003) explains the collapse of higher order functioning in the following terms: a 
mind in which the fragments of the personality are no longer cohered or intact will 
produce hysterical and somatic symptoms. In both of these explanations, it is an 
intact mind which can mentalize that serves as a protection against developing 
these types of symptoms. 
MENTALIZATION AND PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS 
Allen, Fonagy and Bateman (2008) define mentalization as ‘imaginatively 
perceiving and interpreting behaviour of oneself and others as conjoined with 
intentional mental states, shorthand for which is holding mind in mind’ (p. 348). 
Fonagy (1991) articulates the idea that in order for an individual to be able to 
achieve control over intense affects, the individual needs to be able to represent 
the idea of an affect. Fonagy includes in his definition of mentalization the ability to 
understand the mental state of oneself and others. He sees mentalization as a 
form of imaginative mental activity which allows one to perceive and interpret 
human behaviour, including one’s own (Fonagy, et al., 2004). 
Freud saw thought as existing between the instinctual demands of the body and 
the actions taken to satisfy those demands. Freud emphasised the importance of 
bindung, or linking, in secondary process thinking, which creates associations 
between internal states (which Freud conceived of in energetic terms) and gives 
them meaning. This is opposed to primary process thinking which is by definition 
physical, immediate and without psychic meaning (Freud, 1915c). 
Using Freud’s topographical model of the mind, Luquet (in Bouchard & Lecours, 
2004) described a model of four different layers and forms of thought. The most 
primitive of these is the ‘U Level’, which consists of unmentalized sensory 
experiences for which no mental representations are available. The next layer is 
the Primary Mental Representation Level where the first psychic processes occur. 
The third layer is the System Preconscious which is made up of two types of 
thought: a) metaprimary thought and b) metaconscious and intuitive thought. In this 
third layer thought starts to take on a symbolic and more organised form. The 
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material in this level is not yet verbal but is used to form judgements, choices, 
decisions and ideas. The final level is the Conscious Level which is achieved when 
language is acquired. The Conscious Level inhibits the previous levels but does 
keep them potentially active. 
These layers of thought are useful in the conceptualization of the differences 
between conversation and somatisation and will be discussed in the following 
section. 
Continuing in this tradition, authors such as Lecours and Bourchard (1997) define 
mentalization as the ability ‘to elaborate the thoughts of our desires’ (p. 879) and 
integrate Freud's concepts of ‘binding’ and ‘psychical working out’ into their theory 
of the process of mentalization. 
While the Freudian school focuses on the binding of the instinctual drives, the 
second explanation of mentalization focuses on intersubjective and developmental 
aspects, emphasising the mother’s role in helping the infant develop the ability to 
tolerate affect. Bouchard and Lecours (2008) discuss Fonagy’s proposal of an 
interpersonal interpretive function (IIF) which is involved in processing new 
experiences. Its development is driven by the shared affective experiences of early 
attachment and precedes cognition. During these attachment experiences the 
infant internalizes the caregiver’s empathic expressions and in this way develops a 
secondary representation of his own emotional state. Infants who are neglected 
and traumatised will later present with problems of interpretive mentalizing, self-
regulating and attentional mechanisms (i.e. the IIF) (Bouchard & Lecours, 2008). 
Theories of mentalization are helpful in understanding the underlying mechanisms 
of psychosomatic symptoms as well as the differences between conversion and 
somatisation. It was in fact as a result of work with somatising patients that the first 
account of mentalization was developed by Marty, who observed that these 
patients showed a marked lack of psychic representations and psychic processing, 
which he came to conceive of as mentalization (Marty, 1968). Marty and de 
M’Urzan then went on to describe the operational thinking devoid of fantasy life 
seen in psychosomatic patients, which erodes the patient’s relationship with their 
object (Marty & De M'Urzan, 1963). 
It would thus appear that in poorly mentalized structures one observes 
meaningless discharge in action or via the somatic field, rather than in thought. It 
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would seem then that somatic symptoms have their origin in the ‘U layer’ of thought 
described by Luquet (Bouchard & Lecours, 2004). 
Contemporary writings about the genesis of somatisations suggest that these are 
due to problems that occur in very early development when the mind is just 
forming. During normal development, the infant learns to integrate sensory, 
visceral and motoric excitations with images and words into his or her emotional 
schemas. A very important factor in this process is the parents’ ability to attune to 
and regulate the child’s emotional states in order to help the child transform 
emotional arousal into something that can be thought about, named and 
communicated (Fonagy, et al., 2004; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997). 
Mitrani (1995) uses the term ‘unmentalized experience’ to denote internal or 
external elemental sense data which have not been transformed and integrated 
into symbols or mental representations, or into signal affects such as anxiety. She 
argues that experiences which are unmentalized are experienced as concrete 
objects in the mind, or as bodily states such as somatic symptoms or actions. 
These can neither be thought about nor stored as memories, and thus cannot be 
repressed. Mitrani equates this idea with Freud's notion of the ‘anxiety equivalent’. 
If the parents’ containing and reflective functions are not adequate, or if the child 
experiences trauma during childhood, the resulting attachment difficulties may lead 
to problems in affect development or to regression. Such environmental failure may 
result in the emotions being only weakly connected with images and words and 
being experienced mainly as somatic sensations (Krystal, 1997). Individuals with 
developmental histories of this kind may later present with alexithymia, 
somatisation or other medical and psychiatric disorders associated with 
dysregulation of affect (Fonagy, et al., 2004; Taylor, et al., 1997). LeDoux (1996) 
found that emotional learning can be mediated by neural pathways that bypass the 
neocortex, concluding that emotional responses can occur without the higher order 
processes of thinking and reasoning. This means that an individual's mind does not 
need to register, understand, elaborate, or evaluate the symbolic meaning of a 
traumatic stimulus and can instead bring forth ‘direct’ responses from the body. 
This again links to the ‘U level’ of thought (Bouchard & Lecours, 2004) where the 
empty and severely restricted psychic world results in somatisations and 
reenactments with no sense or meaning. 
In a conversion, the superego does not allow any thought of the patient’s desire, 
and this is the very reason for the development of the symptom. Using the more 
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contemporary language of mentalization, this can be understood as follows: since 
the desire cannot be reflected upon (i.e. mentalized) it cannot be expressed 
consciously and thoughtfully. It therefore remains unconscious and is 
communicated in the form of a symptom. It would thus seem that conversion 
symptoms demonstrate a problem in the preconscious layer of thought, or at 
Luquet’s metaprimary or metaconscious and intuitive layers of thought (Bouchard 
& Lecours, 2004). Since symbolism and verbal thinking have obviously already 
been achieved, the symptom must reveal regression to a preconscious level of 
thought. The superego judges the thought as unacceptable, again suggesting that 
it has reached metaconscious thought. The implication for somatisation, therefore, 
is that since the fixations occur at an earlier developmental level and at a lower 
level of mentalization, somatisations are a more ‘severe’ form of psychopathology. 
As such, they are more difficult to treat and can be considered more intractable 
than hysterical conversions which present, by contrast, in individuals with higher 
degrees of mentalization. It is the ability to symbolize that is absent or 
compromised in somatising patients (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010). 
Since the psychic difficulties involved in somatisation appear to be around 
symbolisation, linking and mentalization, I would argue that the therapeutic task 
with somatising patients is to help them develop this capacity with the view to 
aiding them to put their thoughts and feelings into words so that they are not 
compelled to show them in their bodies (Taylor, 2003). 
THE PSYCHE AND THE SOMA: THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS 
As is true with most aspects of human functioning, what is seen in therapy rarely 
fits neatly into the discrete categories of theory. It is the task of the therapist to 
carefully attend to how the patient presents in the room, to try to understand the 
underlying dynamics of what the patient is presenting with and to define the 
therapeutic task based on that understanding. 
It is clear from the arguments presented above that it is almost impossible to draw 
an absolute line between somatisation and conversion. It appears that the ideas of 
‘conversion’ and ‘somatisation’ do indeed describe different processes, but that 
these processes are related. Ron (1994) puts conversion and somatisation on a 
continuum and suggests that they share some underlying mechanisms in that 
unexpressed psychic elements are kept out of consciousness and manifest instead 
as bodily symptoms. Ron’s view is an extension of what Rangell (1959) suggested 
several decades earlier when he concluded that, given that there are many 
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different forms of bodily symptoms, an individual case may frequently be over-
determined and hierarchically layered with dynamic mechanisms stemming from 
multiple points of fixation and regression. 
It is my hypothesis that, during the process of psychotherapy, the form that a bodily 
symptom takes may develop and change along the continuum of bodily symptoms. 
As the patient develops the ability to symbolise and make links (i.e. to mentalize), 
the structure and the form of the symptom may move from a more intractable, less 
symbolic somatic symptom to one which holds unique, symbolic meaning for the 
patient. Similarly, if the patient enters a more regressed state or if their ability to 
mentalize becomes compromised for any reason, any bodily symptoms presented 
may take on a less symbolic, more primitive form. 
To illustrate these ideas, I will discuss the case of Ms C who presented for 
treatment with debilitating Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 
Ms C experienced severe anxiety when facing new situations as her concern about 
whether she would have ready access to a toilet was overwhelming. Initially she 
conceived of the illness as purely biological, treating it with medication and a 
change of diet. She sought therapy because of the anxiety her physical symptoms 
caused her, not because she thought that there was a psychological dimension to 
the symptoms. She linked the development of the symptom to a case of 
gastroenteritis she had suffered some months earlier. The gastroenteritis appeared 
to provide the opportunistic route the symptom took. Over the course of therapy, 
Ms C began to associate the IBS with particular events which she found to be 
stressful, particularly those events that evoked negative feelings such as anger. 
She was initially unable to express these feelings, which were interpreted in 
therapy as needing instead to be evacuated through the diarrhoea and flatulence. 
There were some occasions when she met her father in work situations, and she 
reported that her symptoms would flare up at such times. She was eventually able 
to stay at a higher level of mentalization, to ‘think about what the thing in my body 
means rather than panicking and running to find a toilet’. 
Ms C also associated bouts of her illness with interactions with her boyfriend’s 
mother, who ‘made her sick’. She came to understand that the symptom was also 
a reflection of her feelings for her mother-in-law and that it provided her with an 
excuse to absent herself from family situations without appearing rude or rejecting. 
Her anger towards her mother-in-law appeared to be linked to the older woman's 
envy of Ms C’s youthfulness and attractiveness. This was interpreted when Ms C 
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reported that she had been accused by her mother-in-law of ‘flirting’ with her 
husband (i.e. Ms C’s father-in-law). There were other instances where Ms C 
engaged in passive aggressive behaviour, particularly at work. When it was 
interpreted that she dealt with anger and aggression in indirect ways (e.g. avoiding 
situations through illness, disguising hurt and angry feelings with a sort of syrupy 
sweetness), she could start to see that her symptoms had meaning and played a 
role in her life. Ms C began dealing with the situations more directly and her 
symptoms abated. 
In order to explain the changes in this patient’s presentation and how she came to 
understand and conceptualise her symptoms differently, we need to understand 
the underlying mechanisms involved in the different forms of pathology she 
manifests. When Ms C first entered therapy she was not able to think symbolically 
about the symptom or make psychological links. During this initial phase of 
therapy, the form that the symptom took had little significance for her. Hence the 
initial therapeutic task was managing anxiety. As the therapy progressed and the 
patient became more able to symbolise, create links and hold ideas in her mind, 
she was able to conceive of the symptom differently. During this phase she was 
able to work with the form that the symptom took and to understand that her 
somatic symptoms may have psychological meaning. By thinking about these 
symbols and meanings she also began to exercise more control over the symptom 
because she was able to anticipate and deal with trigger situations. Ms C reached 
a point of being able to think about and manage her symptom and in one session 
said: ‘When I start feeling my tummy is upset and worrying about needing the loo, I 
try and think what I might be worried about, or angry about, and deal with it at that 
level rather than get myself into a whole state about where the nearest toilet is’. 
This demonstrates how she eventually came to see that her symptoms had 
meaning. 
From an object relations perspective, Ms C’s case could be understood in the 
following way: she is aware of feeling anxiety and it seems that her boyfriend’s 
mother and her father elicit this response in her. Perhaps her relationship with her 
mother-in-law, and the accompanying anxiety, is a transference repetition of her 
primary object relationship with her own mother. Her internal mental 
representations of her father are also re-evoked when she meets him in work 
situations. Anxiety is the only conscious manifestation of her aggressive feelings, 
which are otherwise expressed in bodily symptoms, as she has not developed an 
ability to mentalize these affects – or this ability has become compromised – and 
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her aggressive feelings are embodied in primitive affective memory structures. The 
triggers of the new job and an often difficult relationship, coupled with these 
primitive affective memory structures infused with hostile primary object relations, 
led to the somatised aggressive affects. The containment provided by the secure 
base of therapy, together with accurate mirroring of affects by the therapist 
(Fonagy et al., 2004), helped her to develop a capacity to mentalize these. Ms C 
was then able to mentalize her symptoms. She ended therapy when her financial 
circumstances changed, but said that her therapeutic journey had been very 
important because through it she had ‘developed a mind’. 
The case of Ms C serves to illustrate how strengthening the patient’s ego during 
the therapeutic process allows for the shoring up of a capacity to symbolise and 
mentalize. Over time, the symptom becomes more accessible to the ego. Initially 
the symptoms appeared to have an anal character in that they served the purpose 
of expelling unwanted thoughts and feelings, i.e. aggression. As the treatment 
progressed and the patient became more able to mentalize and thus make more 
meaning of her symptoms, the symptoms appeared to take on a more Oedipal 
form, used now as communications to both her boyfriend and his mother. She used 
the physical symptoms as an excuse when she did not want to have sex (even at 
times when she was not feeling unwell) and when she did not want to spend time 
with her mother-in-law. 
Returning to the case of Ms B, the argument could be made that her husband’s 
infidelity was experienced by her as a trauma. This trauma and the feelings of 
neglect and humiliation associated with it seem to have reawakened similar affects 
related to her early primary object relations. Her mother had fallen pregnant again 
very shortly after her birth and Ms B had experienced the birth of her sister as a 
rejection. She subsequently developed a very competitive relationship with ‘the 
other woman’ who her sister came to represent. The abuse by the teacher was 
also a profound trauma, but the memory of it is fragmented and cannot be thought 
about and verbalized. It is bound up in primitive affective memory structures filled 
with anger, disgust and shame, which reveal themselves in a bodily way. 
Perhaps if Ms B had stayed in the therapy she might slowly have developed a 
more robust psychic structure which would have improved her ability to mentalize 
and make links. This might have manifested as an improvement in her symptom. 
The symbolism of the symptom might also have become more apparent and 
accessible, and therefore available for more classically Freudian work. It is my 
 76 
 
hypothesis that, just as in the case of Ms C, the developmental stage at which the 
fixation presented might too have shifted. 
An understanding of how important mentalization is to the therapeutic process in 
general is suggested by Mitrani (1995), who argued that psychoanalysis 
traditionally aimed at seeking out internal psychological conflicts and 
understanding how these affect the patients’ daily lives. However, ideas concerning 
the role of unmentalized experiences and mentalization itself have changed the 
analytic task to one in which the analyst helps the patient to shift bodily sensations 
or body memories out of the body and into the mind. This moves them out of the 
sphere of action into that of logical, verbal expression, where they are then 
available for investigation. According to this understanding, the aim of therapy is to 
create a psychic structure and develop a mind ego in place of the original body ego 
proposed by Freud (1923a). 
During treatment, the unthought, unmentalized parts of the patient’s mind arrive 
first in the therapist who is able to keep them in mind, endure them, think about 
them and then give them meaning before eventually being able to drip feed them to 
the patient (Mitrani, 1995). In my own experience this has usually occurred in a 
countertransference experience which very often takes a physical form, such as a 
vague feeling of nausea in some sessions with Ms B, or a rush of anxiety that 
occurred frequently when Ms C pressed the buzzer. The initial focus of adult 
psychoanalytic treatment is therefore the development of mentalization. This brings 
with it the ability to define and regulate the self and the self-with-other, as well as 
the capacity for reflective functioning. In order to promote the development of 
mentalization, the therapist is required to fulfil the function that the patient’s parents 
were unable to. She must ‘lend her mind’ to the patient (Grebow, 2008). 
Allen, Fonagy and Bateman (2008) advocate that, when working with patients who 
have difficulties in mentalization, the therapist must use a reasonably structured 
and supportive approach, focusing mainly on the present. They suggest that 
engaging in therapy is in itself an act of mentalization as both the therapist and 
patient are engaging in a process where they are working in an attachment dyad in 
which their mental states are the object of their joint attention. When therapists 
interpret the transference, they are presenting the patient with a different 
perspective of their subjective experience. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed some of the similarities and differences that exist between 
the understandings of the concepts of ‘conversion’ and ‘somatisation’ as they have 
been defined since their original coinage by Freud. Much of the literature, 
supported by my own work in this area, concludes that the two concepts, though 
distinct, can be understood to operate on a continuum of bodily meaning. 
From the arguments and distinctions discussed in the paper, it is apparent that 
somatisation can be considered to be a result of fixations which have occurred at 
an earlier and more primitive level of development and mentalization and for this 
reason the symptoms may be more intractable and harder to treat. Somatic 
patients are very commonly described as being alexithymic which points to 
difficulties with symbolising and other verbal processes. By contrast, the very 
nature of a particular conversion symptom is often built around a symbolic turn of 
phrase and therefore, by definition, the patient has the language and symbolic 
skills required to have initialised the conversion, even though this process is not 
conscious. 
The distinction between somatisation and conversion symptoms is important for 
treatment as it defines the therapeutic task. If the patient is concrete, ‘operational’ 
and alexithymic, it is better that the treatment occurs face to face and focuses on 
the here-and-now and on creating the links between what is happening in the 
patient’s body and what is happening in their mind (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010; 
Lombardi, 2008). If the patient has a more developed ability to mentalize and 
symbolise, and can better ‘play with words’, the interpretation of any associations 
to the presenting symptoms may be useful and may bring about shifts in the 
patient’s understanding and in his or her illness (Freud, 1893b). 
It is, however, important to remember that symptoms are frequently layered, and it 
is sometimes hard to tease out conversion dynamics from those of somatisation. It 
is not possible to know the underlying dynamics simply by noting the symptom; a 
deeper understanding of the structure of the patient’s mind is required. The manner 
in which a patient engages with an interpretation will often reveal the level of 
mentalization present. Fonagy et al. (2004) and Allen et al. (2008) have discussed 
how the capacity for mentalization can break down in the face of trauma. When 
treating a patient who is showing bodily symptoms, the therapist should look for 
evidence in other situations in which the patient can (or could previously) mentalize 
and should try to determine whether there is a link between the breakdown of 
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mentalization and the traumatic situation. In this way they will be able to assess 
whether they are dealing with a regression or a developmental fixation. This will 
inform the clinical process. 
Following the understanding that the therapeutic process can result in structural 
changes in the mind, this paper proposes that similar shifts in the mechanisms 
underlying a particular bodily symptom may also occur over the course of therapy. 
Such shifts may take the form of the patient’s presentation moving from a less 
mentalized, less symbolic manifestation to a more symbolic and meaningful 
symptom presentation. This will demand of the therapist a more interpretive role as 
the patient’s ability to engage with, conceptualise and understand their symptom 
matures. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the shift can also happen in 
the opposite direction. Under circumstances of trauma, regression or breakdown, 
the therapeutic task again becomes one of forging links and promoting the ability to 
mentalize. 
Theories of conversion and somatisation suggest that it might be possible to relate 
the two forms of pathology on a sexual developmental axis. While a detailed 
discussion of this is outside the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note how the 
symptoms of Ms B and Ms C were quite concretely representative of the genital 
and anal stages respectively. The symptom of Ms A was not linked to the early 
psychosexual stages of development, suggesting that it is linked to difficulties that 
occurred later and after a higher level of mentalization had been achieved. 
Somatisation symptoms are more likely to occur at a pre-Oedipal level, while 
conversion symptoms imply by their symbolic nature that they are Oedipal or post-
Oedipal. The symbolism and mentalization capacity seen in patients who present 
with conversion symptoms suggests that they are regressing when they become ill. 
This regression may result in them developing either conversion symptoms or 
somatisations, depending on how far the patients regress. Individuals who have 
developed fixations at early, primitive developmental levels are likely to develop 
bodily symptoms in the form of somatisations, as they have not yet achieved the 
capacity to symbolise, a requirement for conversion symptoms. Some of the early 
developmental level fixations may be resolved through the process of therapy and 
the structure of the pathology may take on different forms at higher developmental 
levels.  
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CHAPTER 5: PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The paper in this chapter is the second of the two papers which comprise the first 
half of the thesis and which focus on the symptomatic body of the patient. It is 
entitled “Psychosomatics Today: A Review of Contemporary Theory and Practice” 
and was published in the accredited international journal “The Psychoanalytic 
Review” in its 100th anniversary edition in March 2013 (Gubb, 2013a). When this 
paper was accepted for publication, the editor invited commentaries from two 
authors with an interest in the area and these two commentaries were included 
in the edition of the journal in which the paper was featured. Relevant points 
from these commentaries are included and discussed in the discussion chapter 
at the end of the thesis. The paper is reprinted here with the journal’s permission. 
Please see the second volume of the thesis for a copy of the paper in its published 
format. 
The paper takes the form of a theoretical review of recent literature on the topic of 
psychosomatic illness and builds on the foundation of the paper in the previous 
chapter. Having differentiated between two ways in which illnesses of the mental 
may manifest in bodily terms (i.e. conversion and psychosomatic illness) in the first 
published paper, this paper now explores the idea of psychosomatic illness in 
greater depth. 
The paper begins with an introductory section which establishes the two 
contemporary schools of psychosoma theory which are then discussed in detail. 
The first of these theoretical approaches is the well-defined French school of 
psychosomatics, and the second is one which the paper identifies and argues for: 
the Attachment Approach.  The paper explores in detail how each of these 
approaches understands the concept of mentalization and how this in turn informs 
the theorisation of the mechanisms involved in psychosomatic illness and 
consequently its treatment and the clinical implications resulting from these 
differing theoretical approaches. 
This paper develops a number of the themes which were introduced in the first 
paper. The first of these is the question of whether the very form that the physical 
symptom takes has a meaning related to its origin and genesis or any underlying 
intrapsychic difficulties that the patient might have.  The second of the overall 
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thesis themes discussed further in the second paper is the concept of 
mentalization, specifically different definitions of the concept are compared, and 
mentalization’s underpinning of the link between psychic pain and physical 
symptoms is highlighted. The third theme that is developed in this paper is the idea 
that the talking cure facilitates acts of mentalization which then allows the symptom 
to move into the realm of the mental.   
The paper broadly addresses similar research questions as the first paper. It differs 
from the first paper in so far as it also addressed a fourth research question, 
namely: 
• What implications do the different understandings of the process of 
somatisation have for treatment of psychosomatic illnesses? 
What the first two papers have in common is an understanding of the significance 
of mentalization in psychopathology. This issue will be taken up again in the 
Discussion chapter which will unite and differentiate the concepts presented in 
these two papers and will then explore the implications for clinical practice. The 
first half of the thesis as a whole, therefore, is a clinical contribution to the 
understanding of the role of the patient’s body in psychopathology and how this is 
related to mentalization.  
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PAPER 2: PSYCHOSOMATICS TODAY3: A REVIEW OF 
CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND PRACTICE4,5 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the past few years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
psychoanalytic publications on the topic of psychosomatic illness, including edited 
collections and special editions of psychoanalytic journals. This paper is a critical 
conceptual review of the topic of psychosomatic illness using the material contained in 
a number of these recent publications as a basis, but also drawing on other works by 
the key authors of the publications discussed herein. This paper proposes that 
currently there appear to be two schools of thought around the origin, development, 
and treatment of psychosomatic symptoms. The first of these is the well-established 
“Paris School of Psychosomatics.” The second approach does not formally exist, but 
is referred to in this paper as the “Attachment approach” since there are a number of 
authors who theorize about the treatment of psychosomatic symptoms in a similar and 
important way. The paper will compare and contrast the two approaches with respect 
to their underlying theories, treatment approaches, and conceptualization of the mind–
body problem, with particular attention paid to how this is related to mentalization. The 
understanding of how problems in mentalization may be linked to psychosomatic 
illness can be conceptualized as the “speechless mind” from the perspective of the 
Paris School and as the “speaking body” by the Attachment approach. The paper 
concludes by engaging with these two conceptualizations and suggests that in order 
for an individual to achieve both psychological and physical health, the work of 
sensation must be located primarily in the logic and function of the body, while the 
work of making sense of these sensations and interpreting them must be located in 
the mind. 
During the past few decades, psychoanalysis has not paid much attention to 
psychosomatics, and the field appeared to be losing relevance. There has, 
however, been an explosion of interest in this field in recent years. In the past three 
years alone, there have been special editions dedicated to the topic in the Journal 
of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry in 2008, and 
in Psychoanalytic Inquiry in 2010, an edited collection titled Psychosomatics 
Today: A Psychoanalytic Perspective (edited by Marilia Aisenstein and Elsa 
                                                          
3
 The main title of this paper is a reference to the collection titled Psychosomatics Today edited by 
Marilia Aisenstein and Elsa Rappoport de Aisemberg. This paper explores exactly the issues raised 
by the edited collection as well as other recently published works on the topic of psychosomatic 
illness. 
4
 Copyright for this manuscript resides with the publisher: The Psychoanalytic Review. Citation: Gubb, 
K. (2013). “Psychosomatics today” : A review of contemporary theory and practice. Psychoanalytic 
Review, 100(1), 103-142. 
5
 The paper is reprinted here exactly as it was published. As it was published in an American journal 
the spelling is US spelling which is different to the UK spelling used in the rest of the thesis. 
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Rappoport de Aisemberg) in 2010, as well as three papers published in the 
education section of the February 2011 edition of the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis. This paper aims to explore the interesting phenomenon of this 
renewed and growing fascination with the field. 
The paper engages with this recently published material and attempts to examine 
and analyze some of the key points and theoretical implications of the work 
presented in these special editions and the edited collection, supplemented by 
other works or references by key authors of the publications. This paper is based 
on the literature in the publications listed in the preceding paragraph, but is not 
limited to that literature. 
I propose that there are two clusters of theoretical thrust contained in the literature. 
The first of these is a major school of thought that arose in France during the 
1950s. This school is based on Freudian drive theory and has special interest in 
concepts such as alexithymia and operational thinking (Taylor, 2010). These 
theorists -including Aisenstein, Smadja, and Green - identify themselves as 
belonging to “The Paris School of Psychosomatics” and have the most coherent 
and well-developed psychoanalytic theorization of the topic of psychosomatic 
illness today; they are also the only school to stake a claim on the area of 
psychosomatics in particular. Some recent work, such as that being done in South 
America, consciously aligns itself with the Paris School (Fischbein, 2011). Much of 
the literature reviewed that discusses the theory and approach of this Paris School 
is taken from the edited collection Psychosomatics Today, but there are papers in 
both of the special editions whose authors explicitly identify themselves as 
belonging to the Paris School. 
The second school of thought is an emerging, new approach in the psychoanalytic 
treatment of psychosomatic illnesses. While the theorists describing and making 
use of this new approach (including authors such as Griffies, Sloate, Kohutis, and 
Katz) do not identify themselves as belonging to a particular approach or express 
affiliations to each other, this paper attempts to demonstrate that members of this 
group are working with similar conceptual underpinnings distinct from those of the 
Paris School. This cluster of theorists focuses particularly on attachment theory 
and mentalization as described by attachment theorists such as Fonagy, Allen, 
Bateman, and Target, and their work will be referred to as the “Attachment 
approach” in this paper. Most of the writings from these authors were included in 
the special editions of Psychoanalytic Inquiry in 2010 and the Journal of the 
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American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry in 2008. A number 
of these authors had papers in both of these editions. 
A condensed critical review based on a close conceptual reading of the material 
contained in these publications is presented next. It outlines the principles that 
underpin the diagnosis and treatment of psychosomatic symptoms of both the 
Paris School and the Attachment approach, as they are described in current 
literature, and then compares and contrasts them. In doing so, the paper will 
highlight the differences and similarities in the understandings of the two schools 
around a number of themes including the diagnosis, formulation, and treatment of 
patients who present for psychoanalytic treatment of psychosomatic illnesses. The 
paper ends with a critical discussion focusing on the clinical implications of the two 
approaches when working with the psychosomatic patient, based on the 
understanding that how a psychotherapist practices will be directly related to how 
he or she conceives of the cause of the pathology being treated, and by implication 
what is involved in its cure. 
As the clinical implications of the differences and similarities of the two approaches 
are explored, the mind–body question is reexamined. That discussion is guided by 
questions concerned with how each approach conceptualizes the relationship 
between the mind and the body, and how this relationship is closely tied to the 
development of mentalization. I propose that from the Paris School’s perspective, 
problems in mentalization which are linked to the development of psychosomatic 
illnesses can be understood as being related to the patient presenting with a 
“speechless mind”: one that cannot do the work that a mind should because it has 
not developed sufficiently. From the perspective of the Attachment approach, 
problems in mentalization linked to psychosomatic illness may be thought of as the 
patient having a “speaking body,” where the body attempts to do the work that 
should be located in the mind. 
THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOSOMATIC THOUGHT 
A very brief history is presented here in order to highlight the origins of particular 
theories and propositions that are specifically discussed in the paper. For a more 
detailed history, readers are referred to papers such as those by Bronstein (2011) 
or Aisemberg (2010). 
Freud did not write much about what is now considered psychosomatic illness; 
however, many of the debates that exist currently around the understanding of 
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such physical symptoms find their origins in Freud’s early work, in which he 
differentiated between the bodily symptoms of psychoneurosis and those he called 
“actual neuroses.” By “actual neuroses,” Freud was referring to intense physical 
experiences, such as such as overwhelming anxiety that may accompany or mask 
fear. He understood these experiences to be a consequence of physical 
sensations that have not been able to gain access to the mind and contrasted them 
to the physical symptoms of hysterical conversions, in which psychic stimulation 
resulting from internal conflict is repressed and, after being thus kept out of the 
mind, is instead expressed in a physical way (Freud, 1894a). 
It was his view that the actual neuroses are not caused by an original trauma, nor 
do they have a particular symbolic meaning in the form that they take (as in 
conversions), but that they were instead reactions to real, everyday tensions, 
particularly to libidinal frustration (Freud, 1912d). Thus for Freud, the actual 
neuroses are beyond what could be treated successfully by psychoanalysis, since 
making interpretations about their form or attempting to find a meaning behind 
them would not lead to a fruitful outcome (Gubb, 2010). 
The whole debate about which physical symptoms can be treated using 
psychoanalysis seems to result from Freud drawing this distinction between the 
classic psychoneuroses (where the symptoms are symbolic and result from internal 
conflict, often based on early trauma, sometimes of a sexual kind, and where 
patients cannot take satisfactions available to them) and actual neuroses (often 
related to frustration, which is the result of sexual satisfaction not being available in 
the real world, where the nervous system is bombarded with reality). The 
distinction between the physical symptoms of the psychoneuroses and those of the 
actual neuroses turns quite strongly on the concept of hysteria, as it is here that the 
differences are most vividly expressed. In the hysterical conversion symptoms of 
the psychoneuroses, the relation between body and mind is entirely symbolic, 
unlike how the mind–body relationship manifests in actual neuroses or in organic 
illnesses (in which Freud [1912] saw no evidence of the mind). 
Following Freud, the growth and expansion of the concepts of psychoneuroses, 
actual neuroses, and organic illnesses, and arguments for and against how are 
they distinguished, permeates the history of the development of psychoanalytically 
informed thought on psychosomatic illness. 
Building on the Freudian foundations, the development of psychosomatics as a 
speciality began in earnest with the work of psychoanalysts such as Sándor 
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Ferenczi, Felix Deutsch, Georg Groddeck, and Flanders Dunbar. In a 1926 paper 
titled “Organ Neuroses and Their Treatment,” Ferenczi expanded on Freud’s actual 
neuroses and proposed the idea of “organ neuroses” as being “real” disturbances 
in the normal functioning bodily organs, and in this way attempted to distinguish 
organ neurosis from hysteria (although he acknowledged that the distinction was 
not always that clear-cut). Ferenczi’s account of organ neurosis proposed the 
notion of “organ eroticism,” in which, as well as being involved in maintaining life, 
organs are able to produce pleasurable sensations. His hypothesis was that if an 
organ were manifesting with an organ neurosis, it was evidence of a build-up of 
that organ’s erotic function (Bronstein, 2011; Ferenczi, 1955), which was similar to 
Freud’s idea that in actual neuroses satisfaction cannot be achieved. 
Ferenczi’s ideas of organ neuroses were expanded by Felix Deutsch, who worked 
particularly on the concept of organ specificity. It was his proposal that early 
developmental occurrences might affect specific organs, and that the interaction of 
an intrapsychic conflict and a specific organ created a “psychosomatic unit” which 
was activated every time the individual experienced that conflict again (Bronstein, 
2011; Deutsch, 1939). Authors such as Deutsch and Groddeck (1977) understood 
somatic illnesses to have symbolic meanings in line with Freud’s hysterical 
conversions. Thus, they saw illnesses as expressing unconscious fantasies and 
conflicts and believed that where these were interpreted successfully, just as with 
conversion symptoms, the patient would be restored to health (Taylor, 2010). 
Flanders Dunbar emphasized the complexity of the combination of factors that are 
involved in a psychosomatic response, but did link certain personality profiles to 
particular illnesses. Her other major contribution to the field was the methodology 
of investigation that she established (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010; Bronstein, 2011). 
Dunbar’s understanding of physical symptoms (just as those of Deutsch and 
Groddeck) then fell closer to the Freudian understanding of psychoneuroses than 
that of the actual neuroses. 
Psychosomatics as it is understood today was, however, first studied 
systematically by Franz Alexander, who was a student and collaborator of 
Ferenczi, and who founded the Chicago School of Psychosomatic Medicine. 
Alexander attempted to relate specific somatic syndromes to specific psychological 
conflicts (Aisenstein, 2008), and based his work on two theoretical principles. The 
first of these expanded the idea of organ neurosis, and stated that overwhelming 
emotions that are psychically repressed are carried along the autonomic nerve 
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pathways to the organs. The functioning of these organs is altered after receiving 
these messages, and this effect is seen in the form of functional disorders. The 
second principle Alexander made use of was the theory of specificity; he proposed 
that specific emotions and personality types corresponded to specific physical 
dysfunctions (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010; Smadja, 2010). He saw symptoms as 
symbolic expressions of unconscious psychic conflicts and explored how the 
individual’s “choice of illness” related to particular types of conflict (Alexander, 
1934). Alexander’s work presented somewhat of a conceptual challenge in that he 
located these illnesses somewhere between hysterias, actual neuroses, and 
organic illnesses. 
Contrary to Groddeck (1977) and Deutsch (1939), Alexander and his followers 
understood somatic illnesses to be asymbolic (as Freud understood the actual 
neuroses to be). In this understanding, illnesses are not a result of unconscious 
conflicts, but are rather a product of complex interactions between an individual’s 
constitution and the physiological consequences of unrelieved emotional arousal 
(Taylor, 2010). Alexander suggested that in fact every physical illness was 
psychosomatic as it necessarily involved both physical and psychological factors. 
Thus, even though he had a dualistic view of the mind–body relationship, he still 
emphasized the very close connection between heightened emotions and the 
effect they have on the body (Alexander, 1950). He listed seven illnesses which he 
saw as “classic” psychosomatic illnesses. These were bronchial asthma, essential 
hypertension, peptic duodenal ulcer, regional enteritis, ulcerative colitis, Graves’ 
disease, and rheumatoid arthritis (Bronstein, 2011; Smadja, 2010). Alexander’s 
work thus seemed to be the beginning of a body of thought that rereads what 
would otherwise be regarded as purely organic illnesses as psychosomatic 
illnesses, and the upshot of this is that illnesses that traditionally would have fallen 
into the category of organic illness were reframed as being available to treatment 
by psychoanalysis. Thus in psychoanalytic work, some illnesses began to occupy a 
broad category that came to gain a coherence of validity in itself, and which 
rethought the extent to which a psychic dimension informed illnesses that were 
previously conceived as of organic. 
These early ideas in the field of psychosomatics prompted much research, but 
were often met with the criticism that many personality types and intrapsychic 
conflicts are seen in individuals who do not present with a given illness as 
predicted by theories of Dunbar and Alexander. This critique is still relevant for 
even the most recent psychosomatic theoretical paradigms. 
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Alexander’s work eventually felt out of favor in the United States, but it was 
especially well received in France, particularly his works Fundamentals of 
Psychoanalysis and Psychosomatic Medicine, and laid the foundations for the later 
work of the psychosomaticiens (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010; Taylor, 2008b). It was 
however, criticized by the French thinkers for the dualism between the mind and 
the body that it proposed (Smadja, 2010). 
THE PARIS SCHOOL OF PSYCHOSOMATICS  
In an attempt to capture what is central to the treatment of psychosomatic illness 
as understood by the Paris School, it is important to discuss, first, the overall 
theoretical approach and its Freudian underpinnings; second, to link this to the 
Paris School’s understanding of the mind–body conundrum; and, third, to explore 
how the theorists of the Paris School translate their theoretical understandings into 
clinical practice. 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The Paris School of Psychosomatics has a long and well-established history. 
Calling themselves “psychosomaticiens,” theorists writing in this tradition are 
affiliated to medical treatment centers such as oncology clinics, and also have day 
clinics that have been set up specifically to treat patients with what the Paris 
School classify as psychosomatic illnesses (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010). It is 
interesting to note that some of the illnesses treated by the Paris School include 
those not typically considered to be psychosomatic, such as cancer. This is largely 
due to the fact that the Paris School rejects any dualism between the psyche and 
the soma and instead understands that these two entities are in a continuous 
interaction (Oliner, 2010). Therefore, they do not engage with concepts such as the 
difference between illnesses of the body and illness of the mind, an important tenet 
of their approach. 
The roots of the school are acknowledged to be found in Freudian economic 
principles and concepts such as representation and transference, and the material 
I reviewed for this paper often quoted Freud (1915a): “If we apply ourselves to 
considering mental life from a biological point of view, the ‘instinct’ appears to us as 
a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical 
representation of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the 
mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence 
of its connection with the body” (pp. 121-122). In her paper “The Mysterious Leap 
of the Somatic into the Psyche,” which was published in the edited collection 
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Psychosomatics Today (which she also co-edited), Aisenstein (2010) interprets this 
quotation as meaning that there is a demand from the body for the psyche to do a 
significant amount of work, but that this work cannot be done while the demand is 
in its crude and unrefined state, so the demand must first be interpreted by the 
psyche before it is able to respond. Crucially, she argues that if the body receives 
no response from the psyche, the body will increase its demands in both force and 
quantity. Such an increase in energy within the mind–body unit leads to tension 
that ideally needs to be discharged in a positive way in order to restore calm and 
homeostasis. This discharge of libido is experienced as pleasurable. 
Aisenstein, who has written extensively on the subject of psychosomatic illness 
from the perspective of the Paris School, has three papers in the material listed at 
the beginning of this paper, and many others published in previous years. She 
describes how the drive signifies this constant, internal excitation psychically. The 
aim of instinctual impulses is to achieve discharge, and to this end, the drive 
directs the individual to seek out an external object that will allow the release of the 
tension. The drive and the object thus become indivisible (Aisenstein, 2010; 
Sechaud, 2010). While Freud wrote about the constancy of the drive thrust and 
how this is linked to the demands of creating psychic representations, the Paris 
School extends these concepts by exploring what happens when there is a 
discontinuity in the drive thrust (Aisenstein, 2010) or, in other words, when the 
discharge of libido depletes the ego. 
Oliner (2010), who is the only author writing in the special edition of Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry from the Paris School’s perspective, focuses specifically on the discharge 
of libido, and proposes that the inability to stem the outflow of libido results in the 
individual risking being gripped by the death instinct. She further suggests that this 
economically based preservation of libido is not inherent, but requires that the 
individual has reached the psychic organization level of “desomatization,” which is 
the state where the individual moves from an undifferentiated stage to one that is 
more organized and in which somatic components achieve psychic representation. 
The attainment of such a developmental organization allows for the preservation of 
libido and the chance that emotional rather than somatic responses can be 
expressed because an organization of this kind is capable of containing the outflow 
of libidinal energy. If this level of organization has not been achieved, distress 
leads to fatigue, lethargy, or somatic illness. In fact, Marty hypothesized that it is 
this libidinal collapse that stops patients who stay sick from attempting to get better 
(Oliner, 2010). 
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In his writings about the discharge of bodily excitation as described earlier, Freud 
(1895) had understood that psychoneurotic functioning develops from memory 
traces resulting from satisfying engagements with the primary objects. He 
described how during such experiences of pleasure, endosomatic excitation 
resulting from internal and external perceptions of the relationship with the object is 
transformed into the drive and then again into psychic representation, and serves a 
structuring function. Aisemberg (2010) summarizes this idea by stating that this 
form of psychic functioning is the arena of Eros, which is a drive that organizes and 
objectivizes. 
In contrast, beyond neurotic functioning there may be some somatic excitation that 
has failed to be transformed into drive, and which thus has no psychic inscription 
yet, and that shortcircuits to the soma. This is termed “non-neurotic” functioning by 
the Paris School’s theorists, who see it as being derived from the sensorial traces 
left by the experience of displeasure or pain that has not been transformed into 
drive and therefore remains unbound and on the border of the psyche and the 
soma. It is important to note that in the material I reviewed, the term “non-neurotic” 
was used as though it were common and understood, and appears to be referring 
to psychic functioning that is on the more psychotic or borderline end of the 
spectrum. Kriesler (cited in Fischbein, 2011, p. 92) describes non-neurotic subjects 
as acting rather than thinking, and as having no real mental life. They cannot 
manage internal objects, and are thus empty and without imagination. This 
functioning is summarized by Aisemberg (2007, 2010) as being in the arena of 
Thanatos, which is a drive that disorganizes and disobjectivizes. 
Aisemberg (2010), who co-edited the edited collection with Aisenstein, explains 
that such non-neurotic functioning can coexist with psychoneurotic functioning. 
Somatosis is one manifestation of this non-neurotic psychic functioning, and is 
understood as an expression of the genuine unconscious, as opposed to the 
repressed unconscious of psychoneurotic functioning. Somatosis occurs at the 
point where possibly traumatic sensorial traces that are as yet untransformed, and 
that cannot be converted into drive, are short-circuited into the soma. These sense 
traces are preverbal, archaic experiences and will never become verbal. A trauma 
or significant loss in adult life may set this somatizing process into motion 
(Aisemberg, 2007). 
Thus, according to the Paris School, the process of somatization may occur in one 
of two ways. The first of these routes to somatization is through regression, and the 
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somatization that occurs through regression usually leads to bouts of somatic 
illnesses that are not life-threatening and from which the patient can recover, such 
as asthma or colitis. This somatizing process typically arises in individuals whose 
psychic functioning is on the neurotic–normal spectrum, and occurs when there is 
an irregularity in mental functioning after an experience that overloads work of ego-
binding, such as a trauma. The patient then regresses, with a resulting libidinal 
overcathexis of bodily functioning that leads to a physical system either over- or 
underfunctioning. The regression to this state brings temporary relief to the 
overloaded psyche, and the patient may be able to recover to his or her usual 
psychic efficiency as the situation resolves, or through therapy (Aisenstein, 2008; 
Smadja, 2010, 2011). 
The second somatizing process Aisenstein (2008) and Smadja (2010, 2011) 
describe occurs when the drives become unbound, and the resulting illnesses are 
usually progressive and serious (such as autoimmune diseases or cancer), and 
may even lead to death. This unbinding of drives is usually seen in patients who 
are non-neurotic or in patients who have suffered a psychic trauma so severe that 
it has reopened early, deep narcissistic wounds. 
What the theory of the Paris School suggests, then, is that it is the level of 
mentalization which the individual has achieved that determines which somatizing 
process occurs as well as the final outcome of the symptom. This will be discussed 
further in the following section. 
The conclusion drawn by the psychosomaticiens following the theory outlined in 
this section is that there is no meaning in the form that the physical symptom takes; 
hence, they are more interested in the type of psychological functioning that the 
patient presents with (Oliner, 2010; Sechaud, 2010). Meaning is seen as important, 
but is understood to be a retrospective construction resulting from the work done in 
therapy. This reconstruction and meaning making becomes imperative in the 
patient’s recovery and allows the patient to reintegrate somatic experience by 
making links and working through the conflicts (Aisenstein, 2008). In his paper 
titled “Thoughts on the Paris School of Psychosomatics,” which was included in the 
edited collection, Green (2010) summarizes the view of the Paris School by saying 
that there is no meaning or significance in the form of the physical symptoms, but 
there is meaning and significance in the fact that the individual produced symptoms 
that are physical. 
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What this approach suggests, therefore, is that unlike in the classic formulations of 
psychosoma that can be seen to have originated in Freud’s (1893b) “The 
Psychotherapy of Hysteria from Studies on Hysteria,” the whole issue of the 
meaning of the form that the physical symptom takes is of much less interest to the 
clinician than the underlying psychic structure that resulted in the patient 
developing a symptom in the first place (Gubb, 2010). 
THE PARISIAN PERSPECTIVE ON MENTALIZATION AND THE MIND–BODY 
CONUNDRUM: THE “SPEECHLESS MIND” 
In both the approaches to the treatment of psychosomatic illness under discussion, 
“mentalization” is the process that is identified as fundamental to understanding, 
avoiding, and treating psychosomatic symptoms. It is not surprising therefore that 
what links the Paris School and the Attachment approach is a concern for 
mentalization, but it is important to understand that the term is used differently by 
the two approaches. 
The term “mentalization” was coined by Pierre Marty (1968), one of the founders of 
the Paris School, based on his work with somatizing patients. He observed that 
these patients showed a lack of psychic representations and psychic processing, 
as though their minds were empty. He built his theory of mentalization on the 
foundation of Freud’s view that thought exists between the instinctual demands of 
the body and the actions that are taken to satisfy those demands. Freud underlined 
the importance of bindung, or linking, which occurs in secondary-process thinking, 
and which creates associations between internal states (which were understood in 
energetic terms) and gives them meaning. He differentiates this from primary-
process thinking which is physical, immediate, and without psychic meaning 
(Freud, 1915c). 
Following these Freudian origins, Marty (1968) understood mentalization as the 
mind’s ability to do the work of interpreting and responding to the body’s demands: 
Experiences of pleasure will allow mentalization to develop and to respond to the 
drives and cohere the parts of the mind, while an excess of excitation, and the 
resulting displeasure, causes the individual to have difficulties in the development 
of mentalizing abilities. Consequently, patients who somatize present with 
restricted mental functioning. Marty and de M’Urzan (1963) described this 
“operational thinking” as being devoid of fantasy life and as eroding the patient’s 
relationships with his or her objects. They suggest that, rather than thinking, 
 92 
 
individuals with poorly mentalized structures instead discharge excessive psychic 
excitation in action or via the somatic field in ways that have no symbolic meaning. 
Aisenstein (2008) applies the preceding theory of mentalization to clinical practice. 
She believes that it is important to understand the level of the patient’s ability to 
mentalize in order to work with him or her. Aisenstein explains that since the work 
of binding of representations takes place in the preconscious system, assessing 
the quality of the mentalization of a patient requires that one work at the level of the 
preconscious. She supports Marty’s idea that mentalization can be assessed on 
three axes—depth, fluidity, and lasting quality—but suggests the addition of 
another axis: whether the activity of representation is dominated by the pleasure–
displeasure principle or by automatic repetition. 
The Paris School’s theorists identify problems with mentalization by the way that 
psychosomatic patients present in the therapy room, and they have identified a 
number of ways of engaging that reveal the difficulties somatizing patients have in 
being able to mentalize. These include “operational thinking,” “essential 
depression,” and “alexithymia.” 
Operational or mechanical thinking is factual and makes no use of metaphor, and it 
is not tied to fantasy or symbolization. During analytic work, patients with this kind 
of mental functioning have real difficulties in associating to material and present 
with a narrative that appears to be dead and mechanical, and that is profoundly 
without affect. Functioning in this manner, with its associated reduction in the 
capacity to integrate traumatic events, puts the patient at high risk of becoming 
disorganized somatically (Aisenstein, 2008, 2010). These patients lack the ability to 
do the psychic work of elaborating, or working through, as the connections among 
the parts of their psychic apparatus and between their psychic apparatus and their 
body are non-existent; thus, they are not able to mentalize (Sechaud, 2010). 
Essential depression is characterized by a lack of desire (rather than sadness or 
pain) and little or no emotional life, resulting from a libidinal loss. Patients with this 
form of depression describe just feeling empty (Aisenstein, 2006; Marty, 1968). 
Aisenstein (2008) views it as the negative of the trace of the self-destructive 
movement of the unbinding of the drives. Essential depression often develops 
following trauma, when the disorganization immobilizes and erases all mental 
expression (Smadja, 2010). 
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Alexithymic patients also have difficulties in mentalizing, specifically with putting 
their feelings (both positive and negative) into words. They cannot distinguish one 
affect from another, and have compromised nonverbal emotional expression. They 
often experience interpersonal difficulties, since they find it a struggle to 
understand the behavior of others. Their lack of emotional expression makes it 
difficult for them to elicit empathic emotions from others (Krystal, 1997; McDougall, 
1986). 
Read together, the Paris School of Psychosomatics’ theoretical understandings of 
the cause and genesis of psychosomatic symptoms, the relationship of these 
symptoms to difficulties in mentalization, and the consequent manifestation of the 
symptoms of operational thinking, essential depression, and alexithymia allow one 
to conceive of somatizing patients as having a “speechless mind.” The Paris 
School’s reliance on Freudian economic principles repeats the notion that 
psychosomatosis is related to unbound affect. In this view, people who somatize 
are still operating on the side of the pleasure principle in the pleasure–unpleasure 
series. The development of the ability to mentalize may be likened to the early 
acquisition of the ego and the early instincts, as formulated by Freud. Once this 
development takes place, the mind can become one that has the ability to perform 
such symbolic tasks as speaking, thinking, and remembering, and is thus able to 
express itself without needing to rely on the body to do so in its stead. If this task is 
not completed, the mind cannot speak, as it has not fully developed its capacity to 
think and make physical experiences mental. Such a mind is all affect that is not 
modulated or controlled. This mind cannot express itself as a mind because it is all 
body. 
In the literature I reviewed, it becomes apparent that the members of the Paris 
School are arguing that almost all illnesses that are not caused by a specific 
pathogen can be treated, and in some sense helped, by a specific form of 
psychotherapeutic intervention. This is precisely because of their conceptualization 
of how the body functions and what the mind–body relationship should be in illness 
or in health. The relationship between the physical and the mental is such that if a 
patient has an illness of the physical, it is likely to be closely linked to the level of 
mentalization the patient has achieved. In other words, from an economic point of 
view, what happens to the drive plays a part in the way in which physical illnesses 
function, and, therefore, incapacity in the primary relationship between the body 
and mind (understood here as being expressed by the level of mentalization 
achieved) exacerbates, and may possibly even cause, illnesses. 
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The psychosomaticiens thus present a theory of mentalization that suggests that 
there are possible relative components of the psyche and the soma in any 
psychosomatic illness which are dependent on levels of mentalization achieved by 
the particular patient. It then follows that there is an implicit understanding of the 
type of treatment required and how effective it may be. There is, however, an 
important question that is not identified and addressed in the literature, and that is 
the question of how the Paris School delineates which illnesses are purely 
psychological, which are psychosomatic, and which (if any) are purely physical. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF PSYCHOSOMATIC PATIENTS WITHIN THE 
PARIS SCHOOL 
It is interesting that the psychosomaticiens are very integrated with the medical 
treatment of physically ill patients and that the biological and psychological 
treatments occur hand-in-hand in Paris (Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010). Many 
patients are therefore referred to these clinicians after they have received a 
diagnosis of a medical illness, but they may also seek analysis due to 
psychological difficulties such as anxiety or depression which they do not directly 
associate with physical illness. It is worthy of note that many of the patients who 
have had psychoanalytic treatment “prescribed” following a somatic illness, and 
who have no interest in anything psychological, still manage to remain in treatment 
for many years. Aisenstein (2010) proposes that this is due to what she calls a 
“transference compulsion,” which exists in everyone. In somatizing patients, 
however, this transference compulsion is less developed and integrated than in 
classical transferences, but does still meet the drive’s need that representation is 
transferred from the physical to the mental. This may explain why these patients 
become attached to therapy and to the therapist. 
When a somatising patient is first seen by a clinician from the Paris School, 
whether the patient was referred by a medical doctor or approached the clinician 
directly, he or she will be assessed in an attempt to uncover whether a regression 
or a complete unbinding of the drives is at play, as this School believes that it will 
be one of these factors which is causing the difficulties. This assessment will 
determine how the patient’s pathology is formulated and what form the therapy will 
take (i.e., a classical analysis or a face-to-face therapy) (Aisenstein & Smadja, 
2010). 
Patients who are assessed to be neurotic and somatizing due to regression are 
likely to be offered a classical analysis, while those patients described as non-
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neurotic and presenting with an unbinding of drives are more likely to be offered 
face-to-face treatment (Smadja, 2011). Whichever of these is chosen, the aim of 
the therapy remains the same: trying to awaken in the patient an interest in his or 
her own survival (Oliner, 2010) which he or she may have lost, or never had. This 
is achieved (as in all psychoanalyses) by the fostering of a transferential 
relationship. The transference is an expression of the unconscious, and is also the 
only tool that the analyst has to access these parts of the psychic apparatus. The 
aim therefore is to facilitate the development of a transference and to encourage 
the patient to make use of the fundamental rule in order to allow the unconscious 
derivatives to be revealed to the therapist. Memories can then be constructed from 
the repetitions that play out between patient and analyst in the transference, and in 
the countertransference, since these transferential manifestations are the symbolic 
equivalents of unconscious wishes. Aisenstein (2010) describes how in a 
transference there are many levels of transformation at work. There is the 
transformation from the somatic into the psychic, which is then in turn transformed 
into language, and then there is the transformation of the impulse from one object 
onto another. This final transformation is what ultimately makes it possible for 
regression in the therapy to occur.6 
While working with patients who are experiencing an unbinding of the drives, the 
therapist will not be confronted with the typical defences of neurotic patients, such 
as resistances or compromise-formations, since these somatizing patients often 
present as though they are experiencing no internal conflict at all. Many times the 
only affect appearing out of the unconscious that the patient presents with is 
anxiety, which is used by these patients to avoid any libidinal impulses or activity. 
The therapeutic aim is to make use of the transferential–countertransferential 
relationship to give this anxiety back its meaning and eventually restore it to the 
status of being a real affect (Aisenstein, 2010). In order to achieve this, the 
unconscious derivatives need to be accessed and new material needs to be 
constructed on the primitive traces causing the anxiety. This is done through 
building a positive therapeutic relationship where the primitive experiences of pain 
and nonpleasure are replaced by experiences of pleasure. This occurs as a result 
of a holding, nonjudgmental and validating relationship that starts to structure the 
patient’s mind and organize the repressed unconscious material (Aisemberg, 
                                                          
6
 It appears that Aisenstein (2010) is broadening the concept of “transference” to denote a drive to 
transformation as well as rudimentary relating that occurs in the early stages of treatment with a 
somatising patient, in relation to the more traditional sense, where a patient reenacts a past 
relationship in a current one. As she writes in French and her work is translated, there may be the 
possibility that there are slips in the usage of the concepts of “transference” and “transformation.” 
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2010). The repetitive and consistent nature of the therapy and the transference 
allows the patient to give meaning to the sensorial traces, thus transforming them 
into representations  (Aisemberg, 2007). 
THE ATTACHMENT APPROACH 
Before introducing what I am calling the “Attachment approach” to the treatment of 
psychosomatic illness, it is important to first introduce the notion of attachment and 
its theoretical foundations. What is distinctive about the Attachment approach is the 
way in which the conceptualization of attachment to mentalization unfolds, as well 
as how it is related to the mind–body question in terms of the way in which 
somatizing patients present in therapy, why and how they manifest physical 
symptoms, and the treatment of these symptoms. 
The approach I am attempting to characterize here is rooted in classic 
developmental attachment theory originating with theorists like Bowlby and more 
recently expanded on by authors such as Fonagy, Allen, Bateman, and Target. 
Attachment theory started with the work of Bowlby (1969), who saw the aim of 
attachment as providing the infant with closeness to the caregiver in order for the 
child to feel secure. Advances in attachment theory began to focus more on the 
internal workings of the mind and moved away from Bowlby’s theory that the 
individual’s mind reflected the external world directly. Mary Main’s (1991) 
contributions, specifically, understood the internal workings of the mind in a more 
complex way than Bowlby’s did, but still described the mind in terms of cognitive 
structures and did not give much consideration to the role played by affect. 
The application of psychoanalytic thought has brought a richness to attachment 
theory; in particular, mentalization is a very useful theoretical device with which to 
integrate attachment and psychoanalytic thinking (Jurist, 2005). The foundations of 
the notion of what is now understood as mentalization were seen in Bowlby’s work, 
but were added to significantly by Main in her work on “metacognitive monitoring,” 
which she defined as the individual’s capacity to reflect on and think about his or 
her own thought processes (Main, 1991; Seligman, 2007). She understood that the 
quality of an adult individual’s attachment symbols will determine the level at which 
that individual will be to think about his or her own thinking and, consequently, to 
represent complex emotions and memories accurately (Main, 1995; Slade, 1999). 
Fonagy (Fonagy & Target, 2007) later linked these early ideas to classical 
psychoanalytic concepts such as Freud’s (1915c) linking (Bindung), Klein’s (1975) 
depressive position, and Bion’s (1962) alpha function. 
 97 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The Attachment approach as it is described here does not formally exist, yet on 
reviewing recently published material, a large number of the writers (particularly 
those featured in the special editions of the Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry [2008], and in Psychoanalytic Inquiry 
[2010]) seemed to conceive of and treat psychosomatic illnesses in a similar way. 
The Attachment approach’s theory, as it is explained here, relies mainly on the 
work published in the two special editions cited. Some authors, such as Kohutis 
and Sloate, published work in both special editions, and their work is referred to 
extensively here. This work as it relates to psychosomatic illness may be seen as 
an extension and elaboration of some of the concepts used by the Paris School, 
and often provides evidence for some of the Paris School’s concepts, as a result of 
scientific observations of mothers and infants. 
These attachment theorists do not have a robust and explicit theory about the 
origins of psychosomatic illness, but they do write about and discuss many of the 
same illnesses as the Paris psychosomaticiens (particularly gastrointestinal 
difficulties). Attachment theory is a view based on a theory of normal development 
and focuses on how early attachment experiences influence the infant’s attainment 
of an individuated body. This is a crucial early step in psychological development, 
as the emergence of the mind occurs out of the individual’s sense of a coherent 
body and consequent sense of self (Fonagy, et al., 2004). This consideration of the 
infant’s relationship to its body, in particular, seems to suggest that the Attachment 
approach contains theoretical ingredients that might credibly link it to the 
understanding of psychosomatic illness. 
Attachment theorists state that during uncompromised development, the infant 
integrates sensory, visceral, and motoric excitations with images and words, and in 
this way expands existing emotional schemas. A fundamental aspect of this 
learning is dependent on the parents’ ability to mirror and regulate the infant’s 
emotional states, and in this way help the infant to convert emotional arousal into 
psychic elements that can then be thought about, named, and communicated 
(Fonagy, et al., 2004; Taylor, et al., 1997). The early mother–infant symbiotic 
attachment regulates the way the brain matures after birth, and also influences the 
basic neurobiological stress and affect-regulation systems. Early attachments have 
a profound impact on the child’s physical health, regulation of affect, body ego 
development, and object relations, and also aid in the development of symbolic 
structures. When the attachment relationship is successful and the child 
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experiences pleasure, it will begin to develop an awareness of its physical self as a 
cohered unit (Maunder & Hunter, 2008; Sloate, 2010). The capacity to mentalize 
body and affect requires this type of secure attachment (Griffies, 2010). 
Those attachment theory writings that do exist concerning the origins of 
somatizations in particular suggest that these are due to difficulties experienced by 
the child very early in life, which occur as the child’s mind is forming (Taylor, 
2008a). The authors from the Attachment approach (including Sloate, Griffies, 
Katz, and Taylor, all of whom are published in the two special editions) expand the 
general understanding of attachment and relate it to psychosomatic illness. It is 
their view that when attachment difficulties occur and the mother is unable to 
regulate and organize the child’s experiences, the infant may not develop a 
capacity to modulate its own arousal and other affective states (Maunder & Hunter, 
2008). Psychosomatic patients often describe their mothers as being either 
overpossessive and overwhelming or unattuned to the needs of their child. Authors 
such as Griffies (2010) and Sloate (2010) formulate such cases by understanding 
that this kind of mother may have engaged with her child’s body as though it was 
her own narcissistic possession. In order to function, the individual may develop a 
split in his or her ego that will create a picture of pseudo-normal functioning. This is 
seen in many psychosomatic patients who can achieve great success in isolated 
areas of their lives. However, in creating this split, their unresolved conflicts and 
unprocessed affects, particularly those regarding separation and individuation, 
remain avoided, denied, unintegrated, and never symbolized (Sloate, 2010). 
Griffies (2010) hypothesizes that some of the pain-processing dysfunctions seen in 
somatizing patients may stem partly from such problems in attachments. It is 
therefore possible that the irregularities observed in neuroimages of the basal 
ganglia of patients with chronic pain may be a sign of abnormalities in the neural 
circuits developed in early attachment. He illustrates these points in a paper 
published in the special edition of Psychoanalytic Inquiry by describing a case of a 
patient who suffered from fibromyalgia. The patient remembered his mother’s care 
for him being mechanical and not in line with his needs. Since preverbal 
development, his attention had been exquisitely attuned to the sensations 
stemming from the fusion with his mother’s body, which made it difficult for him to 
perceive and make sense of his own bodily sensations. This was revealed and 
interpreted in the transference by means of his intense sensitivity to any bodily 
movement made by his analyst. This patient’s deficient capacity to mentalize 
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appeared to be a result of his poor separation from his mother and the resulting 
insecure attachment (Griffies, 2010). 
Importantly, this focus by the Attachment approach on the process of separation 
and individuation differentiates them from the Paris School, for whom this is not of 
interest. Many of the cases published by these authors in the two special editions 
discuss the difficulties that the patients had in separating from their mothers. Many 
of them described the experience of having “one body for two” (Katz, 2010; Sloate, 
2010; Taylor, 2008a). In the case of a somatizing patient described by Sloate 
(2008), this played out in the transference when the patient described feeling like 
there was only one body for herself and her therapist. For this particular patient, 
her lack of separation and individuation, as well as the parental prohibitions she 
had internalized against knowing herself, had made it impossible for her to grow up 
and develop past magical thinking to a more advanced level of mentalization. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from a review of this collection of material written 
specifically about psychosomatic illness, as well as about attachment theory more 
generally, is that the separation–individuation phase will need to be worked 
through again in therapy in order to allow the patient to begin to view his or her 
body as his or her own and in that way to start to pay attention to the feelings 
within it. 
While the Attachment approach authors are in agreement on the points described 
thus far, they appear to be divided on the question of whether or not a somatic 
symptom has symbolic meaning. Some of the writers in working in this approach 
state that somatization lacks symbolic meaning, and instead, in a way similar to the 
Paris School, understand it to be the result of compromised development (Beutel, 
Michal, & Subic-Wrana, 2008). However, while many of the cases described by 
these authors did not engage with the questions of the symptom’s symbolism 
explicitly, the cases were formulated in a matter that implied an understanding that 
the physical form that the symptom took was relevant, important and necessarily 
symbolic7 (Griffies, 2010; Kohutis, 2010; Sloate, 2010). 
 
                                                          
7
 In this sense, a symptom is understood as being meaningful and symbolic in the same sense as 
hysterical symptoms. In such cases the form that the symptom takes is in some way related to the 
underlying psychological conflicts experienced by the patient. 
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THE ATTACHMENT PERSPECTIVE ON MENTALIZATION AND THE MIND–BODY 
CONUNDRUM: THE “SPEAKING BODY” 
As stated earlier, “mentalization” is for both approaches a concept that is vital to 
understanding the psychogenesis of psychosomatic illness. It is a term which is 
used widely in the literature of psychosomatics, as well as in current 
psychoanalytic literature more generally. Although the term was coined by the 
Paris School, there are some nuanced and some more significant differences in 
the way that it is used by the Attachment approach. 
The term “mentalization” is used generally by attachment theorists such as Allen, 
Fonagy, and Bateman (2008) to mean “imaginatively perceiving and interpreting 
behaviour of oneself and others as conjoined with intentional mental states, the 
shorthand for which is holding mind in mind” (p. 348). Fonagy (1991) explains that 
for an individual to be able to achieve control over intense affects, he or she needs 
to be able to represent the idea of what an affect is. The attachment theorists see 
mentalization as a form of imaginative mental activity that allows a person to 
perceive and interpret one’s own and others’ behavior (Fonagy, et al., 2004). 
While the Paris School focuses on the binding of the instinctual drives and how 
unpleasure handicaps the development of the psychic structure and thus 
mentalization, the attachment account of mentalization focuses on intersubjective 
and developmental aspects, with particular emphasis placed on the mother’s role 
in helping the infant develop the ability to endure and make sense of affects. 
During normal attachment experiences the infant internalizes the caregiver’s 
empathic expressions and thus develops a secondary representation of his or her 
own emotional state. Infants who are neglected and traumatized may later reveal 
problems in mentalization and self-regulation (Bouchard & Lecours, 2008). If the 
infant experiences either inadequate parental containing and reflective functions or 
trauma during childhood, he or she may experience emotions that are only weakly 
connected with images and words and that are subsequently experienced as 
mainly somatic sensations (Krystal, 1997). He or she may later present with 
somatization, alexithymia, or other medical and psychiatric disorders associated 
with dysregulation of affect (Fonagy, et al., 2004; Taylor, et al., 1997). In summary 
then, there is not a significant difference in the understanding of what mentalization 
is between the Paris School and the Attachment approach; rather, the difference 
lies in the understanding of the factors involved in the development of the ability to 
mentalize. The Paris School emphasized the impact of innate drives and their 
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frustration or satisfaction, while the Attachment approach focuses on the type and 
quality of early interactional experiences. 
The use of the concept of mentalization in general attachment theory has been 
expanded by the theorists of the Attachment approach to apply to the 
understanding and treatment of psychosomatosis. For example, Katz (2010), who 
writes about psychosomatic illness in the special edition of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 
uses the term “mentalization” to describe the reflective function that allows an 
individual to be aware of his or her emotions and thoughts. He explains the role of 
mentalization in preventing somatization by highlighting that the ability to mentalize 
is a significant developmental accomplishment which depends on the child being 
cared for well enough to assist the child in making meaning of his or her 
experiences and thus not to somatize. When an individual has not achieved a 
robust capacity to mentalize, the result may be deficient self- and object-
representations and consequently a reduced capacity to hold overwhelming 
experiences within the mind. The individual then either needs to find someone else 
to contain the experience—distancing himself or herself from the intense emotion 
by acting out physically or projecting it into someone or something else—or to 
thrust it into the body in the form of illness or pain. So in summary, from the 
Attachment approach’s perspective, mentalizing is the intrapsychic capacity that 
contains and transforms bodily experiences. When it is deficient or unavailable, 
one needs to make use of other techniques of handling emotions. One such 
method is somatization, where unbearable and chaotic feelings are forced from the 
experiencing mind, leaving behind them physical residues of affect that continue to 
work on the body. 
The question that is raised by this understanding of mentalization is how a patient 
with this form of psychic structure will present in therapy. Just as the Paris School 
links essential depression, operational thinking, and alexithymia to poor 
mentalization and the psychosomatic processes, the Attachment approach links 
concrete thinking to psychosomatosis. 
People who are “concrete” tend to describe events rather than reflecting on them, 
and only attribute meaning to objects that can be perceived through touch or sight. 
They also experience emotions as events that happen to them, rather than as their 
own distinct responses to experiences. This way of being may not simply be a 
defense, but often suggests that the individual is unable to think abstractly, to 
symbolize, to reflect on himself or herself, or to tolerate uncertainty. It is well 
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accepted in the literature reviewed here that somatizing patients typically think very 
concretely (Kohutis, 2008, 2010; Taylor, 2008a; Tylim, 2010). 
Kohutis (2010), for example, describes a case of a patient with irritable bowel 
syndrome in the Psychoanalytic Inquiry special edition. This patient knew the 
names of negative affects intellectually, but could not associate them with the way 
he experienced himself. During the therapy he was eventually able to integrate his 
feelings into his self-experience and could then talk about them freely rather than 
having to act them out in criticisms, control, and diarrhea as he had done 
previously. 
In an earlier work published in the Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry special edition, Kohutis (2008) relates the 
concepts of concrete thinking to alexithymia when she asks whether her patient 
who engaged in a very concrete manner and who presented with gastrointestinal 
and gynaecological problems was alexithymic. She argues that alexithymic 
patients have difficulties with identifying and describing their feelings and also have 
a limited fantasy and dream life. They tend to view the world literally and make little 
use of symbolic thinking. Unlike most alexithymic patients, Kohutis’s patient was a 
prolific dreamer. Kohutis makes sense of this apparent contradiction by referring to 
Krystal (1997), who points out that alexithymic patients might be able to dream, but 
they will not be able to associate to their dreams, just as Kohutis’s (2008) patient 
was not able to do so. Kohutis then seems to be creating a parallel between the 
understanding of operational thinking and of alexithymia and the understanding of 
concrete thinking. 
Taken together, the Attachment approach’s conception of the relationship among 
concrete thinking, mentalization, attachment theory, and psychosomatic illness is 
conceived of in Kohutis’s paper as the “speaking body.” Attachment theory 
emphasizes how emotions and experiences are initially physical, and it is a 
developmental task to learn how to read, interpret, and make sense of these 
physical stimuli. When problems occur in this process, and the mind does not learn 
to think, symbolize, and communicate, the body does so instead. 
What is revealed after reviewing the work in the collection Psychosomatics Today 
is that the Attachment approach theorists appear to engage with illnesses implicitly 
described as psychosomatic using the same theory of mentalization that they have 
applied to a number of other illnesses traditionally seen as being psychological. 
This approach would thus define an illness as being psychosomatic if it is in any 
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way related to unexpressed, inaccessible or disavowed emotions. The Attachment 
theorists therefore do not have a theory of psychosoma in particular, but view all 
suffering that can be treated by way of a talking cure in the classic psychoanalytic 
tradition as being related to early development. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF PSYCHOSOMATIC PATIENTS BASED ON THE 
ATTACHMENT APPROACH 
While the Paris School has clear ideas on how different types of psychic 
functioning may result in the patient presenting with different types of illnesses, 
theorists from the emerging Attachment paradigm do not take a clear stand on 
which psychosomatic mechanisms are associated with which illnesses. The 
Attachment approach does not propose different underlying mechanisms (e.g., 
unbinding or regression) in different physical illnesses and therefore treats all 
psychosomatic illnesses in the same manner. However, the cases described in the 
collection of Attachment literature reviewed include many of the same illnesses that 
the Paris School engages with, such as cancer, chronic pain syndromes, irritable 
bowel syndrome, and colonitis. 
Unlike the patients of the Paris School therapists, the patients described by the 
Attachment theorists were not “prescribed” psychotherapy by medical doctors, and 
all sought psychotherapy of their own volition. What is more, the majority of these 
patients did not seek therapy in order to treat their physical illness, but instead 
began therapy in order to better manage the psychological difficulties they 
experienced in coping with their physical illness, or for other unrelated 
psychological difficulties (Griffies, 2010). Like patients described by the therapists 
from the Paris School, many of these patients denied any connection between their 
emotional life and their physical malady (Sloate, 2010). 
In treating patients with psychosomatic disorders, the Attachment literature 
reviewed describes the aim of the treatment to be for the therapist to help to 
maintain the patient’s self- and object representations within his or her reach so 
that the patient can slowly develop a capacity for independent mentalization. In 
other words, the therapeutic task is to assist the patient in creating a psychological 
space in which he or she becomes aware of, and curious about, his or her mind 
and body and the relationship between them, so that the patient can begin to hold 
on to his or her own experiences and to reflect on them, instead of simply ejecting 
them into the body (Katz, 2010). Until the patient has developed such a mentalizing 
mind, interpretation (which is by definition metaphorical and symbolic) is not 
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beneficial (Griffies, 2010), so the therapy begins by helping the patient recognize 
and then verbalize his or her physical and psychic experiences. 
This was illustrated in many of the cases discussed in the two special editions, 
where the authors described that as the patient’s reflective capacity developed, 
somatization was no longer the patient’s sole mode of expression. Patients began 
to realize the importance of putting physical experiences into words, and to see 
how foreign they had previously found that form of expression. When they 
previously could not find words, they had made use of their soma (Ginieri-
Coccossis & Vaslamatzis, 2008; Kohutis, 2010). As mentalization is fortified, the 
capacity for cognitive-emotional differentiation is enhanced, which allows patients 
to consciously process memories and affects that were previously repressed and 
dissociated. As these are worked through psychologically, they will no longer need 
to be played out in physical terms (Beutel, et al., 2008). The symbolism in the form 
that the physical symptoms takes gives clues to the underlying difficulties; when 
the symbolism is accessed and decoded, the patient and therapist can make sense 
of the symptoms. Thus, the patient can slowly be helped toward more effective or 
functional mentalization, bringing the conflicts and difficulties into the realm of the 
mind and of thought, and ultimately of language and speech. 
As is true in psychoanalysis generally, as therapy progresses, conflicts will begin to 
be acted out in the transference. The analytic frame, and the associated holding 
and containing functions, together with the new object relationship that develops 
help the patient to understand his or her destructive enactments on the body, and 
allow the patient to develop new patterns of behaviour without fear of retaliation, 
overstimulation, or boundary breaches— in other words, to separate and 
individuate safely (Sloate, 2008; Taylor, 2008b). The patient will then develop 
through the psychosexual stages toward health. In other words, the initial treatment 
phase with these patients aims to help them develop enough of a mind so that they 
then will be able to enter treatment proper—where the approach that is used is not 
specific to the form of illness that the patient presents with. 
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
PSYCHOSOMATOSIS 
Given the Paris School’s understanding of the different possible mechanisms at 
work behind any illness that they perceive to be psychosomatic, it follows that they 
would believe that psychoanalytic treatment would be of use. Since the patient’s 
psyche is seen as playing a part in the origin of the illness (the “speechless mind”), 
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treatment is aimed at that very problem. The Paris School does not make claims 
about being able to cure any illness, but does assert that psychoanalytic 
intervention may halt the spread and development of an illness. 
Following this understanding that psychosomatic illnesses result from 
compromised levels of mental functioning, it is important for the analyst to adjust 
and temper any interpretations made so that they will fit with the patient’s level and 
type of psychic functioning. At all times the therapist should bear in mind the 
economic cost of the illness to the patient and the stage of progression it is in. 
Smadja (2011) refers to Marty when describing this vigilance and adaptation of the 
therapist, and characterizes the process that unfolds as moving “from the maternal 
function to psychoanalysis” (p. 229). 
While the Attachment approach offers an explanation of the development of 
psychosomatic illness, it does not seem to suggest that this understanding requires 
an adjustment in technique in order to treat these patients. The focus would 
instead be on building links between somatic sensations and their meaning, or, in 
other words, allowing the “speaking body” to hand back communication to the 
mind. There is no requirement to change the format of the therapy, only the timing 
and format of the interpretations. 
The Paris School describes how demanding it often is to be attuned to 
psychosomatic patients in the way required because of the difficulties in making 
therapeutic contact with alexithymic and operational patients, who function in a 
rationalizing rather than reflective way. Bronstein (2011) calls the initial relationship 
between the therapist and such patients a “relation blanche” and describes it as 
having no real emotional involvement. It is imperative therefore that the focus is 
always on keeping the psychotherapeutic relationship alive or giving it life, as it is 
this which reorganizes the patient’s psyche. The therapist must defend against 
feeling bored and uninterested in treating these disconnected and unresponsive 
patients. Authors such as Smadja (2011) suggest making use of psychodrama and 
playful interpretation in order to achieve a flowing and alive conversation while still 
maintaining the analytic stance. 
It is not only during treatment that caution is required; it is also imperative that the 
therapist is cautious at the termination of treatment. Although a patient may appear 
to have stabilized both psychologically and physically, a break or end in the 
treatment could result in the regeneration of a progressive illness with serious 
consequences (Smadja, 2011). Fischbein (2011) describes a sign of such a 
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deterioration, which may occur at any point in a treatment, as an absence of 
dreams in the patient’s narrative or the appearance of repetitive, operational, or 
“raw” dreams. These are indicative of the impact of a new trauma on the patient’s 
psyche and should serve as a warning to the therapist. 
This link between dreaming and psychosomatosis is also of great interest in the 
Attachment approach, whose theorists write prolifically about the relationship 
between dreaming and somatization. It is generally accepted as true that due to 
the concrete, asymbolic functioning that psychosomatic patients present with, there 
will be fewer dreams presented in therapy (Griffies, 2010). It is interesting, 
however, that this was not true in many of the case histories presented (Griffies, 
2010; Kohutis, 2008). 
The fact that many of the somatizing patients discussed by the Attachment 
approach did report dreams that were used in their treatment suggests the 
conclusion that symbolic and nonsymbolic mental functioning may occur alongside 
each other, depending on the patient and his or her circumstances. It might also 
suggest that fixations may occur at a number of different levels during the 
development of the ability to mentalize and, depending on this fixation point, the 
individual may dream more or less frequently. The dream content may be restricted 
or unlimited, and the patient may or may not be able to reflect on the dream and 
associate to its content. 
Griffies (2010), for example, discusses a somatizing patient who was able to 
symbolize enough to produce a dream, but was not able to self-reflect (or 
mentalize) about the dream’s meaning. Similarly, Kohutis (2008) presented a 
patient who dreamed frequently about houses. These dreams played a significant 
role in the treatment, although they had very limited content. In this treatment the 
dreams never developed into anything like a classical analytic dialogue, since the 
process that took place was the patient recounting her dreams and the analyst 
reflecting on them. The dreams did, however, provide a common language and 
space for the patient and analyst to work in. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that while these examples are rich and add to the understanding of the individual 
cases, they do not appear to be particular to psychosomatosis, since any concrete 
patient may present with such dreams, but may not necessarily somatize. The link 
between certain types of dreams, concrete thinking, and psychosomatic illness is 
not yet well developed enough in the literature to be of any diagnostic significance. 
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Interestingly by contrast, none of the Paris cases in the material reviewed included 
any dream material. While there was no explicit commentary about the interactions 
of dreams and somatization, the lack of comment implies that it may not be an area 
of specific interest or focus. Secondary references comment that alexithymic 
patients do not typically report many dreams, and this implies that there is a known 
link between psychosomatosis and diminished dream activity (Krystal, 1997). 
Dreaming is a good prognostic sign in a therapy, as it demonstrates that a level of 
symbolization and creativity does exist in the patient’s psyche. When the patient 
begins to produce dreams, it may suggest that his or her ability to mentalize is 
occurring at higher and more complex levels. 
Fischbein (2011) writes from the Paris perspective, but his view reflects that of both 
approaches when he emphasizes that mental organization and its work provide 
protection for the patient from psychosomatosis. It follows, therefore, that the more 
plentiful and varied the products of psychological work are, the less chance there is 
of somatization in particular. The contrary is also true, and when the psyche is 
disorganized or impoverished, there is more chance that the patient will begin to 
somatize when better defenses fail. 
DISCUSSION 
The complexity that arises when trying to compare these bodies of theorists is that 
one group has an explicit and elaborated theory of psychosoma in particular, while 
the other does not. The Paris School has a theory that includes an understanding 
of the drives and how these are involved in mentalization. This approach does not 
have an explicit distinction between illnesses they would describe as 
psychosomatic and other physical illnesses, and this question is not addressed. So 
while the theory appears to apply to psychosoma in particular, the question is 
never raised theoretically about whether there are any other forms of illness (i.e., 
purely physical suffering, or purely mental suffering). Since the theory includes the 
idea that there are different levels of mentalization that can be achieved, and thus 
different degrees of somatizing, it is implicit, however, that there could be illnesses 
which are purely physical. The Paris School theorists do not explicitly say why 
some illnesses, such as rheumatic fever, are not treated psychoanalytically while 
some illnesses, such as cancer, are. 
The Attachment approach does not have a theory of psychosoma in particular. In 
the interest of treating patients with illnesses assumed to have a psychosomatic 
dimension, this approach makes use of the general attachment theory of 
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mentalization and relates all forms of both bodily and psychic health to failed 
attachment. This school approaches all suffering that can be treated by way of a 
talking cure as being related to early development in the classic psychoanalytic 
tradition.  
The consequence of these difficulties is that the literature, then, has all of the 
richness and many of the problematic aspects associated with a theory that does 
not delimit its object of intervention. While both schools have identifiable theoretical 
underpinnings, neither of the approaches specifies the particular domain of their 
intervention, and they do not answer the question of what distinguishes 
psychosomatic illness from other sorts of illnesses. 
The apparent unconcern around this lack of clarity may stem from the observation 
that in psychoanalysis, as well as other areas of research and therapy, there is an 
increasing drive for less duality in the understanding of the relationship between 
the body and the mind. This is particularly true in the field of psychosomatics, 
although, as we have seen, different paradigms understand the mind–body 
relationship in different ways. 
Having reviewed the literature on psychosomatic illness contained in recent 
publications, and having considered the two broad approaches contained in that 
literature, a number of similarities and differences have emerged in the 
understanding of the mechanisms at play as well as the diagnosis and treatment of 
psychosomatic illness based in the mind–body relationship. 
As has already been noted, although the topic being discussed is physical illness, 
there is little in the material reviewed that comments directly on the types of 
physical symptoms that are targeted specifically by psychoanalytic therapy. The 
Paris School does classify groups of illnesses by their underlying psychosomatic 
origins, as well as making some comments on the different ways these categories 
of illnesses are treated. The Attachment approach does not, however, engage with 
the idea directly, but all the cases reviewed included the same kinds of illnesses as 
those discussed in the literature aligned with the Paris School. The physical 
illnesses targeted by psychoanalysis are illnesses where the body’s functioning 
becomes unregulated and an organ or a system over- or underfunctions. They are 
thus illnesses where it is the “self” that is causing the illness (rather than an 
external pathogen), and where the body appears to attack itself, such as in 
autoimmune diseases or cancer. This implies that illnesses that are caused by 
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infections or bacteria are understood as having different causes, and thus receive 
no attention in this literature. 
One of the biggest differences between the two approaches discussed is their 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in the origin and genesis of 
psychosomatic illness, which is related to their divergent theories about both infant 
development and what is understood to be at the origin of psychic life. The Paris 
School stresses the importance of the drive and sees the roots of psychosomatic 
illness as being in excessive physical sensations and the consequent need to 
reduce this unpleasant stimulation. The mind cannot make sense of such 
experiences and is unable to transfer them into entities that can be thought 
about—this is described here as the “speechless mind.” By implication, the Paris 
School focuses more on individual constitutions than on early object relations. The 
Attachment theorists come out of an object relations tradition and give an 
alternative explanation for the genesis of psychosomatic symptoms. In this 
conceptualization, something goes wrong in the object relations when the mother 
cannot regulate the child’s affects; the child thus does not develop the necessary 
level of mentalization to reflect on experiences, and instead expresses them in his 
or her body—by way of the “speaking body.” As a result of their object relations 
roots and focus on the interpersonal, the Attachment theorists consider difficulties 
that occur during the separation–individuation phase to be important in the 
development of psychosomatic symptoms. When the child has an experience that 
there is only one body between himself or herself and Mother, the child may have 
difficulties identifying and making sense of his or her own bodily experiences. This 
is not a focus of the Paris School. Both theories, however, consider psychosomatic 
symptoms to be a result of psychic deficits rather than of the intrapsychic conflicts 
that result in neurotic symptoms (Bronstein, 2011). 
Another important difference between the approaches is their understanding of the 
meaning of the form that the physical symptom takes. The debate that started 
between early theorists such as Deutsch and Alexander continues today. Theorists 
of the Paris School see no meaning in the form of the symptom (Oliner, 2010; 
Sechaud, 2010). There is some debate about this among the Attachment theorists, 
but the thrust is toward meaning. In the cases discussed in the literature reviewed, 
it appears that the meaning that the symptom holds has to do with the manner in 
which the object is taken in, and whether there was an identification with some sort 
of physical aspect of a primary object. An example of this was Tylim’s (2010) case 
in the special edition of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, in which the patient’s diarrhea was 
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linked to his identification with his mother, whom his father had described as being 
dirty. This case therefore demonstrates the patient’s difficulties in mentalization, as 
the idea seemed to have been taken in as a form of a very concrete “symbolic 
equation” (Segal, 1957) rather than being thought about symbolically. 
As described earlier, there are some major and some subtle differences in the way 
that the two approaches understand mentalization. The Paris School understands 
mentalization in terms of economic theory and intrapsychic mechanisms, and 
maintains that pleasurable experiences foster psychic cohesion and the ability to 
mentalize, while displeasure disrupts psychic cohesion, thereby handicapping the 
development of mentalization. The Attachment theorists understand the 
development of mentalization in interpersonal, object relation terms, asserting that 
caregivers help children to regulate their affects and that this is what allows the 
child to develop the ability to mentalize. Negative or traumatic experiences in 
childhood interrupt the development of mentalization. An interesting overlap is that 
Marty’s (1968) formulation of the ability to mentalize included the power to 
associate as well as permanence and stability of internal objects, and in this way is 
very similar to what Bowlby described as the psychological faculties of the securely 
attached child (Fonagy, 1999). 
An area where the two approaches do appear to agree is the view that the task of 
the therapist might change through the process of therapy. The Attachment 
approach proposes that there is an initial stage in the treatment that fosters the 
development of mentalization; once this is achieved, the patient is able to enter 
analysis proper. This concept seems to relate to the Paris School’s idea that some 
patients might do better by starting with face-to-face therapy and then eventually 
moving onto the couch. 
Having discussed the similarities and differences between the schools, it is 
important to note that within each of the schools there are also some areas of 
difference or contradiction. An example in the Paris School is Aisenstein (2006), 
who sees psychosomatic illness as an extension of Freud’s “actual neurosis,” while 
Smadja (2011) states that psychosomatic illness falls into what Freud called 
“illnesses of the body.” It may be this very sort of contradiction that leads to the 
complications in the Paris School described earlier, wherein there is confusion 
about exactly which illnesses are included as “psychosomatic” and which are not. 
An example of internal difference in the Attachment paradigm is that a small 
number of these theorists question whether there is any symbolic meaning in the 
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form that the physical symptom takes (Beutel, et al., 2008), whereas the majority of 
the Attachment theorists take the stance that the symptom’s form is meaningful. 
This paper has attempted to give a coherent account of each school, but there are 
some inconsistencies in the positions held within each school. 
The differences in the two approaches to psychoanalytic treatment interventions 
appear to be subtle, and possibly no more dissimilar than what one would see on 
different continents anyway. While the theoretical underpinnings of the origins of 
psychosomatosis are substantially different, there are certainly some areas of 
similarity. This may mean that it is not beholden upon any analyst to locate himself 
or herself in any particular school or paradigm in order to successfully treat a 
somatizing patient. It seems that the clinician’s understanding of the origin of the 
symptom only affects the treatment approach regarding questions such as whether 
the treatment should take place face-to-face or on the couch. However, following 
those initial decisions, the aim of the treatment in both the approaches, despite the 
significant and interesting differences between the two paradigms, is to help the 
patient become interested in the contents of his or her own mind, the sensations of 
his or her own body, and the relationship between the body and the mind, as well 
as to explore the transference relationship that develops between analyst and 
patient. The two approaches are therefore not mutually exclusive. In the literature 
reviewed, therapists from each of the treatment approaches described positive 
changes in their patients’ health—both psychological and physical—and thus 
understood the treatment to have been successful. 
CONCLUSION 
It is my opinion that the most important aspect that the two approaches have in 
common is that the intervention on the bodily symptoms is made via speech. This 
implies that there is an understanding that bodily suffering is intimately connected 
to psychic suffering and that both of these can be treated by means of the mind via 
language. The very basis of the “talking cure” is that words can interact with 
feelings and in this way create both psychic and physical change (Bucci, 2010)—
that the therapist can make contact with both the conceptual “speechless mind” or 
the “speaking body” and cultivate the development of mentalization, so that the 
patient can move away from either of these problematic positions to one which 
better promotes both physical and mental health. 
Both the speaking body and the speechless mind are concerned with forms of 
illness that can be described as psychosomatic, and both arise from some form of 
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disturbance or inadequacy in what belongs in the mind and what belongs in the 
body due to problems in mentalization. It is mentalization that underpins the form 
that the relationship between body and mind takes. 
Both schools argue for a conceptual unity of body and mind as a goal or 
requirement, and see body and mind as being intimately connected and yet 
necessarily functionally separate since early development: They must work in 
tandem, but they must work differently. The mind must be able to take account of 
the body’s affects and appropriately allocate meaning to them, rather than letting 
the body itself do the meaning making. In other words, the work of sensation (both 
pleasure and unpleasure) must be located primarily in the logic and function of the 
body, while the work of making sense of these sensations and interpreting them 
must be located in the mind. Psychic health is dependent upon this ability to 
spontaneously achieve the capacity to distinguish between pain and meaning. 
As the very term “psychosoma” suggests, the ways in which the body and the mind 
are related in someone presenting with a psychosomatic illness involve a transfer 
of the functions and locations of the relationship between the mind and the body. In 
psychosomatic illness the forms of the connection between the mind and body are 
in some way deformed, and functional elements of that ongoing complex 
connection have somehow not been established as functionally distinctive, either 
developmentally or in some return to a bodily focus due to a trauma. The 
Attachment approach conceives of this in terms of the body behaving as if it was a 
mind; in the case of the Paris School, the mind is behaving as though it were 
purely body. However, both schools suggest that the aim of therapy is for bodies 
and minds to express themselves in conjunction, but in the right registers, in the 
right locations, and with the right emphases. This will allow the patient to “speak” 
his or her mind, and not his or her body. 
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CHAPTER 6:  THE ANALYST’S PHYSICAL 
RESPONSE TO THE PATIENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The paper in this chapter is entitled “Craving Interpretation: A Case of Somatic 
Countertransference” and is the first of the two papers which make up the second 
half of the thesis which focuses on the body of the therapist. The paper has been 
provisionally accepted for publication by the accredited journal “The British Journal 
of Psychotherapy” in August 2013 pending some minor changes which are 
currently being processed8.  
The first half of the thesis is a theoretical understanding of how psychic symptoms 
can manifest in the body. The second part has more of a clinical orientation and 
focuses on the body of the analyst rather than the body of the patient. It is not 
saying that the analyst’s body is necessarily symptomatic, but is suggesting there 
are concepts from that original literature that are useful in understanding how the 
analyst’s body can present in a therapy, and how it might become a  therapeutic 
object. 
The paper has a clinical emphasis and advances some of the ideas presented in 
the first two papers. This third paper mirrors the work done in the first two papers 
by suggesting that the same mechanisms are at work when the analyst 
experiences bodily ‘symptoms’ as when the patient somatises (as described in the 
first two papers). The paper proposes that what the therapist has learnt thus far 
about the nature of somatisation, then needs to be applied by themselves to 
themselves. The paper gives a clinical example of how this may done, and 
suggests that the therapist’s reverie does the interpretive work about the therapist’s 
own ‘somatisation’ that the therapist’s free floating attention and interpretation 
would do for the patient.  
One of the most important of ideas in the paper is an extension of the common 
understanding that it is the therapist’s role to foster mentalization in the patient, and 
in fact that the therapist may even need to mentalize on behalf of the patient on the 
                                                          
8
 This paper was published during the time that the thesis was being examined. Copyright for this 
manuscript resides with the publisher: British Journal of Psychotherapy. Citation: Gubb, K. (2014). 
Craving interpretation: A case of somatic countertransference. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 
30(1), 51–67. 
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assumption that there are times when material that is unavailable to the patient’s 
mind is being revealed physically in the patient’s pathology. The task of therapy 
could therefore be conceived of as the therapist promoting the development of the 
patient’s ability to mentalize by means of their own mentalization. The second set 
of two papers expands on this notion by suggesting that it is as important for the 
therapist to apply the process of mentalization to their own bodies and to carefully 
attend to what doing so may reveal about what has, until that point, not been 
available to the therapist.  
The paper is therefore advocating that if focus is given to the therapeutic dyad 
which the contemporary writings on countertransference recommends it should, it 
then becomes necessary to theorise the clinical practice to include thoughts on 
how the therapist should read and engage with her own “failures” of mentalization 
that emerge at the level of the body and engage in a process which gives meaning 
to these physical experiences and moves them to the realm of the mental. The 
argument is therefore being made that the therapist needs to take the impact of the 
patient on her own body seriously, and to interpret this in the context of the dyadic 
relationship 
The clinical development which thinks of the notion of countertransference in a 
wider sense than what was originally presented by Freud, together with the more 
contemporary move in the countertransference literature which brings the other 
half of the therapeutic dyad – the therapist – into greater focus than might 
previously have been the case, facilitates this opening up of the idea of the 
therapist’s own body emerging in the room, and enables the therapist to think 
about the moments in the therapy where they may not have been able to 
(immediately) mentalize. It is these historical and theoretical moves which open the 
door to the second half of the study. 
The paper makes the specific points that Ogden’s understanding of reverie makes 
it possible for the analyst to engage in reverie specifically relating to any somatic 
experiences that might occur during a particular treatment. It will therefore suggest 
that while reverie is broadly a part of the literature on technique, it is also an 
instrument of mentalization.  
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The research questions which are directly addressed by this paper are: 
• What information about the therapeutic dynamics are revealed by the 
therapist’s physical response to the patient, and how can this be used in the 
treatment? 
• What might the patient’s references to the therapist’s body reveal about the 
therapeutic dyad, and how can this information be used therapeutically? 
• What are the potential benefits of paying particular attention to the 
embodiedness of both members of the therapeutic pair? 
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PAPER 3: CRAVING INTERPRETATION: A CASE OF 
SOMATIC COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary psychoanalysis views the countertransference as equally important to 
the therapeutic endeavour as its counterpart, the transference. This paper focuses on 
a particular kind of countertransference phenomena: those which are bodily in form 
and perceivable to the patient. It begins with a brief rehearsal of some of the 
fundamental psychoanalytic principles related to bodily symptoms, and then reviews 
the developments and changes that have occurred in the understanding of the 
concept of countertransference. The focus then shifts to theoretical developments 
around somatic countertransference in particular, and the division seen in the 
literature between authors who locate the source of the phenomenon of somatic 
countertransference in the patient’s unconscious, and those who locate it in the 
therapist’s personality or psychic history. The paper will argue that while attempting to 
characterise somatic countertransferences into a generalizable set of personality 
types of either the patient or therapist may provide a general understanding of the 
phenomenon, exploring the uniqueness and specificity of the therapeutic dyad will 
reveal important information about the dynamics at work in the therapy.  The paper 
uses a clinical example to illustrate the specificity of the form that a somatic 
countertransference takes in a particular therapy. It then proposes that in order to 
make sense of the rich information that this unique response provides, the therapist 
must mentalize and make meaning of her particular somatic experience by way of a 
therapeutic analysis of reverie. The paper concludes with several comments on issues 
to consider when working with perceivable somatic countertransferences in particular. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is located within the context of attempting to ‘mind’ what the analyst’s 
body can bring to a therapeutic process. The paper focuses on moments in the 
therapy when the analyst’s body enters the room in ways that cannot be controlled 
by the analyst and on how engaging with these moments may lead to therapeutic 
gains. The paper concentrates specifically on those countertransferential bodily 
phenomena which are perceivable by the patient. 
In contemporary psychoanalysis, countertransference is seen as being equally 
fundamental to the analytic endeavour as its complementary process, the 
transference (Carlson, 2009). However, somatic countertransferences receive less 
attention than more common, ‘mental’ forms of countertransference such as the 
analyst’s thoughts and fantasies. It is likely that this is because 
countertransferential manifestations in the form of thoughts or fantasies are in the 
same register (i.e. language) as that in which therapy takes place. 
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Understanding somatic countertransferences can result in useful therapeutic gains, 
but these phenomena can often be difficult to deal with and complex to understand. 
The mere fact that these are bodily reactions may make them less controllable, 
less easy to disguise and less easy to interpret than other forms of 
countertransference. When these reactions are perceived by the patient they may 
become even more alarming to the therapist as they reveal material about the 
therapist before the therapist has a chance to interpret and understand it herself. 
Considered widely and generally, “psychosomatic” events in the analyst are 
commonly seen as pathological and problematic failures of mentalization. This 
pejorative view is unhelpful and does not encourage these experiences to be 
considered and understood. The paper attempts to challenge that view and instead 
argues for the clinical usefulness of paying attention to bodily countertransference 
reactions, particularly those perceivable to the patient, in order to reveal the 
psychodynamics at work in the particular dyad. The paper begins by briefly framing 
the theoretical context in which it is positioned, and then makes use of a case 
example in order to illustrate the points being made.  
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
In order to place this paper in a theoretical context, it is important to briefly review 
two areas of psychoanalytic literature. The first of these is the psychopathology 
behind psychosomatic responses, and the second is the literature regarding 
somatic countertransferences. 
PSYCHOSOMATIC RESPONSES  
The earliest understandings of symptom formation and the interpretation of those 
symptoms was generated by Freud’s work on Hysteria. This work understood that 
mental conflict could be expressed in bodily terms (Breuer & Freud, 1893; Freud, 
1912d). Hysterical symptoms were treated in the mode of language using 
interpretations which were intended to lift the repression of the traumatic memories 
which lay behind the symptoms, and to transform these, and their related wishes, 
from physical symptoms into psychological objects. The aim of this treatment was 
for the analyst to aid the patient to develop insight into the symptom and into the 
unconscious meaning behind its form (Freud, 1905).  
I am suggesting that when the countertransference is somatic, similar processes 
may be at work and that therapists then needs to ‘mind’ their own body by 
uncovering and interpreting the meaning behind their own physical response. In 
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other words, there should be a diagnostic, interpretive dimension to the 
psychoanalytic practice of making use of somatic countertransferences in the 
therapy room. 
SOMATIC COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 
While there is a substantial body of literature on countertransference generally, 
there is less written about somatic countertransference in particular. The area of 
countertransference is theoretically complex and its development is tracked and 
commented on by authors including Gabbard (1995, 2001), Richards (1989), Smith 
(2000) and Zachrisson (2009). The concept has undergone two fundamental shifts 
since it was first introduced by Freud (1910b) where it was understood as the 
analyst’s transference to the patient’s transference and viewed as a difficulty which 
analysts should do their best to overcome. Following the work of Winnicott (1958), 
Little (1951), Racker (1957, 1968) and particularly Heimann’s (1950) paper “On 
Counter Transference”, the concept of countertransference has now come to 
include all the feelings and reactions that the analyst experiences while in relation 
to a patient (Jacobs, 1999; Lazar Smith, 1990; Young, 1995). This wider view of 
the concept further suggests that all countertransference reactions can be used in 
order to gain a deeper understanding of the patient, and sees countertransference 
as the analyst’s reaction to the patient’s unconscious dynamics and how these 
manifest in the therapy, rather than being merely a reflection of the analyst’s own 
internal, unconscious material (Epstein & Feiner, 1979; Zachrisson, 2009). Most 
importantly, this widely accepted, broader understanding no longer sees 
countertransference as problematic and something to be avoided, but rather as a 
helpful tool to be added to the therapist’s repertoire (Epstein & Feiner, 1979; 
Zachrisson, 2009).  
The second important shift is as a result of the more contemporary view of 
countertransference which does not look for the origin of a countertransference in 
either the therapist or the patient alone, but instead understands that it is the 
unique material that develops in that particular therapeutic dyad which results in 
the specific countertransference manifestation. Gabbard (1995, 2001) describes 
this understanding of countertransference as the patient drawing the therapist into 
playing a role that reflects the patient’s internal world, but that the specific 
dimensions of that role are coloured by the therapist’s own life history.  
Despite the various definitions and understandings of countertransference, one 
point which is not disputed is that it is essential that the analyst detect and name 
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the countertransference (even if only to herself) in order for the clinical endeavour 
to progress effectively (Schwaber, 1992). Any concern about somatic 
countertransference in particular is rooted in the general moves in the acceptance 
of countertransference generally as these moves have allowed for an interest in 
the analyst’s responses to the patient as well as the development of tools to make 
sense of these responses. 
Much of the theoretical writing that does exist on somatic countertransference 
seems to be divided into two categories: the first category is concerned with the 
kind of patients who are likely to elicit somatic countertransferences, while the 
second explores the kinds of traits, defences and personal histories that might 
make it more likely for an analyst to experience somatic countertransferences.  
Authors who locate the source of a somatic countertransference in the patient 
include McLaughlin and Samuels, who focussed their writings on the types of 
patients who are likely to produce somatic countertransferences. McLaughlin 
(1975) identified two types of patients. The first type is patients who use defences 
that control and dull anyone they deal with, while the second type includes 
borderline and psychotic patients.  
Following McLaughlin’s work, Samuels (1985) conducted empirical research on 
somatic countertransference. His results also situated the source of the 
countertransference in the patient. Samuels’s research noted that patients who 
presented with instinctual problems, such as difficulties regarding sex, aggression 
or eating, were more likely to evoke a physical countertransferential response 
(Samuels, 1985).  
Focussing particularly on countertransference feelings of hunger, Greene (2001)  
suggests that hunger in the therapist generally represents deprivation that the 
patient is beginning to explore, and that the deprivation is resonating with a 
deprived place in the therapist. Greene’s work is starting to suggest the idea that 
for a somatic countertransference to develop, it is a combination of the patient’s 
pathology and the therapist’s psyche that play a role. 
In contrast, Jacobs (1973) and Stone (2006) focussed their attention on 
researching what it is about a therapist that makes it more likely that he or she 
would experience countertransferences somatically. Jacobs proposed three 
circumstances which might result in the countertransference taking a physical form: 
firstly,  when the patient’s material revives similar past physical experiences in the 
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therapist; secondly, if a therapist is consistently faced with material that relates to 
highly conflictual bodily experiences; and thirdly, the quality of the bodily 
experiences in the analyst’s own childhood (Jacobs, 1973). What Jacobs highlights 
is the important role that the therapist’s own history plays in the formation of 
somatic countertransferences.  
The more recent work of Stone (2006) mapped the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
personality characteristics of analysts who are likely to experience bodily 
countertransferences and saw a high incidence of the introvert-intuitive construct in 
these analysts. He concluded that when the therapist resonates with the patient on 
the physical level, thoughts and feelings remain unknown to the conscious mind 
(Stone, 2006).  
What the groupings of literature discussed here (i.e. locating the source of the 
somatic countertransference in either the patient or the therapist), have in common 
is that they seem to aim at a developing a general theoretical understanding of 
somatic countertransference. I am suggesting that to take these general concepts 
further it is useful to adopt a clinical approach which looks at the personal and 
unique dynamics of each therapeutic dyad specifically.  
It is widely accepted that countertransference reactions should be worked with by 
the analyst, and the process for doing so would obviously be similar for all forms of 
countertransference, although somatic responses may require more work as they 
manifest in the somatic domain and need to be processed and mentalized by the 
analyst in order for them to enter the domain of language and thought. While the 
importance of interpreting countertransference reactions, whether they be somatic 
or otherwise, is clear and well-established, countertransference reactions which the 
patient notices bring a further dimension to the process, which is worth exploring.   
Following the changes in the perception of the usefulness of countertransference, it 
became necessary to develop tools and theories so that therapeutic use could be 
made of countertransference reactions. A foundation for this endeavour was laid by 
Freud in “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900a, 1900b) in which he explicated the 
process in which the analyst analyses and interprets his own internal world by 
means of the process of free association which was developed in order to 
overcome the patient’s resistance and to allow the analyst access to unconscious 
parts of the patient’s psyche (Bollas, 2002). Freud suggested that analysts are 
required to submit to a similar free associative process as a counterpoint to the 
demand placed on the patient (Freud, 1912c). In order for analysts to do this, 
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Freud described the way in which the analyst should attend to the patient’s 
material and which has become another fundamental tenet of psychoanalysis: free-
floating attention  (Lothane, 2006; Miller & Aisenstein, 2004; Parsons, 2006).  
Lothane (2006) extends Freud’s original concept of free-floating attention when he 
suggests that the analyst should not only hear what the patient says, but that he 
should also notice any thoughts, images, fantasies, emotions, and memories which 
the patient’s words evoke. Making use of such a process combines the analyst’s 
internal world with that of the patient which allows the analyst to understand the 
manifest content of the patient’s material as well as the underlying, unconscious 
content. This analytic stance relates to concepts described by other writers such as 
Bion’s (1962) ‘reverie’, Ogden’s (2004b) ‘dreaming’ and Fonagy’s (1994) 
‘reflectiveness’ (Israelstam, 2011). 
Ogden (1997a, 1997b, 2004a) has extended Bion’s (1962) term “reverie” in his 
discussions of therapeutic technique regarding how to make use of 
countertransference responses. He sees reveries not as the product of the psyche-
soma of the analyst alone, but as resulting from the combined unconscious of 
patient and analyst. It is his view that through the use of reverie, the analyst 
transforms the unprocessed material which the patient has projected into her mind, 
into thought (Brown, 2009). What is particularly useful about Ogden’s work in this 
paper is his specific inclusion of the analyst’s somatic responses in his descriptions 
of working to understand countertransferences. 
A CLINICAL EXAMPLE 
In order to demonstrate the complexities involved in uncovering the meaning 
behind a physical response to a particular patient, I will discuss a case in which the 
usefulness of interpreting and understanding the form that the physical 
countertransference takes was clear. The patient in question (whom I will call Ann) 
presented herself as a kind and sensitive person who always put others first. She 
was softly spoken, friendly and obliging. Her anorexia was entrenched, and she 
would severely restrict her eating, but would also taunt herself by exposing herself 
to food that she would not allow herself to eat, like standing in a bakery and 
smelling meat pies cooking. She would feel great triumph when she was able to 
walk out of the store and deny herself what she was craving.  
Ann would always arrive for her sessions a few minutes early, and would frequently 
comment on whether I called her from the waiting room on time (which she 
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measured by the second hand reaching the ‘12’ on the clock in the waiting room), 
or if I was a few moments early or late. While she presented this in her ‘sweet’ way 
by saying that I was “spot on so much of the time”, she was a little triumphant if I 
called her into the session a moment early or late.  
During many sessions with Ann, I would experience sudden and severe hunger. 
My stomach would rumble loudly, to the point that the patient would notice and pull 
a disapproving face as if to express her disgust at my apparent desire to eat. What 
was particularly noteworthy was that on these occasions I would crave a very 
specific type of pizza with a number of meat toppings, and I sometimes had a 
visual hallucination9 of the pizza floating between us just out of my reach. This type 
of pizza was not something that I would ordinarily eat, and significantly, the patient 
had stopped eating meat a number of years before in order to restrict her calorific 
intake.  
I became aware of the depth of the transference-countertransference dynamics 
and how I enacted them, when I invited a friend, with whom I have a competitive 
relationship, to join me for a pizza. She said that she was expecting my call as I 
called every Monday to suggest that we go for a pizza. Mondays were the days on 
which Ann was the last patient of the day.  
Of particular importance here were the frequency and intensity of the stomach 
rumbling (known as borborygmi) and the accompanying severe hunger and visual 
hallucination of the pizza. I did not have any of these ‘symptoms’ with any of my 
other patients, even those that I saw at a similar time of day or who also restricted 
their food intake.  
INTERPRETING THE SOMATIC COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 
My stomach rumbled frequently in the sessions with Ann, and she always pulled a 
disgusted face in response, and would sometimes comment on the sound. She 
would (unconvincingly) attempt to apologise for making me work late and for 
keeping me from the food that I “obviously” desired. Interpretations were met with a 
shrug and smile, but I was left with the strong sense that her comments and 
gestures indirectly meant “you poor mortal having these base, physical needs”. 
This seemed to be a part of her transference which was superficially so sweet, 
polite and self-deprecating, but which certainly seemed to have a sting in the tail. 
                                                          
9
 I use the term ‘hallucination’ rather that ‘visual image’ in order to evoke the idea of an hallucinatory 
gratification and to highlight the sensory quality of the experience.   
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It was after I had called my friend and invited her for pizza yet again, and she had 
commented that I did that regularly on a Monday night, that I developed further 
awareness of the dynamics at work. After eating the entire pizza, the craving was 
satisfied, but I felt over full, guilty and disgusted with myself and I was aware of the 
very clear thought that ‘Ann would never have eaten that’. Reflecting further 
allowed me to be become more aware of the idea of “Ann vs me”. I had had the 
physical response, the craving and hallucination of the pizza, however, the 
hallucination was not satisfactory and therefore needed to be enacted, and so I 
had allowed myself to satisfy the wish, but all of that had occurred against the 
backdrop of how that was in contrast to the way in which Ann would engage with 
the world. This experience echoed Renik’s (1993) idea that the analyst often 
develops an awareness of their countertransference only after an enactment, and 
Deveraux’s emphasis on the importance or deciphering and working through the 
enactment (2006). 
In the following sessions, when this somatic response occurred, my reverie 
included all the different factors which were at work in this transference-
countertransference dynamic. These included the time at which the response 
occurred (it was always on a Monday, the day when Ann was my last appointment 
of the day); the food that I was craving (a high calorie, high fat meal which I did not 
usually eat);  the friend whom I had called (someone with whom I have a 
competitive relationship, and it seemed that I had unconsciously tried to mitigate 
my failure by making my friend complicit in it, in order to defend myself from feeling 
defeated by my patient and envious of her iron will) and the thought which had 
occurred to me that Ann would never have eaten the pizza. 
After reflecting on these elements, and following my reverie, what emerged was 
the competition that Ann was setting up between herself and me. I know myself to 
be compelled to do ‘difficult’ things and to enjoy the success achieved in 
completing difficult tasks, but what was being activated in this transference-
countertransference experience was a feeling that the patient triumphed over me 
because she was able to resist the temptation and do the ‘difficult’ thing of not 
eating. She was able to walk away from the meat pies, but I had eaten the meaty 
pizza. I felt that I was not as ‘strong’ as she was and knew that the patient would 
certainly not have ‘given in’ or ‘caved’ as I had done since she would simply never 
eat a pizza, much less a meaty one. Recognising Ann’s competitiveness and 
seeing how it was disavowed, but present in a disguised form, in her sweet but 
patronising manner I could then see how her minding of my body in the form of her 
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comments about the borborygmi (as well as her comments about session start 
times) had lured the competitiveness in me. It was her reaction to that which was 
perceivable in me which became a crucial trigger to my understanding of the 
therapy dynamics. 
I became aware, however, of a paradox in the win-lose competition with Ann. My 
enactment which took the form of calling my friend and eating the pizza meant that 
I had ‘lost’ the competition of control over bodily urges, but in eating, I also allowed 
myself to be healthy and not trapped in the anorexic web that Ann found herself in. 
While I initially felt shamed and defeated, it was through the creative act 
(Rosenberg, 2006) of understanding the countertransference and putting it into 
words (if only to myself) that my interpretive capacity was re-established and my 
therapeutic role retrieved. Holding the physical response in mind, noting the 
moments in which it appeared and trying to link it to specific material that the 
patient brought facilitated the mentalization of my physical experience. The 
consequently improved understanding of the patient’s unacknowledged 
competitiveness sharpened my focus on this issue. Listening for such material it 
was then possible for us to start talking about the competitiveness in her 
relationships which allowed her access to a part of herself that she had, until that 
point, not allowed herself to acknowledge. As Ann became more consciously 
aware of her competitive nature, she began to engage differently with those in her 
world. At that point my countertransference no longer took a somatic form.  
On reflection, it was clear that there had been a two stage process involved in the 
interpretation of my somatic countertransference. Ann’s comments on my stomach 
sounds and my experience of the accompanying craving, drew my attention, firstly, 
to the form of my response and thus to the ideas of eating, the desire for food, and 
most importantly control over that desire. Importantly, however, my reverie made it 
clear that the physical response was occurring in relation to her. Enacting those 
cravings allowed me to then mentalize the deeper, more unconscious dynamic of 
competition between us.  
DISCUSSION 
I will reflect on this case material by discussing three issues. The first is a rehearsal 
of the existing literature specifically the literature concerned with the origin of the 
somatic countertransference and that on borborygmi in particular. The second 
point to be discussed is the use of reverie in the interpretation of somatic 
countertransference. The final area of focus is the specific concerns brought to the 
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therapy when the therapist’s somatic countertransference is perceivable by the 
patient. 
In order to make sense of the transference-countertransference dynamics at work 
in the case of Ann, it was necessary to establish why this response was occurring 
with this particular patient at this particular point in the therapy. The patient, Ann, 
did have some borderline defences which were identified by McLaughlin (1975) as 
being involved in the development of somatic countertransferences. She was also 
eating disordered which Samuels (1985) recognised as a potential factor in the 
development of a somatic countertransference. These points were helpful in 
developing some thoughts around what it was about Ann that was triggering this 
response in me. It was important to note, however, that I treat a number of eating 
disordered patients with borderline defences, and while it is well known that 
countertransferences with patients with that combination of pathologies are often 
very intense (Russell & Marsden, 1998), the physical response in question 
occurred with only this patient. It followed that attention should also be given to 
what it might have been about me that might have been activated by the patient, as 
Stone (2006) and Jacobs (1973) suggested. It was clear that I did contribute 
something general to the relationship with my patient (i.e. my competitiveness), but 
although that is a stable part of me, competitiveness was a part of this therapy and 
does not occur with all my patients. It is then clear that while there were aspects of 
both the patient’s pathology and the therapist’s personality which had played a role 
in the developing of the somatic response to the patient, it was the interaction of all 
the relevant elements of the therapeutic dyad which were required for the somatic 
countertransference to be produced in the form in which it manifested.  
Da Silva (1990) and King (2011) have written about the physical response of 
borborygmi specifically. This literature establishes the idea of gastro-intestinal 
movements as having a strongly metaphoric dimension and thus the authors 
suggest that they hold a psychic meaning, and consequently link body and mind.  
Instantiated in the case of Ann, it was clear that this particular understanding of 
gastro-intestinal responses allowed me to  enter the site at which her pathology 
(anorexia) played itself out, but that this was merely the arena in which our 
competition occurred. With Ann, the form of the somatic countertransference was a 
clue to the final understanding, but was only the vehicle with which to reach that 
understanding.  
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Da Silva (1990) makes the point that when borborygmi occur in the analyst, it is a 
signal that the patient’s conflict has resonated at a point of sensitivity within the 
analyst. Since my sensitivity is not related to food, it meant that the physical 
response was pointing to something else. This highlights the complexity of the 
relationship between the generalised understanding of the form of somatic 
countertransference and how the body of the analyst can become treated as an 
object of transference activity in unique ways in each individual therapeutic 
relationship.  
In this case, my borborygmi was accompanied by a severe hunger as well as the 
visual hallucination of the object that my hunger craved. The image of the pizza 
that appeared to hang between Ann and myself emphasised the physicality of the 
countertransference: it was not a vague wish for some sort of food, but instead I 
had visually and specifically conjured up the precise object which I desired in a 
very physical way. There are of course limits to the form of satisfaction that fantasy 
can provide which is why hallucinatory satisfaction is partial, and my hunger 
persisted. Only my enactment of actually ordering and eating the pizza satisfied the 
craving.  
In order to explore the meaning of my countertransference and the manner in 
which it manifested, Ogden’s writings on reverie were very useful in developing an 
understanding of what was at work in this case. Four points arose from Ogden’s 
extensive writings on the subject of the analytic use of reverie that were especially 
useful. The first of these points is that working with, and interpreting, reverie 
transforms unconscious, intersubjective experiences into verbal metaphors which 
are then accessible to the analyst. From a position of free-floating attention and 
reverie in the treatment with Ann, it became possible to track the associations and 
follow the links in order to move them from the physical response of stomach 
rumbling into a more mentalized space where it became possible to begin to reflect 
on what was being played out on the level of hunger and the control of physical 
desires.  
The second point made by Ogden (Ogden, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) which was 
helpful here is that the content of a reverie needs to be interpreted and understood 
rather than simply shared concretely with the patient, because doing so will lead to 
superficial interpretations in which manifest content may be mistaken for latent 
content. This point was particularly helpful in the described case as it ensured that 
the understanding of the dynamics at work moved from the first level which 
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focussed on food and eating, to a second deeper, more unconscious level which 
revealed the dynamics of competition.  
Ogden’s (1997a) third important point is that the responses which make up the 
reverie of the analyst are not just simply the analyst’s own unresolved conflicts, 
current distresses, physical state or personality. Every situation experienced by an 
analyst is framed differently in the face of each patient and thus becomes a 
different “analytic object” in each therapy. As described in the case with Ann, it was 
her comments and the manner in which they were delivered which brought the 
dynamics between her and me to life. Reflecting  on the way in which Ann 
presented and engaged in therapy – superficially very sweetly, but always a little 
critical and patronising – allowed for an understanding to develop about what role 
that played in my countertransferential response to her. Thus Ann’s way of 
engaging with her therapist brought out something in her therapist which revealed 
something about Ann. 
The final of Ogden’s (1994a, 2004a, 2004b) points made use of in understanding 
this case was his idea that it is not helpful to discuss the highly personal emotional 
experience that is reverie with the analysand directly. It should first be made sense 
of in terms of the patient’s material and the analytic relationship. In the case of Ann 
it would not have been helpful to simply reveal the craving, hallucination and 
enactment to Ann. It was far more important that the work of understanding how all 
the elements fitted together and what they revealed needed to be done first, and 
then for that digested understanding to be used effectively in the therapy room. 
The contribution that I am attempting to make here is the idea that the analytic use 
of reverie is a process which facilitates mentalization in the analyst. Ogden’s 
suggestion that the contents of the therapist’s mind are as important as the 
responses in their bodies (Ogden, 1997a) in the process of reflecting on and 
making use of reverie, is particularly helpful in this regard. Clearly, unmentalized 
material is often present in a treatment, and when a patient is not able to express 
their internal conflicts in words, their preverbal transference may instead be 
manifested in the analyst’s countertransference (Jacobs, 2001; Richards, 1989). 
The point at which the ‘unmental’ become sufficiently accessible to the conscious 
mind is the moment it becomes possible to use that material in the talking cure. 
The first signs of this process in this case were the rumblings in my stomach. 
Reverie was then useful to render coherent the thoughts, physical sensations and 
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the wandering of my mind, thus giving the bodily and the mental due and equal 
attention which eventually allowed for significant therapeutic gains to be made. 
Despite the volume of literature that discusses countertransference generally, there 
is relatively little written on the technique of exactly how interpret and work with it. 
The work of Ogden is very significant in that regard for this paper as his examples 
do not only explicate the process of using reverie (see for example Ogden, 1994a), 
but the notion of reverie and the affective overtones as used by Ogden seem to 
have a particular applicability to somatic countertransferences  precisely because 
they allowed me make associations to responses that were not as yet in the 
medium of words (Ogden, 1994a, 1997a). This paper is arguing that drawing 
attention to the physical aspects of reverie allows the analyst to reflect on, and in 
that way mentalize, their somatic responses eventually enabling them to interpret 
their somatic countertransference. 
An important issue raised by the case of Ann is the complexity brought to the 
therapy room when the therapist’s somatic countertransference response to the 
patient is perceivable by the patient. Somatic countertransferences in general are 
often more difficult to make sense of than those which occur in other domains 
because they need to be translated from the language of the body to the language 
of the mind. An extra layer of difficulty is added to managing somatic 
countertransferences when the somatic responses are perceivable to the patient, 
whether it be visually (e.g. tears or blushing) or audibly as in the case of 
borborygmi. The fact that the patient becomes aware of these physical responses 
in the therapist may have unanticipated consequences. 
I am in agreement with Ogden’s (1994b) view that not every thought or feeling that 
an analyst has when with a patient is countertransference. There are times when a 
therapist may respond somatically to a patient, and where it is immediately clear to 
the therapist what the somatic response means. For example, a therapist may get 
tears in their eyes when they are told a sad story that reminds them of similar pain 
or loss in their own life. While these responses are of course important, they often 
occur at the level of the ego and are likely to be manifestations of sympathy or 
identification. They do not therefore require sustained interpretive activity on the 
part of the therapist. When responses such as these occur, the therapist may be 
required to acknowledge their response, and it is clearly always important to pay 
attention to and interpret the patient’s reaction to the analyst’s physical responses. 
For example, a patient may feel comforted and validated by their therapist’s tears, 
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or may become irritated or angry if they feel that it is now their responsibility to 
comfort the therapist. This material then becomes grist for the therapeutic mill. In 
this type of physical response it is the content of the material that moves the 
analyst to ‘ordinary’ affects like sympathy or identification, where, even if the 
intensity is determined by the therapist’s history, the extent to which this is a 
countertransferential response might be questioned and debated in the sense that 
it does not have a disguised, unconscious component. It is also likely that the same 
event being narrated by any other patient in conjunction with the analyst’s history 
would have produced the same effect.  
The distinction being made here is one that is based on the therapist’s own 
intuition: while some somatic responses might need to be talked about with the 
patient, others immediately call for interpretation before they can be used 
therapeutically because their meaning is still unconscious and therefore not 
immediately available to the analyst. Everything that the analyst experiences in 
relation to the patient in the therapy room is relevant and potentially useful, but 
there is a fundamental distinction between that which only requires further 
reflection from that which requires interpretation.  
What is of interest in this paper is the type of strong somatic countertransference 
reaction whose meaning is not immediately clear to the therapist and which is 
perceivable to the patient. The presence of these physical manifestations in their 
undeniable bodiliness is not easily disguised from the patient by the therapist and 
are therefore more uncontrollable in their visibility or audibility than other forms of 
countertransference (such as affect or fantasy). They therefore bring something 
into the therapeutic space of the dyad which may need to be explored before the 
therapist develops an understanding of what the response might mean and in what 
way it might a reflection of therapeutic dynamics. 
In these instances the therapist’s response immediately becomes a shared 
‘analytic object’ (Ogden, 1997a). By contrast, countertransference reactions which 
occur in the domain of thought or fantasy can be kept from the patient and remain 
in the therapist’s reverie until they have been unpacked and understood and the 
therapist can then make use of the information they reveal in the therapeutic 
process. In the case of Ann, it was the particular way in which she perceived and 
commented on my borborygmi which highlighted and brought the transference-
countertransference dynamics to the fore, and made it a part of the dyad even 
before its meaning had been fully interpreted. In the long run, the information it 
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provided was crucial for the progression of the treatment and provided access to 
the highly beneficial material, but did require an active process of interpretation by 
the therapist first. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to how it is possible to think about and make use of somatic 
countertransferences. Since these responses occur in the physical domain, they 
require an additional layer of interpretation to other forms of countertransference. 
The form that the countertransference takes provides hints and clues to what the 
dynamics at work are, but it is important that the therapist understand these 
thoroughly and in the context of the particular dyad, since interpreting them simply 
at the general level may lead to simplistic understandings of their meaning.  While 
it can be argued that some of this understanding would obviously apply to 
countertransference generally, somatic countertransferences need particular 
attention and focus, and once this has occurred and the underlying unconscious 
material has been understood the wider implications for the therapy will be 
exposed. 
‘Minding’ the body of the analyst in this way may reveal important aspects of the 
dynamics at work in a particular therapy. However, there are particular issues that 
arise in the relationship when the therapist does not have the choice whether or not 
to disclose their understanding of, or reaction to, those dynamics. This ‘decision’ 
may be even more apparent if the psychotherapy takes place in the chair rather 
than on the couch. The use of the couch in psychoanalysis was designed to control 
the frame and the setting and to allow unconscious material to be revealed by the 
patient with as little influence from the analyst as possible. Sitting across from the 
therapist, and looking directly at them results in the therapist being much less of a 
‘tabula rasa’. Face-to-face psychotherapy puts the therapist’s body in a much more 
central role even before it may gain attention by the therapist’s crying, grumbling or 
blushing. An unexpected consequence of psychotherapy taking place on this face-
to-face manner is that somatic countertransferences may be more visible to the 
patient. The therapist should be vigilant for such events so that if they bring new 
material to light when the patient notices the physical response (as it did in the 
case of Ann) that this can be worked with and made use of. When the as yet 
unprocessed material of the therapist is brought into the room, it is incumbent on 
the therapist to make use of all the tools available (particularly that of reverie) in 
order to reveal the meaning of such a response as deeply and thoroughly as 
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possible to themselves first, and then to apply that understanding to that particular 
therapy’s dynamics. These situations may add pressure on the therapist to 
maintain their analytic stance and not engage in an enactment, but even if slips in 
these areas do occur, thoughtful and careful analytic work can reveal those 
underlying dynamics which crave interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE TWO BODIES IN THE ROOM 
INTRODUCTION 
The paper in this chapter is the second of the two papers which make up the 
second half of the thesis and which focus on the body of the therapist. The paper is 
entitled “Re-Embodying the Analyst” and was published in the accredited journal 
“Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South Africa” in June 2013 (Gubb, 2013b) The 
paper was the recipient of the Mervyn Glasser award for the best postgraduate 
student submission of the year, and is reprinted here with the journal’s permission. 
Please see the second volume of the thesis for a copy of the paper in its published 
format. 
The nexus of the first three papers of this thesis is an increased understanding of 
the clinical dimension of work with physical symptoms which have a mental origin 
based a common psychoanalytic idea about the aetiology of psychosomatic 
symptoms and how these are related to levels and kinds of mentalization achieved 
by the individual. 
The third paper “Craving Interpretation: A Case of Somatic Countertransference” 
focuses specifically on somatic countertransferences which are perceivable by the 
patient and which consequently cause the body of the analyst to become an object 
of the patient’s interest or inquiry. If the analyst’s body is perceivable to the patient 
through the countertransference, it is likely that it is also a site of transference 
relations. The argument made by this, the fourth paper, is that the therapist must 
think about their own body not only as an object of their own free floating attention 
and reverie, but also as a potential object of meaning making and transferential 
sense-making in the eyes of the patient. 
The interest and theorisation around countertransference in the broadest sense is 
very well established, and what is important here is how the advancement of the 
phenomenon has evolved psychoanalytic practice. It has drawn increasing 
modulation and development to the role of the analyst and led to more of an 
understanding about the analyst’s role (despite the different understandings of 
what the role might / should be).  
However, while the practice turn, the countertransference literature and the analytic 
practice coming out of a more intersubjective tradition together combine to suggest 
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a focus on the individuated person of the analyst, that literature does not draw 
much attention to the analyst as embodiment, but rather focuses on the 
psychological individuating (i.e., the clinical and psychological rendering) of the 
figure of the analyst. The analyst therefore gets a more personal density, but the 
embodied presence of the analyst in the room doesn’t receive the appropriate 
amount of attention. This thesis argues that there needs to be an investigation of 
the role and implication for practice of the analyst as embodied.  
This ‘gap’ paves the way for this fourth paper which looks at the analyst’s physical 
body as an object of the patient’s attention and in this way fits the “Minding the 
Body” theme. The focus of the fourth paper is how the analyst’s physical body 
provokes transference, and there are two practical or clinical contributions made by 
the paper. The first of these is related to how to treat the patient’s relation to the 
therapist’s body under a number of specific conditions (such as the therapist’s 
pregnancy or illness). The second is a discussion of the implications of the 
surfacing of the analyst’s body by the patient on the question of technique or 
practice. 
This paper addresses the same research questions as the previous paper.  
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PAPER 4: RE-EMBODYING THE ANALYST10 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on comments made by patients about the body of the analyst in 
therapeutic exchanges. The paper begins by exploring the nature of the asymmetry 
between analyst and patient and its theoretical foundations in psychoanalysis. The 
question is then posed as to whether considering some of the specific features of the 
form and timing of the references to the analyst’s body in light of this asymmetry may 
help therapists understand the dynamics of particular therapeutic dyads. Making use 
of the existing literature and clinical material to support the argument, the paper 
suggests that using the nature of the therapeutic frame as a preliminary aid to 
interpretation may cast light on the extent to which references to the analyst’s body 
can be understood as resistances to the defining features of the therapeutic frame, 
and in so doing illuminate aspects of the transference-countertransference dynamics. 
INTRODUCTION 
For a long time, due to the belief that a ‘non-tendentious’ psychoanalytic technique 
(Freud, 1923b, p. 252) fulfils scientific principles, any examination of the analyst’s 
influence acting upon the patient was neglected (Thoma, 2009). As intersubjective 
models develop and expand psychoanalytic theory, and there is more focus on the 
dyad in the room, the therapist is compelled to become more aware of her11 own 
body and the important information which the patient’s interaction with it can 
provide (Cornell, 2009). While this shift in paradigm has raised awareness of the 
fact that there are two bodies in the therapy room, there is still relatively little 
written about the impact of the analyst’s physical body and appearance on the 
patient and the therapeutic process. This relative neglect is not surprising given the 
understandable focus on speech and thought in ‘talking cures’, as well as a general 
social emphasis away from the physical body in professional arenas where 
engagement is usually intellectual and little personal information is shared by the 
professional. 
While such an asymmetry is common in professional relationships, what is of 
interest in this paper is the particular one-sidedness of the psychoanalytic 
exchange in which the patient is regularly expected to reveal personal and intimate 
                                                          
10
 Copyright for this manuscript resides with the publisher: Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South 
Africa.  
Citation: Gubb, K. (2013). Re-Embodying the Analyst. Psycho-Analytic Psychotherapy in South 
Africa. 21(1), 1-27. 
11
 The feminine is used in the paper, but is assumed to encompass both the masculine and the 
feminine. 
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material while the analyst12 does not reciprocate in the exchange. References to 
the analyst’s body by the patient during psychoanalytic psychotherapy occur within 
this broader context of asymmetry, and gain particular meaning because of this 
asymmetry which is designed as an integral part of the psychoanalytic frame. 
Following a consideration of the asymmetry of the therapeutic setting, this paper 
provides an historical account of the place occupied by the therapist’s body in the 
therapy room. It begins by reviewing how and why the therapeutic situation was 
designed to keep personal information about the analyst to a minimum and argues 
that this results in the analyst’s body acquiring a particular significance. The paper 
briefly reviews the limited literature on the impact of profound physical changes in 
the analyst’s physical body in psychoanalytic treatment, or differences in body size 
between the patient and the therapist. 
The paper then explores how any particular patient might uniquely engage with 
their analyst’s body during a therapy. Clinical material is presented in the form of 
three vignettes in which patients’ thoughts about their therapist’s body specifically 
emerge. These vignettes illustrate that patients’ references to the analyst’s body 
are an important and rich source of information about the transference and 
countertransference dynamics at work in a particular therapy. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of some theoretical issues that arise out of 
the case material concerning the clinical usefulness of paying attention to the 
intersubjective nature of the therapeutic relationship, how this is reflected and 
represented in the way the particular patient engages with the analyst’s body, and 
how the therapist may respond to the resulting complexities of interpretation. 
THE ASYMMETRY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPEUTIC SETTING 
The analytic situation, with its therapeutic frame, is an unusual setting in which a 
patient seeks help within a context that is significantly different from other forms of 
human interaction and caregiving. In this setting the patient is expected to reveal 
all manner of intimate and personal material while the analyst is expected to 
engage with neutrality and anonymity. In psychoanalytic literature the analytic 
concepts of ‘neutrality’ and ‘anonymity’ are varyingly understood and seen as 
either interchangeable or distinctive terms. Laplanche and Pontalis (2006), in their 
review of the development of the term ‘neutrality’, explain how the term was initially 
                                                          
12
 Many of the concepts used in this paper find their roots in classical psychoanalysis – not so much 
to the setting of the couch, but instead to the psychoanalytic approach to the frame, transference and 
interpretation. The argument presented in the paper has applicability to both psychoanalysis and to 
psychotherapy. For this reason, the terms ‘analyst’ and ‘therapist’ will both be employed in the paper.  
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used to describe the non-judgmental stance of the analyst in relation to the 
patient’s material. The definition was later expanded to include the idea that the 
analyst should not make himself felt in his own ‘psycho-social specificity’ (p. 272). 
In his discussion of analytic anonymity, Aragno (2008) describes Freud’s (1912c, p. 
118) recommendation for analysts to be ‘opaque’ to their analysands, reflecting 
back only what is shown to them, and by implication not revealing anything about 
themselves. This asymmetry is fundamental to the practice of psychoanalysis as it 
emphasises the nature of the exchange and produces a form of interaction that is 
different to others. Importantly, it creates an arena in which to lure the unconscious 
of the patient. The classical approach to neutrality is thus the idea of the blank 
slate onto which the patient projects. Contemporary theorists have increasingly 
come to insist upon an acknowledgement of the person of the analyst in the room, 
and complex debates have consequently emerged regarding what happens to 
analytic neutrality if the analyst as a person is acknowledged (Burka, 1996; Renik, 
2007). Despite these differing views, however, there is agreement that it is 
important for the focus to remain on the patient. What always remains is the 
asymmetry in the material that the analyst and patient reveal.  
Many widely accepted elements of therapeutic practice emphasise impersonality in 
order to foreground that this relationship is not an exchange of confidences 
between analyst and patient. The room is set out in a way that is different to rooms 
of medical professionals, the analyst deliberately withholds personal information, 
and there is the ‘oddness’ of the transferential relationship (van Zyl, 2003). Into this 
peculiar context is brought the ‘fundamental rule’ whereby the patient is instructed 
to say whatever comes into her mind. Thus the analytic space, which is at once so 
private, is also a space in which nothing of the patient’s is private at all and in 
which the analyst reveals nothing personal in response to the patient’s revelation of 
very intimate material. Freud emphasised that the most difficult thing the patient is 
asked to do is to talk aloud about things that might feel too disagreeable or too 
indiscreet to express (Freud, 1917a). It is a safe assumption that some of the most 
difficult of these disagreeable thoughts and feelings to give voice to are those 
regarding the analyst themselves (Adler & Bachant, 1996), and yet that is what 
patients are required to disclose. 
This asymmetry suspends many of the common ways in which human beings 
engage, and emphasises that psychoanalytic psychotherapy is a form of relating 
which is different to most others. This unusual way of relating is resisted by 
patients, manifesting in attempts to personalise the relationship and thereby 
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remove the difference or distance patients experience between themselves and 
their analyst. The analyst’s body acquires a density and becomes a potential place 
for the patient to try to discover something personal about the analyst. It is 
accessible to the patient in a unique way in the therapeutic setting – it is in plain 
sight all the time in face-to-face treatment, and at the beginning and end of the 
session in psychoanalysis proper. The analyst’s body is one signifying presence 
that will allow the patient to individuate the analyst. In fact, in the absence of other 
signifiers, the physical appearance of the analyst may become ‘hyper-signified’ by 
the patient. In this way the analyst’s body becomes a privileged place from which 
the patient attempts to draw personal information – to ‘read’ the analyst’s body – 
because most other forms of personal expression are prohibited. 
The use of the couch in psychoanalysis further highlights the structured asymmetry 
of the psychoanalytic therapeutic setting. The reclined position of the patient in 
classical psychoanalytic treatments is a legacy of psychoanalysis’s beginnings 
when hypnosis was still the method of treatment used, but the positioning of the 
patient on the couch with the analyst out of view was continued by Freud even 
after the psychoanalytic method replaced hypnosis. The reason Freud continued to 
use the couch was that he did not want his facial expressions to ‘lead’ his patients; 
instead he wanted to foster the development of the transference as much as 
possible (Adler & Bachant, 1996; Eissler, 1993; Lable et al., 2010; Seeley, 2005; 
Wolf, 1995). Freud believed that knowing too much about the analyst interfered 
with the patient’s use of the analyst as a transference object and impeded the 
psychoanalytic process (Freud, 1913). When the analyst is not visible to the patient 
the development of the transference is believed to be encouraged: the inability to 
see the analyst’s facial expressions, body movements and overall demeanour 
encourages the patient to explore unconscious constructions of the analyst rather 
than to focus on the external and visible aspects (Lable, et al., 2010). 
This analytic seating arrangement privileges the auditory over the visual modality in 
psychoanalysis even more than is true in other forms of talk therapy (Seeley, 
2005). However, even when psychoanalytic psychotherapy occurs face-to-face and 
the therapist is in the patient’s line of sight, therapists still endeavour to keep as 
much as possible about their personal lives private and unknown to their patients. 
It is common for psychotherapists to try to avoid revealing anything significantly 
personal through their attire and to keep the clinical space, and their own 
appearance, free from individualising visual cues which may alert patients to some 
aspect of their personal lives (Seeley, 2005). Therapists can try to dress neutrally, 
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not have anything personal on display, and behave neutrally. It is not, however, 
possible to control and exclude the appearance and size of their physical bodies. 
The intimacy of the therapy situation is not only in the emotional, psychological and 
verbal domain, but also in the physical. Patient and therapist repeatedly sit 
together in a comparatively small space in a way in which their bodies echo each 
other (Burka, 1996). 
The psychotherapeutic asymmetry is uncomfortable and unfamiliar to the patient 
and at key moments may produce vulnerability which the patient will try to reduce 
by ‘equalising’ the situation. I am arguing that because of the therapist’s attempts 
to achieve relative impersonality, and the patient’s desire to move to a more 
personal relationship, the patient may be extremely sensitive to the analyst’s 
appearance, tone of voice, gestures, posture, moods and even their office in order 
to gain clues about the therapist's person. Simply because a patient is looking 
straight at the therapist’s body, however, does not mean that they will perceive that 
body objectively, nor does it predict how the patient will use the therapist’s body 
unconsciously (Burka, 1996). The patient builds up both conscious and 
unconscious images of the analyst that are comprised of subjective features as 
well as components of reality (Eissler, 1993). How the patient perceives any 
‘realities’ about the analyst is important grist for the therapeutic mill, and the 
patient's reaction to these ‘realities’ must be analysed and interpreted in the 
psychoanalytic session. An analyst's actual appearance, manner, way of speaking 
and surroundings are all important and play a role in any therapy, but the exact 
effect that they have and the particular type of role that they play will be unique to 
each patient and may differ at different points in any given treatment (Eissler, 
1993). 
An unintended consequence of the desire not to reveal anything private, together 
with the analytic setting, is that the analyst may unwittingly become disembodied 
and depersonalised. As described above there is commonly a wish by the patient 
to resist what the framing of the therapeutic relationship does to relating, and 
commenting on the analyst’s body may be a way to re-embody the analyst. This 
paper focuses particularly on physical characteristics of the analyst’s body which 
are fairly stable and unchanging, and while the analyst’s style of dress and office 
furnishings are important, they are not the object of investigation here. When fully 
understood, the form and timing of these references to the body may helpfully 
reveal transference dynamics. 
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THE ANALYST’S BODY IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC LITERATURE 
There is little focus on the role of the analyst’s physical body in the psychoanalytic 
literature (Burka, 1996). Such literature tends to fall into two categories. The first 
concerns the theoretical implications related to particular forms of visible change in 
the analyst’s body. Secondly, a theoretical basis for the clinical use of material 
about the analyst’s body in psychotherapeutic practice is offered.  
VISIBLE CHANGES TO THE ANALYST’S BODY 
The majority of the literature regarding the role of the analyst’s body discusses 
occasions when the analyst’s private life enters the therapeutic space in a dramatic 
way consequent to profound changes to the analyst’s body, such as when the 
analyst is pregnant or becomes significantly ill. 
Most of the literature about the effects of an analyst’s body changing during 
pregnancy focuses on how it affects, and often sharpens, the transference. Many 
writers suggest that the fact of the pregnancy may trigger deep infantile conflicts, 
sometimes earlier than might otherwise have occurred in a particular treatment 
(Eissler, 1993; Paniagua, 1998; Richman, 2006). For example, the pregnancy 
might highlight old sibling rivalry issues or remind the patient that the analyst has a 
private life which excludes the patient. These writings explain why an analyst 
becoming visibly pregnant may re-activate in patients the developmental stage 
during which they began to separate from their mothers and became aware of the 
painful reality of the father’s relationship to the mother. When patients respond 
intensely to the analyst’s pregnancy analysts may experience countertransference 
guilt, which might make them reluctant to address the Oedipal issues being raised 
(Linderholm, 2009). Balsam (2012) writes about the suspicion and anxiety that the 
plasticity of a changing woman’s body might evoke. Whyte’s (2004) review of the 
literature on analysts’ pregnancies explores these themes, but also includes how 
patients of different gender or sexual orientation may respond differently to the 
pregnancy. Whyte therefore examines not a general response to the analyst’s 
pregnancy but rather the importance of different responses from particular patients. 
In contrast to the literature on the analyst’s pregnancy, the majority of literature 
concerning changes to the analyst’s body following illness focuses on the ethical 
considerations of self-disclosure, enactment, absence and whether the analyst can 
and should keep working while they are ill (Fajardo, 2001; Galatzer-Levy, 2004; 
Kahn, 2003; Robutti, 2010; Rosner, 1986; Silver, 2001; Torrigiani & Marzi, 2005). 
Plotkin (2000) includes some comment on how an analyst’s absence due to illness 
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might impact an older patient who might experience fear of the same illness, or 
how a patient may experience anger about the analyst’s absence. The analyst’s 
body is of interest in this literature in terms of the general themes that may be 
evoked by illness rather than in terms of the potential meanings of individual and 
unique responses. 
The published work about the pregnant or ill analyst thus focuses predominantly on 
a general range of possible meanings, but does not look specifically at how a 
particular patient might respond to the changes in the analyst’s physical body. It 
therefore deals with the fact of the change rather than the question of how and why 
the patient might make reference to it in particular circumstances. It also 
demonstrates that in the circumstances of profound physical changes, such as 
pregnancy and illness, even the safety of the analytic frame is not able to maintain 
analysts’ impersonality and limit patients’ access to their bodies. 
CLINICAL USE OF MATERIAL ABOUT THE ANALYST’S BODY 
Nearly a century ago Ferenczi (1928) addressed the question of the importance of 
the patient’s observations about the analyst’s appearance. He believed that such 
comments may reflect critical feelings about the analyst, and he highlighted the 
need for the analyst to pay attention to such comments and be sensitive to their 
possible meanings. More recently Blechner (2009) suggested that it is important for 
the analyst to notice comments on, and engagements with, the analyst’s body by 
the patient and to make sense of these. His particular focus is on how these 
comments might signify the presence of an erotic transference and may take the 
form of flirting. He helpfully states that, as with any other transference, the analyst 
should accept the patient’s feelings with curiosity and explore an erotic 
transference fully before it is interpreted. I would like to suggest that this approach 
is helpful when dealing with any comments about the analyst’s body, whether they 
are reflective of an erotic transference or otherwise. 
Ferenczi also commented on the importance of urging clients to express their 
observations about the analyst: ‘Every patient without exception notices the 
smallest peculiarities in the analyst’s behaviour, external appearance, or way of 
speaking, but without previous encouragement not one of them will tell him (sic) 
about them’ (Ferenczi, 1928, p. 93). Tintner’s (2007, 2009, 2010) experiences of 
losing weight led her to appreciate how this affected her patients and, following 
Ferenczi, how essential it is to ask for observations about one’s body directly. She 
explains how patients might be hesitant to share their perceptions of the therapist 
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and adds that therapists may also be disinclined to elicit these. She stresses that 
the therapist may not even be aware that there is something to ask about: the 
patient’s perceptions may emphasise issues that the therapist cannot bear to think 
about. She suggests that the patient’s observations of the analyst’s physical body 
may be used to access and express underlying unbearable feelings, and for these 
unbearable feelings to be known and talked about. 
Tintner’s suggestion that the therapist should directly ask patients for their 
observations is made in the context of a significant change in her physical 
appearance. The risk of her suggestion is that therapy becomes led by the 
therapist’s agenda. If there are significant and obvious changes to the therapist’s 
appearance that the patient fails to notice or comment on, it may be important to 
discuss this. There is an important difference, however, between noticing how 
comments (or the lack of comments) reflect dynamics and moving to unprovoked 
and unnecessary self-disclosure. Conversely, failing to engage with comments a 
patient does make may lead the patient to believe that the therapist is not able to 
hear the patient. 
In one of her papers addressing how the therapist’s physical size and weight 
impacts patients, Tintner (2009) refers to a publication by Margaret Little (1990), 
who discusses her experience with two different analysts. The first did not engage 
with Little’s comments and observations about the analyst’s declining health and 
Little (a medical doctor) was left feeling frustrated, silenced and very angry when 
the analyst suddenly died, proving her observations correct. The second analyst 
discussed Little’s comments openly and even confirmed Little’s observations about 
his health. Little describes how helpful this felt and how it removed her from the 
previous double-bind in which she was faced with two conflicting realities – on the 
one hand she was required to say whatever was on her mind, but on the other 
hand the lack of reply from the therapist left her feeling that the subject was off 
limits and that she was being rude by divulging her observations (Little, 1990). 
Little’s work emphasises how important it is for the analyst to engage with the 
patient’s comments about the analyst’s body. 
CLINICAL EXAMPLES 
The first vignette I would like to present to illustrate my thinking comes from the 
treatment of a paranoid patient. This vignette demonstrates the usefulness of 
asking patients to reflect on their observations about their therapist’s body. This 
young man had applied for a full-time position at an organisation, but had only 
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been offered a temporary placement as an intern with a view to his suitability for 
full-term employment being assessed. He had found this experience painful and 
humiliating and a real blow to his self-esteem, and he worried that others would 
see that he had not ‘made the grade’. He began to have temper outbursts at home 
and his family encouraged him to enter therapy. Mr A, as I will call him, struggled to 
settle into treatment and asked many questions about ‘this thing called therapy’ 
and how it worked. During our third session he interrupted his own account of how 
things were going at work to ask me about my badly scarred hand. He told me that 
he found it distracting and demanded to know what had happened. I asked him 
about what he thought had happened to my hand and he replied that he was trying 
to work out whether my hand had been scarred by violence inflicted on me, or by 
me inflicting violence on another. I interpreted that he was not able to work out if I 
was safe or frightening, and whether I would help or harm him. The conversation 
moved to how this was true in all of his relationships and how for him the world is 
full of people and things that cannot be known or trusted. A few sessions later Mr A 
again turned the subject to the scar on my hand. He was angry that I would not tell 
him what had happened and was frustrated by what he experienced as my 
withholding of information. He said repeatedly that he couldn’t understand why I 
‘wouldn’t just tell him’. 
Mr A’s frustration at me not ‘just telling him’ what had happened surfaced his 
experience of the therapeutic asymmetry and of the frame as frustrating and 
persecutory. His frustration when I was not forthcoming with information was a 
clear resistance to the therapeutic frame, but also revealed something about the 
way he operated in his world. He struggled to work out where he stood with people 
and that made it hard for him to trust anyone. He was mistrustful of therapy from 
the outset (which was likely exacerbated by his family requesting that he go into 
therapy), and it was almost impossible for him to trust me until his questions were 
answered to his satisfaction. He was afraid that he had been sent to a persecutory 
therapist he could not trust, but then paradoxically found that he was dependent on 
that same therapist. This was very difficult for him to bear. His questions about my 
scarred hand and the fantasies he had about it seemed to represent an attempt to 
determine whether I was friend or foe, and reflected his internal dynamics and the 
paranoid way in which he experienced the world. The desire to know whether my 
hand had been damaged or had done the damaging represented the split in his 
mind in which he saw people as either victims (like himself at work) or as 
persecutors (like his bosses). More importantly, however, fixating on my scarred 
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hand was a way for Mr A to resist the dependence he had developed on me. If he 
could keep alive the idea that I was a dangerous, frustrating perpetrator, he could 
avoid his wish to know me more intimately and keep his view of the world alive. 
In Mr A’s search to find ‘me’ by searching for clues in my body, he was projecting a 
part of himself into my body. It became the task of the therapy for him to try to work 
out, with my help, what of that projection was of him, what was of me, and what 
was of him in me. 
The second vignette illustrates how references to the therapist’s body often occur 
in a throw-away manner ‘at the door’, and how these can make the therapist very 
uncomfortable. A colleague told me of a patient who returned to therapy after an 
absence of three years. As the patient (whom I will call Ms B) walked into her first 
session after the break she commented that the therapist must have been happy in 
the three intervening years as she had put on weight. The therapist felt unable to 
reply. This is an illustration of experiences which are not uncommon for therapists. 
Comments which occur at the start and end of sessions are often silencing. 
Ms B made her throw-away comment as she entered the room. She may have felt 
small, anxious and vulnerable as she did so. It could be assumed that needing to 
return to therapy had put her in touch with the feeling of needing her therapist and 
made her feel she had failed in some way. She was possibly also attacking her 
therapist’s happiness while demonstrating her own unhappiness by needing to 
return to therapy. Her comment could be read as evidence of defending against 
such feelings and resisting the asymmetry of the therapeutic relationship by 
attempting to re-embody, and in this case belittle, her therapist by calling her ‘fat’ 
which is generally an insult when said by one woman to another. In her comment, 
Ms B appeared to be projecting her vulnerable, ‘unattractive’ feelings into her 
therapist. This example foregrounds the particular vulnerability of the frame during 
moments of transition. More relevant to the current argument, however, was my 
colleague’s reference to how she felt about the personal content, which opens the 
question of the countertransferential dimension of body comments. 
The second of my own patients I would like to discuss, Mr C, demonstrates how 
comments about the therapist’s body may occur at the close of a session. This was 
a difficult therapeutic relationship defined by a lack of emotional connection. The 
young man had enormous potential at work and had been given extraordinary 
opportunities, but was a procrastinator and was never able to achieve the success 
that his potential promised. It was only after a session in which I spoke to him in a 
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very direct way about how he was engaging in his world, and with me, that he was 
able to admit that he had no interest in those things that others wished for him. His 
resistance to the therapy process was also acknowledged. He seemed relieved to 
have been able to admit this, and relieved that I seemed to understand rather than 
judge his lack of ambition. When I opened the door at the end of the session, he 
noticed my scarred hand for the first time (having been in therapy with me for over 
a year). He seemed shocked to see the scar and wanted to know what had 
happened. He asked whether I had been hurt since our last session, which was 
clearly impossible. It seems in this case that I needed to really ‘see’ the patient and 
understand his resistance in order for him to be able to see me in my physicality. 
Mr C seemed to only be able to notice my body at a point in the therapy when the 
transference had shifted and he felt that he could be more honest and real. It is 
significant that his comment came at the end of the session, perhaps when it could 
not draw too much of a response. 
DISCUSSION 
The past two decades have seen a marked shift in our conceptualisation of 
psychoanalysis from a one-person to a two-person process (Sapountzis, 2009). 
Intersubjective psychoanalysis now recognises that the analyst’s physical 
appearance is an important contributor to the therapy process (Burka, 1996) and 
that careful attention should be paid to the patient’s references to the therapist’s 
physicality. It is important to note that references to the body do not all do the same 
work or have the same meaning in every therapeutic process. 
The case of Mr A highlights the usefulness of asking for the patient’s thoughts and 
fantasies about the therapist’s body, and how this reveals information about the 
therapeutic dynamics and what the patient is projecting onto the analyst’s body. 
Had I simply answered Mr A when he asked about the scar, and not encouraged 
him to share his thoughts, I would have missed his fantasies of me as a perpetrator 
of violence. His lack of information about me allowed for the production of his 
fantasies, and in that way lured his unconscious processes into the open.  
The therapy with Mr A also demonstrates how, in the absence of other cues, the 
therapist’s body becomes hyper-signified. Mr A openly struggled with our 
relationship and how it was defined by the frame, and he tried hard to know me 
personally, making particular use of my hand in his attempts. With reduced 
availability of other information, his attention on the little that he did know was 
intensified and my scarred hand became his focus. The concentration on my hand 
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was a way in which he could protest against the therapeutic setting which he found 
so frustrating. When he could not get the information that he desired from me 
verbally, he looked for other ways in which to do so and tried to read it off my body. 
If the therapist does not allow the patient’s thoughts and feelings about the 
therapist’s body to be talked about, it is likely that the patient will assume the topic 
lies in a spectrum from rude or impertinent to forbidden, because of the social view 
that it is intrusive to talk about the person of others, particularly their bodies. When 
patients are asked directly about their feelings towards the therapist’s body, they 
frequently deny noticing or feeling anything at all (Little, 1990). A therapist’s 
reactions to this may include relief, surprise, confusion, amusement or scepticism. 
If she pursues the issue and encourages exploration, a myriad of fantasies often 
emerges (Lowell & Meader, 2005). Allowing Mr A to share his fantasies about my 
scarred hand gave me access to his split and paranoid world, and underscores the 
helpfulness of exploring the meaning behind such comments before interpreting 
them (Blechner, 2009). 
If the analyst is supposed to be a ‘neutral’ receiver of a patient’s projections and 
fantasies, talking about the analyst’s body is an obvious way for the patient to try to 
get the therapist to break this neutral and impersonal way of engaging. The patient 
makes things personal in order to keep them less one-sidedly intimate. Mr A’s 
demands for information are an example, an attempt to get me to share personal 
information so that the exchange could be more reciprocal and therefore more 
comfortable for him. 
The manner in which Mr A and Mr C engaged with my hand is illustrative of 
Burka’s (1996) idea of the therapist’s body as analytic object. Burka (1996) makes 
use of Green’s (1975) concept of the analytic object to understand the role of the 
therapist’s body. In her description she combines Ogden’s (1994a) concept of the 
analytic third with Green’s notion of the analytic object and proposes that the 
analyst’s body as an analytic object is co-created by the intersubjectivity of the 
analyst and patient. Such an object is neither strictly internal nor strictly external 
but exists in shared unconscious space between the patient and the therapist. 
Samuels (1989) raises a similar point: ‘What I am trying to convey is that, in 
analysis, the analyst’s body is not entirely his or her own and what it says to him or 
her is not a message for him or her alone’ (p. 164). The physical body of the 
analyst is always present, but not always an analytic object. It only manifests as 
such when it becomes the carrier of meanings that had not existed prior to a 
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particular moment in a treatment. Its meaning and the dimensions it takes may 
change at different points in the treatment. 
When the therapist’s body does become a focus it develops into something that 
has a substantive impact on treatment outcome. Burka (1996) proposes that the 
body assumes the position of an analytic object under some conditions and not 
others. This may be out of the analyst’s control, such as during the dramatic and 
unavoidable physical changes of illness or pregnancy. The analyst’s body may also 
only emerge as an analytic object in response to certain intersubjective 
transference-countertransference dynamics. The analyst’s body therefore only 
becomes an analytic object under certain conditions, but there are conditions under 
which the chances that it becomes an analytic object are higher than others. 
My scarred hand became an analytic object for much of Mr A’s therapy (especially 
in the early stages), but gained significance and became an analytic object for Mr 
C only after a particular therapeutic interchange allowed him to notice it. For Mr A, 
my hand represented information to which he was not privy, and which reinforced 
that he was not accepted and included as he wished to have been. This 
emphasised his split worldview. Mr C’s observation of my hand signified a growing 
closeness and a more real and accurate appraisal of each other in the relationship. 
My scarred hand is one of my unusual and outstanding physical features and may 
thus opportunistically become an analytic object in therapies with my patients more 
than hands might do for other therapists. Other therapists will be embodied in 
different ways. Responses to my hand will not feature significantly in every 
treatment and requires that certain conditions (like those described with Mr A and 
Mr C) arise. 
The case of Mr C illustrates a paradox provoked by the hypersignifying of the 
analyst’s body. Due to the absence of other cues, the patient focuses more on the 
analyst’s body than they might do in other circumstances. In some cases however, 
they may only be able to see the analyst’s body accurately (i.e. notice what is really 
there) when they are able to experience the analyst as a separate and real person 
(and in turn, this might only happen when they experience being seen in that light). 
In other words, when there is nothing else to see, the patient sees the therapist’s 
body, but they may resist seeing the body of the therapist in its uniqueness until 
there is a shift in the transference-countertransference dynamic which makes the 
resistance no longer necessary. Only when I was able to demonstrate being able 
to see Mr C psychically was he able to see me physically. This intersubjective 
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dynamic allowed for a therapeutic breakthrough. In this case, it was the avoidance 
of the physical rather than a focus on it which reflected the resistance to the 
therapeutic process. This case highlights the context and therapy specific nature of 
references to the body, and their unique relationship to the transferential elements 
of a particular case. 
The cases of Ms B and Mr C illustrate the common occurrence for comments about 
the therapist’s body to occur at opening and closing session moments. It is equally 
common for the therapist to find such comments silencing. I would suggest that this 
is true for a number of reasons. Firstly, there may be a temptation to return to the 
‘whole’ patient and avoid the ‘heat’ of the transference. Returning to the relative 
safety of a therapeutic exchange, and avoiding the directly personal, might feel 
more comfortable for the therapist. Secondly, if the comment is made as the 
patient walks into the room, it may feel as though the session has not yet started 
and the therapist and patient are not yet ‘doing the business’ of psychotherapy. If 
the remark is made as the patient leaves the room, there is no time to engage with 
it since the session is over. Bringing the comment up at another point may feel 
defensive to the therapist, and they may worry that talking about the comment 
gives the patient insight into the therapist’s hurt feelings. A third reason why such 
comments may be hard to pick up on is that they may be hurtful, insulting or 
surprising. Therapists are trained to engage with negative comments about 
themselves as therapists, but criticisms about them as embodied beings might be 
particularly difficult to engage with and interpret. Personal comments about the 
interpersonal interaction, thoughts or attitudes are the everyday products of 
therapy, but comments about one’s appearance may feel penetrative and the 
therapist may feel less practiced at responding appropriately. 
The questions that Mr A asked about my hand brought up strong 
countertransference feelings. The scar is as a result of being badly hurt in an 
accident in which I was a victim. It was rather shocking to me, and hard to hear, 
that someone might think that I had received the injury in the role of an aggressor. 
The damage had come from outside, and I had no responsibility for it, so when it 
was viewed through a lens of me being responsible and violent I felt aggrieved and 
my instinct was to answer Mr A’s question defensively. Managing and digesting 
these countertransference feelings allowed me instead to ask him for his thoughts 
and fantasies. This led to a useful conversation which would have been foreclosed 
had I simply answered him directly. It also gave me insight into how he might 
unconsciously provoke and anger people around him. 
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While it is true that the therapist’s physical appearance is an integral part of the 
therapeutic setting, it often does not receive the same kind of consideration as 
other aspects of the setting such as time and money. Perhaps this is because it 
seems to approach the subject of the personal and of self-disclosure by the 
therapist. It also reflects a paradox that occurs in the therapy room: the therapist is 
not a person until the session has started (or at least not one with whom the patient 
can engage), but once they start the session they are no longer a real person but 
are instead constituted by the patient’s fears, fantasies and projections. 
As the vignettes illustrate, patients’ comments on the body of the analyst may be a 
form of symptomatic response which reveal something about the patient’s 
unconscious dynamics, and the analyst’s body becomes a site into which these 
dynamics can be projected. The defence of projection is understood as a failure of 
mentalization (Grenell, 2008), so the comments and the meanings behind them 
need to be mentalized by the patients with the aid of the analyst. In this way the 
patient can begin to take back the projection and be helped to see what is of them 
in the analyst and what is in fact separate to them.  
The short vignettes discussed illustrate the complexity of the therapeutic 
relationship and the analyst’s physical body in that relationship. The therapist’s 
body maintains its impersonal status in order for the patient to keep projecting into 
it, yet it is simultaneously continuously communicative, and frequently 
communicates much more than the therapist would like it to. The therapist defends 
against the patient having any knowledge of her body while the patient remains 
curious about it. The therapist’s body is thus something for the patient to project 
into as well as to find reality in. 
CONCLUSION 
The physical body has always been present in psychoanalysis. Indeed, 
psychoanalysis began with Freud exploring the psychological mechanisms at work 
in patients who presented with physical illnesses for which no identifiable biological 
cause could be found (Breuer & Freud, 1893; Gubb, 2010; Rangell, 2000). This 
was the body of the patient. Despite increasing attention by analysts to the space 
between the patient and the analyst, the patients’ projections and other material 
are still usually interpreted from a unidirectional perspective. Specifically, they are 
treated as metaphors or symbols that communicate core aspects about the 
patient’s conflicts and fantasies, and the role of the analyst is to understand these 
projections and interpret them to the patient. This paper offers a challenge to 
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engage with the bodies in the therapy room in a different way: by acknowledging, 
firstly, that there are two bodies in the room and, secondly, that these are 
inescapably physical bodies which lend themselves to psychic significance. Doing 
so allows the analyst to be re-embodied. The way in which the patient engages 
with the analyst’s body offers useful information about the therapeutic process. 
In order to work with comments or enactments focused on the therapist’s body, it is 
useful to look at the nature of the comment, its timing, and to interpret what it 
appears to mean to the patient. As with all clinical material, when a patient makes 
reference to, demonstrates a preoccupation with, or comments upon the analyst’s 
body, it is incumbent upon the therapist to reflect on the significance of the timing 
of the comment and on what might be going on in the transference-
countertransference relationship. 
Normal social interaction contains unspoken rules about normative behaviour. 
These rules tell us how to behave and tell us what we may and may not say. The 
social injunction around making personal comments – particularly negative 
comments – about the body might further explain why it is difficult for a therapist to 
respond. There is shame and meaning attached to our physical appearance. When 
a patient focuses on the body in this way, it may be an attempt to move themselves 
out of the discomfort created by the analytic setting. The act of the patient making 
themselves more comfortable in this way may have the intended or unintended 
effect of making the therapist less comfortable. 
The paper has argued that the body of the analyst always acquires salience, and 
indeed a special salience, due to the absence of other cues and personal 
information. Analysts bring aspects of their embodiment into the room without even 
being aware of these, and are often less aware of the impact of their bodies than of 
their minds. The frame also inadvertently moves the body out of the room. By 
paying attention to how patients bring the analyst’s body back into the room, the 
analyst is re-embodied and through that process is able to gain more nuanced 
insight into the dynamics occurring in a particular therapy. 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION  
The title of this undertaking, “Minding the Body”, was chosen as it not only raises 
the issue of the physical body in psychoanalytic practice, but in doing so also 
includes many of the meanings that the word ‘minding’ evokes both in a 
psychological sense as well as in common speech, such as ‘taking care of’, ‘being 
mindful of’, ‘taking into account’, ‘holding in mind’ and importantly ‘giving mental 
attention to’. The project as a whole is located against a backdrop in which, despite 
the fact that the body has been fundamental to psychoanalysis from the beginning, 
in recent years there have been relatively few developments in theories of mental 
illness that take a route to the physical as well as very little concern with the body 
of the analyst, both in terms of the analyst’s private experience and as an object of 
the patient’s own experience. The aim of this study was to address this relative 
neglect and to research what the clinical implications of paying attention to both the 
bodies in the therapy room might be.  
The questions and explorations addressed in this project need to be considered in 
historical context and set against the beginnings of psychoanalysis. Since Freud’s 
early attempts to diagnose and treat hysterical patients who presented with bodily 
symptoms for which no underlying biological cause could be found, the body has 
been central to psychoanalysis (Breuer & Freud, 1893). The very possibility of 
symptoms that are fundamentally mental in origin manifesting in the body, which 
was suggested in Freud’s work with hysteria, establishes a relationship between 
the body and the mind, and it can be argued that a concern with this relationship is 
inseparable from psychoanalysis itself (Breuer & Freud, 1893; Freud, 1893a, 
1893b, 1896).  
Implicit in this emphasis on the mind and body in relation, as manifest in the clinical 
challenge Freud encountered in hysteria, is the close epistemological link between 
theory and practice characteristic of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1893a, 1893b, 1894a, 
1905, 1909). It can be, and often has been, argued that psychoanalysis has always 
been about theorising practice rather than practicing theory. In accordance with the 
close link between theory and practice in psychoanalysis, this research draws on 
two fundamental theoretico-clinical constructs: that of mentalization on the side of 
theory, and the phenomenon of countertransference on the side of practice. 
Freud’s early work with hysterical conversions was a particularly vivid example of 
how unconscious material can take a disguised route to the body, and this kind of 
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pathology illustrates the essentially analytic notion of mental illnesses that are 
related to repressed psychological conflicts which eventually emerge in indirect 
form in the body, and where the origins of the illness remain unavailable to the ego 
of the patient (Freud, 1894a, 1909, 1926). 
Freud described various other forms of psychosoma too, such as hypochondriasis, 
actual neuroses and psychosomatic illness, and theorised the clear distinctions 
between the symptoms of these pathologies and their underlying dynamics. He 
also had precise ideas about which of these could be treated by means of the 
analytic method and why that was so (Mitrani, 1995; Taylor, 2003). The work in the 
area of bodily symptoms following Freud expanded and questioned some of the 
aspects of the Freudian position as well as emphasising new areas of enquiry. An 
important Freudian view that was questioned was whether or not it was possible to 
treat other physical complaints, such as those that became known as somatisation, 
with psychoanalysis (Deutsch, 1939; Ferenczi, 1955; Groddeck, 1977). As theories 
developed around the origin and genesis of somatisation, the Freudian concepts 
behind the idea that symptoms have unique and specific meanings related to the 
particular patient’s history, was also debated (Gottlieb, 2003; McDougall, 1974). 
What these theoretical extensions of Freud’s work also highlight is that the 
distinction between the various types of psychosoma are neither simple nor 
straightforward and much debate ensued, particularly around differentiating and 
diagnosing conversion symptoms from those now described as the product of the 
condition called psychosomatosis.  
THE DYNAMICS OF PSYCHOSOMA 
The paper entitled “The Sense of Bodily Symptoms” (Gubb, 2010) investigated the 
specific extension of psychoanalytic practice to include physical symptoms which 
were not originally considered to be treatable by means of psychoanalysis, using 
the psychoanalytic method or talking cure. The paper was written against the 
background of the literature attempting to distinguish, in theoretical terms, a form of 
diagnostic and classificatory activity which implied that patients belonged in either 
the category of hysterical conversions or that of psychosomatosis (Carveth & 
Carveth, 2003; Taylor, 2003, 2008b; Verhaeghe, Vanheule, & De Rick, 2007).  
The limitation of this position is that it does not reflect what is observed in the 
clinical situation. In practice one sees examples of patients who are classical 
converters, patients who present with vague forms of somatisation, and 
interestingly, patients who seemed to move from one position to another during the 
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course of a therapy. These moves occur in both directions: in some cases the 
patients’ presentation changed from one in which the symptom had a less 
mentalized and symbolic form to one in which the symptom became more symbolic 
and meaningful. In other cases, usually if the patient experienced a trauma, 
regression or breakdown, the move occurred in the other direction. 
The implication of this shifting in position coupled with the extent to which a 
particular patient’s circumstances influence levels of mentalization combine to 
suggest that the diagnostic tendency underpinning the theory has been overly 
constraining, and therefore does not adequately explain what is seen in clinical 
practice. The paper consequently proposes a continuum on which the two 
pathologies might be mapped and which reveals different levels of underlying 
pathology which in turn affect whether there is a particular meaning in a symptom 
related to the patient’s history, while still retaining the central understanding that 
this psychopathology involves repression of unconscious material. Much of the 
theorisation in the paper is made possible following the work done on the concept 
of mentalization and what that has revealed about the underlying psychical 
mechanisms which link patients’ physical symptoms to their relative mentalizing 
capacity. The mentalization theory also has clinical implications, as it informs an 
understanding of what the task of treating patients with these symptoms might be. 
The clinical application of identifying where the patient lies on this continuum and 
what their underlying level of mentalization is, is important for treatment as it 
defines the therapeutic task. Since the way in which a psychosomatic pathology 
will manifest is related to the patient’s level of mentalization, (in that conversion 
symptoms require a degree of mentalization related to the level of language 
required for the symbolisation behind the disguised meaning of the symptom) while 
somatization symptoms do not, and as the patient’s ability to mentalize changes 
during a treatment, so too might the symptom presentation. Consequently, different 
kinds of interpretive activity may be required at different points in the therapy 
depending on whether the patient is operating in a more concrete, rigid manner, or 
if they are able to make links and free-associate to material. If the patient has poor 
mentalizing and symbolising ability it is best for the treatment to place in a face-to-
face manner and to focus on creating the links between the patient’s mental activity 
and their physical responses to that. Assisting the patient in this way to mentalize 
and symbolize aims to shift their position along the continuum. If the patient has a 
more well-developed capacity for mentalization, the therapist can make more use 
of word play and interpretation, in order to allow the patient to make sense of their 
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symptom and understand its disguised meaning, and in that way allow them to lift 
the repression and work through the underlying conflict. 
Interestingly, while there are contemporary papers which engage with the debate 
concerning the differences and similarities of conversions and psychosomatic 
illnesses (Taylor, 2003, 2008b; Verhaeghe, et al., 2007), there are apparently 
fewer and fewer patients who present with hysterical conversions clinically. 
Whether this is in fact the case and is a result of different attitudes to sexuality in 
more modern society as is often argued, or if in fact conversion symptoms are not 
being recognised in different contexts, is a matter for debate. However, the 
apparent ‘disappearance’ of, or concern with, classic conversion hysterias does not 
mean that attention is no longer paid to other kinds of symptoms which involve 
both the psyche and the soma. 
SCHOOLING PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS 
Work in the field of psychosoma has been explored and developed by the well-
established Paris School of Psychosomatic Illness since the 1960s. The Paris 
School is based on the founding work of Pierre Marty, and the theorists belonging 
to this well-known Paris School maintain Freudian economic principles, focusing on 
how the patient preserves and discharges their libidinal energy. They argue that if 
the patient is not able to mentally deal with their libidinal energy by identifying and 
processing (i.e. mentalizing) the underlying psychic suffering or discomfort, the 
unbound energy takes a route to the body, but that this route to the body may not 
be related to specific, identifiable forms of trauma, or to an identifiable 
developmental history (Aisenstein, 2006, 2008; Aisenstein & Smadja, 2010).  
In the psychoanalytic literature published in the English language, the Paris School 
is the only acknowledged and established school of thought focusing on the field of 
psychosomatic illness. However a review of contemporary literature suggests the 
emergence of another group of theorists who generally seems to be writing in a 
similar way and who thus could be construed as a school, even if they do not yet 
identify themselves as such. The second paper “Psychosomatics Today: A Review 
of Contemporary Theory and Practice” (Gubb, 2013a) argues for this second 
school and names it the Attachment approach. Not surprisingly, the Attachment 
approach is based on the work of attachment theorists such as Fonagy, Target and 
Allen and their work on mentalization (Allen, et al., 2008; Fonagy, et al., 2004; 
Fonagy & Target, 2007). This school is also related to Freudian economic 
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principles in that it understands somatisation in terms of unmet childhood needs 
stemming from interactions with caregivers which leave the child unable to manage 
intense affects and physical sensations. The Attachment approach is also more 
related to Freudian topographics and developmental theory than the Paris School, 
as it recognises that the relationship with the caregiver produces internal conflicts 
and desires, some of which need to be repressed in order to be managed. 
The development of the theorisation and treatment of psychosomatic illness 
appears to be following one of two trajectories based on these two different 
understandings of mentalization and the levels and forms that it can take. 
Accordingly, the paper compares and contrasts the two approaches with respect to 
their underlying theories and treatment approaches, paying close attention to how 
the school’s understanding of the concept of mentalization translates into the task 
to be completed by the therapist in the room with the patient. The term 
‘mentalization’ was coined by Pierre Marty (1963) of the Paris School who 
understood it in Freudian economic terms, describing it as the process which is 
used by the mental apparatus to bind the body’s libidinal drives. By contrast, 
mentalization as understood by the Attachment approach focuses on early 
experiences with caregivers as well as on affect recognition and regulation 
(Fonagy, et al., 2004).  
Based on their theoretical foundations, each of these schools make proposals 
about how the therapist should understand their task and how they should engage 
if a somatising patient seeks treatment with them. The clinical implications of these 
differences between the schools, while defining the therapist’s task according to 
the particular patient’s level of mentalization, interestingly translate into very little 
difference in the treatment activity. The two schools are also in agreement that the 
therapeutic task may be required to be adjusted through the process of therapy as 
the patient’s capacity for mentalization is strengthened and deepened. 
In summary, contemporary theorisations about patients’ bodily responses to 
psychological events agree that these have psychological meaning and can be 
treated by means of psychoanalysis. The keys issues in the current literature turn 
on the understanding that the patient’s underlying level of mentalization will affect 
how much and in what way that patient will somatise. This suggests that it is 
important to pay attention to mentalization in the therapy room and allow that to 
inform the therapeutic task. The first two papers presented in the thesis highlight 
the therapeutic consequences that arise after the therapist identifies different levels 
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of mentalization and how this affects the treatment of different types of 
psychosoma.  
Since changes in any key ingredient of the practice of psychoanalysis are likely to 
involve possible theoretical shifts in understanding and vice versa, it becomes 
important to pose the question of what impact the shifts in both practice and theory 
coming out of the contemporary theorisations of psychosomatosis might have had 
on the psychoanalytic theoretical foundations underlying the understanding of the 
symptomatic body, as well as how this is treated in psychoanalytic practice. In 
contemporary psychoanalytic practice, and as suggested by the Paris School and 
Attachment approach, the scope of what can be treated by means of the 
psychoanalytic method has increased, as well as the understanding of the nature 
of the therapist’s task. The most significant contemporary practice development is 
the acceptance of the close relationship between psychosoma and mentalization 
and how that relationship informs the therapeutic endeavour. The therapist’s task is 
now understood to be determined by the patient’s underlying level of mentalizing 
ability and requires that that level of mentalization be enhanced and improved by 
means of both mirroring and interpretation by the therapist. However, despite these 
developments, the conceptual foundations nevertheless still allow for the retention 
of the fundamental conception of psychosomatic illness as an unconscious process 
underpinned by the repression of psychic material, which can be treated using the 
psychoanalytic method, importantly, making use of interpretation. It would appear 
then, that even though there have been significant developments in practice, the 
metapsychological principles and understandings of somatic psychoanalytic 
psychopathology are still intact, and in fact little has changed in the understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms of psychosomatosis as these still closely resemble 
their early Freudian beginnings (Gottlieb, 2013).  
While there might be some variance between different schools of thought between 
their emphases on economic, dynamic or topographical principles, there is still 
fundamentally the same understanding of psychosoma and how the unconscious 
works and how symptoms function in most of the work described and reviewed in 
this research, as when Freud described the “puzzling leap from the mental to the 
physical” (Freud, 1917b, p. 258). This is the understanding of psychic energy which 
is frustrated or not satisfactorily discharged to the object, and when a mental 
understanding can be applied to this, the discharge can instead be made mental 
meaning of, and does not need to manifest in the body.  
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This general acceptance of symptoms of a mental conflict manifesting in physical 
terms, occurs at the same time as the contemporary emphasis on the importance 
of countertransference, and this combination of theoretical influences predicts a 
new and matured understanding of the same conceptual elements of 
psychosomatic psychopathology being applied to the relationship between the 
mind and body of the second body in the room: the body of the analyst. 
THE SECOND BODY IN THE ROOM 
The contemporary embracing of the importance of the countertransference, and 
specifically more focus on the contribution of the analyst to the form in which the 
countertransference manifests (Gabbard, 2001), expands the role of the therapist. 
The expansions in theory around the phenomenon of countertransference have 
evolved psychoanalytic practice in that the role of the analyst in the unfolding of a 
psychoanalytic treatment is now understood in an increasingly modulated way, and 
countertransference is now worked with extensively and is considered to be an 
irreplaceable tool in psychoanalytic treatment (Gabbard, 2001).However, despite 
this emphasis on the countertransference in the psychoanalytic literature, there is 
still insufficient attention paid to the physical countertransferential responses of the 
analyst, and therefore the unanalysed material on the level of the analyst’s body is 
neglected. It is interesting to note too, and crucial to this thesis, that what little 
attention is paid to somatic countertransference is read outside of the tradition 
which makes sense of bodily responses as being specific to the particular 
therapeutic dyad and developing out of the dynamics of that dyad. 
In the context of the analyst’s expanded role and their contribution to the form of 
the countertransference, it would seem that it is equally important for the therapist 
to mentalize any regular physical sensations which they experience in their own 
bodies in relation to a specific patient in order to understand what those may reveal 
about what has not been available to the therapist until that point. This will, in turn, 
lead to the analyst using him- or herself as a psychoanalytic tool in a more 
nuanced way.  
The third paper “Craving Interpretation: A Case of Somatic Countertransference” 
suggests that what has been learned about the need for the mentalization of 
physical symptoms in the patient should be applied to the physical responses the 
therapist experiences to the patient in the therapy room, and by doing so those 
physical responses will be transformed into the realm of the mental. This proposal 
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is made possible by the shifts in the countertransference described previously and 
advocates that these ‘signs’ which are indicative of preconscious and as yet 
uninterpreted responses to the patient, and which are not immediately available to 
the therapist, be made mental and become grist for the analytic mill.  
In suggesting that somatic countertransferences have been neglected in theoretical 
consideration and implying that major attention needs to be paid to interpretive 
processes that the analyst needs to apply to herself, questions of technique arise 
with urgency. The first of these arises consequent upon the requirement for the 
analyst to interpret their somatic countertransference. The interpretation of a 
somatic countertransference can usefully be developed on the basis of Ogden’s 
notion of reverie (Ogden, 1994b, 1997a). The emphasis Ogden places on making 
sense of physical responses is a very useful vehicle which the analyst can add to 
her repertoire in order to make mental those of her responses which were 
previously unconscious and physical, in order that she may make the best clinical 
use of the countertransference.  
The second question of technique raised is consequent to the developments in the 
theory and use of countertransference and the debate this raises about the nature 
of the relationship between the patient and the analyst, as well as opening up a 
substantial difference in clinical practice from the original Freudian construal and 
the Kleinian interpretation which followed. When the therapist begins to mind her 
own body with the view to exploring both the intrapsychic and interpersonal 
meaning of its responses (even if this meaning is initially partially unavailable to 
her, and may or may not be disguised), this may result in a different way of 
engaging with the ‘symptoms’ of her body and the visibility of these to the patient. 
This introduces an examination of the positioning of the role of the therapist and 
how much of her hidden physical responses should explicitly be revealed to the 
patient. In the case of psychosomatic phenomena which are spontaneously 
perceivable (and in that sense not able to be hidden) there is a particular 
implication for therapeutic practice, and the question is then not whether the fact of 
the physical response should be revealed or not, but instead how to work with that 
dimension – as discussed in the third paper. Engaging with the patient’s response 
to these visible or audible somatic countertransferences may provide the analyst 
with a further area in which to explore and understand the dynamics of that 
particular therapeutic dyad.  
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While the traditional understanding was that contents of the analyst’s unconscious 
or their preconscious material prior to interpretations were not to be revealed to the 
patient, the broader intersubjectivist tradition suggests that useful therapeutic gains 
can be made when the analyst reveals information about their physical responses 
to the patient even when these are not immediately perceivable (Ehrenberg, 2005; 
Gerhardt, Sweetnam, & Borton, 2003). This issue of the extent and nature of the 
analyst’s disclosure of personal information and how it affects the patient’s 
involvement in the interpretive process is one of the controversial and intensely 
debated issues currently confronting contemporary analytic practice (Sugarman, 
2012).  
The intersubjectivist paradigm advocates the disclosure by the analyst of their 
thoughts, fantasies and responses (both psychological and physical) in order for 
these to enter the field of interpretation (Sugarman, 2012). The therapist engaging 
with the patient in this way fundamentally changes the nature of the psychoanalytic 
exchange, and the degree and character of the patient’s involvement in the 
interpretive process as it has been conceived of since the beginning of 
psychoanalysis. It was Freud’s (1914) view that the best interpretation is one that is 
made by the patient himself. However, while this Freudian understanding does 
include the patient making interpretations about him or herself during the 
interpretive exchange between patient and therapist, this is not done via an 
interpretation about the impact that the patient might be having on the therapist.  
Even though in some ways the intersubjective extension of this technique could be 
seen as a reasonably logical move, the position taken in this research is a more 
traditional one in which the analyst does not disclose personal information. This 
position is not taken in order for the analyst’s anonymity to be preserved in some 
false way, but in order to retain the important key analytic concept of the 
importance and use of interpretation. I would also argue that the approach 
suggested by the intersubjective paradigm may increase the attention paid to the 
countertransference but with a focus on the more ‘real’ aspects of the relationship, 
and may thus edge towards a ‘two-way’ interaction characteristic of informal 
conversation. This sort of change in the therapeutic relationship may close down 
the space for the analyst’s body to receive the patient’s psychic projections or other 
manifestations of a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic method, the transference, by 
filling in the gaps that a patient might otherwise fill with their fantasies. 
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THE ANALYST’S BODY AS ANALYTIC OBJECT 
When the body of the analyst enters the room, whether it be ‘accidentally’ in a 
visible countertransference, or if something of it is unavoidably revealed by the 
analyst, for example by manifest illness or pregnancy, there are implications for 
practice. An idea traditionally endorsed by psychoanalysis is that the analyst 
maintains the position of a ‘figure’ in the therapy room and this is related to the fact 
that the analyst is seen by the patient as an expert, and it is common for an 
interaction with an expert to be conducted in an impersonal, professional manner. 
Psychoanalysis views this impersonal presentation of the analyst to be especially 
important because of the very personal nature of the exchange, and the 
therapeutic encounter was therefore intentionally set up to construct the interaction 
as a professional consultation rather than, for example, a friendly, advice-giving, 
confessional relationship (van Zyl, 2003). The interpersonal relationship between 
analyst and patient is of utmost importance to the two parties involved, but it is a 
relationship unlike any other in that it is particularly one-sided. The analyst does 
not confess or celebrate the personal in equal measure to the patient as would 
occur in a friendship (Freud, 1912c).  
The establishment of the analyst as a figure is derived from the work of early 
psychoanalytic theorists who promoted the idea that the analyst should remain 
neutral, impartial and impersonal in order for the transference to develop and for 
the analyst to function as a screen onto which the patient can project their conflicts, 
fantasies and neuroses which are unconscious in origin. It was believed that this 
was the best way to foster the development of the transference as the analyst’s 
neutrality and anonymity kept any ‘real’ aspects of the analyst from ‘muddying’ the 
therapeutic space (Freud, 1940; Giustino, 2009; Moore & Fine, 1990; Smith, 2003).  
The concepts of analytic neutrality and anonymity have recently been the subject 
of much debate, especially with the emergence of the intersubjective approach to 
practice (Renik, 2007), and it is within that debate that the paper entitled “Re-
embodying the Analyst” (Gubb, 2013b) is located. The paper argues that when 
attention is drawn to the body of the analyst in the room, the idea of the 
impersonal, neutral analyst, which has been encouraged since the birth of 
psychoanalysis, is challenged. 
The traditional psychoanalytic perspective was therefore one in which it was the 
‘figure’ of the analyst and the body and mind of the patient which took part in the 
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treatment. The unconscious parts of the minds of both participants were active 
during the process and were the objects of enquiry for the analyst. However, all of 
the developments which have developed the understanding and use of certain 
elements of psychoanalytic practice have made it possible to now move the 
embodied person of the analyst legitimately into the arena of analytic practice and 
allow it to join the customary figure of the analyst.  
The fourth paper suggests in contrast to the traditional idea that the analyst should 
remain only a figure, that the physical body of the analyst will always give clues to 
the patient about the analyst in their reality as a person, and instead of spending 
effort attempting to hide these, it may be clinically useful to engage therapeutically 
with the patient’s comments and observations about the analyst’s body. It is likely 
that the body of the analyst will only enter the therapeutic space and affect the 
impersonality of the analyst after there is either a significant physical change such 
as due to illness or pregnancy, or if there has been a shift in the transference-
countertransference dynamics which has consequently drawn the patient’s 
attention to the analyst’s body in a more personal way. The paper proposes that 
paying attention to the physical aspects of the analyst as they are seen through the 
eyes of the patient following a physical change or shift in the interpersonal 
dynamics provides a wealth of information which can then be mined during the 
treatment. The paper consequently advocates that the body of the analyst as an 
object of perception and experience of the patient must be allowed to enter the 
therapeutic space.  
It is important to emphasise that what is proposed here is that when the analyst’s 
body becomes explicitly present after such changes, that it is both the figure and 
the embodied person of the analyst, rather than the figure of the analyst alone, that 
enters the room. This therapeutic approach importantly reinforces the fundamental 
structure of a psychoanalysis in which the position of the analyst as a figure is not 
abandoned, and the therapeutic frame still exists, while at the same time opening 
up a space for an investigation of what the more ‘real’ aspects of the relationship 
reveal about the transference-countertransference dynamics.  
As the raison d’etre of psychoanalysis is to treat the suffering of patients, it is 
understandable that the emphasis has traditionally been upon the body of the 
analysand and that the therapeutic dimensions of the changing body of the analyst 
have therefore not been sufficiently reflected upon. Further to that, against the 
background of the analyst being conceived of as an expert who deals in language, 
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interpretation and the talking cure, the asymmetry of the psychoanalytic 
relationship comes to the fore, and the body of the analyst may easily be construed 
as being not for the attention of the patient. However, by paying attention to the 
body of the analyst as it is experienced by the patient the analyst can add to their 
therapeutic repertoire and access useful information about the transference-
countertransference dynamics at work in the therapeutic dyad. 
In summary then, the first two papers of this thesis outlined what procedures could 
be used to facilitate patients’ mentalization of their physical symptoms, while the 
second two papers advocate that the analyst pay attention to two different ways in 
which their own body becomes an object of the analysis. The first of these is the 
suggestion that the analyst brings the same procedures and techniques to bear 
upon themselves in order to enable interpretation and understanding of their 
physical responses to a patient as they did to the patients’ psychosomatic 
symptoms, or in other words, that the analyst interpret their own bodily self. The 
second advocates interpreting the patient’s interpretation of the analyst’s body.  
It was possible to put forward this argument in the second part of the study 
following the expansion of the notion of countertransference as this has brought 
the other half of the therapeutic dyad – the therapist – into greater focus than might 
previously have been the case, and importantly for this research, with a particular 
focus on the therapist as embodied. The theory of mentalization and its 
implications for practice also relates the first part of the thesis with its focus on the 
patient’s body, to the second part of the thesis which focuses on the analyst’s 
body, by proposing that the analyst must herself make her own body mental.  
The project therefore submits that all expressions of the body in the therapy room – 
whether in the case of psychosomatic symptoms in the patient or in the case of the 
‘normal’ relation between the analyst and her own body, or the way in which the 
patient responds to the analyst’s body – require therapeutic investigation and 
interpretation. It further urges that any clinical practice in the area of psychosoma 
now be written in a way that includes the somatic dimensions of both the patient 
and the analyst based on the proposition that by paying attention to the two bodies 
in the room the analyst extends her analytic range which can in turn facilitate deep 
and lasting therapeutic gains. 
The structure of the thesis with two interconnected parts making up a whole, was 
chosen to reflect a similar relationship in two other areas of psychoanalysis: the 
first of these is the non-cartesian relationship between the body and the mind, and 
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the second relates to an appreciation of the fact that that there cannot be a patient 
without a therapist. The two-part structure of the research therefore accentuates 
both the setting of the psychoanalytic situation and its two participants, as well as 
aspects of the two ‘parts’ that both of these participants bring into a psychoanalytic 
treatment, namely a mind as well as a body. 
In conclusion, this thesis has argued that it is therapeutically useful to mind both 
the bodies in the room. Giving attention to the patient’s physical symptoms and 
presentation will allow for a deeper understanding of their psychic conflicts and 
levels of functioning which in turn informs the clinical intervention so that patients 
might be helped to function with reduced suffering. Minding the body of the analyst 
allows for the analyst’s body to emerge in a way in which it can play a part in 
therapy, and consequently invites the body of the analyst to enter the room as a 
tool in analytic practice and in that way as an analytic object (Ogden, 1997a) in and 
of itself.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE PROJECT 
Research making use of the methodology used in this study raises four interrelated 
epistemological considerations.  
The broadly qualitative research paradigm is often criticised on the grounds that 
the findings of qualitative studies cannot be generalised both because of the small 
number of participants involved and due to the fact that the kinds of claims being 
made may be very case specific. As described in the methodology chapter, this 
criticism is true of case study methodology specifically as well as other research 
methods where small numbers of instances are explored, such as in-depth 
interviews. The lack of generalisability of this project could be considered as its first 
limitation. However, the depth and richness of the material produced using that 
method is also one of its strengths, and was therefore an appropriate research 
method for this project. The cases used were chosen because they were believed 
to be typical of the point being argued and were revealing in that very typicality 
which exemplified points under discussion and/or expanded theoretical positions. 
The second and third limitations are related to the fact that this research is 
specifically clinical in form and has certain aspects in common with the clinical 
case study research method. Clinical research by definition includes a high degree 
of data selection and thus raises questions in relation to ethics particularly vividly, 
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since in clinical contexts there is an imperative to maintain a patient’s privacy and 
consequently issues of confidentiality and recognisability come to the fore.  
As a result of the ethical requirement that patients be asked for permission to use 
their material in the research or for them to have terminated therapy a long time 
previously, restrictions were placed upon the choice of which patients could be 
included (as described in Chapter Three). This important consideration 
necessitated that great care be taken when deciding who to approach so as not to 
negatively impact any on-going therapeutic processes, and consequently some 
potential participants were not included even though their material may have been 
connected to, or useful for, the study.  
In this form of research, once appropriate subjects have been selected specific 
material from within the case needs to be selected. This in turn raises the question 
of to what extent the material chosen can itself risk a confidentiality breach if it 
reveals the identity of the patient or in some way makes it possible that they may 
be recognised. In order to prevent that, some of the identifying details needed to be 
disguised. This leads to the third possible limitation of the study since, as a result 
of the disguise, there may have on occasion been some inhibition or distortion in 
the presentation of the research data. There is therefore a tension between the 
authenticity and accuracy of the research data as in literal, detailed information, 
and epistemological cogency in the research. Every possible attempt was made to 
maintain the integrity of the material and to not disguise any substantive details in 
ways which would skew or influence the manner in which the material was 
understood. 
The fourth limitation is related to the use of case material from other therapists, and 
in those cases the researcher took on the position of interlocutor. This may have 
been limiting in the sense that the material was not known as intimately or in as 
nuanced a way as it was to the therapist involved. It did, however, allow for the 
researcher to hold an observing, more distanced, ‘third’ position which then opened 
up possibilities for new understandings of the material. Using the material of other 
clinicians also allowed for a way to extend the use of case material without risking 
the confidentiality of patients (as described in Chapter Three). The potential 
limitations of using this research method were mitigated by repeatedly checking the 
way in which the papers were written up with both the contributing clinicians as well 
as the PhD faculty.  
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In all these cases, every attempt has been made to limit these potentially vitiating 
circumstances 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In order for the thesis to have focus, the decision was made to draw a single 
theoretical paradigm even though there is not only one theoretical trajectory around 
the understanding of psychosoma. The decision was made to choose one strong 
paradigm, and the classical Freudian one seemed to be the obvious one as it is still 
widely accepted and was also able to account for the various ways in which the 
patients and therapists presented. It is acknowledged that broadening the research 
to include other paradigms might broaden and deepen the work.  
An engagement with the field of psychosoma in the wider sense would necessarily 
involve taking on board some of the newer, more recent research, particularly in 
the field of neuropsychoanalysis which has particular cogency to the field of 
psychosoma and is an extension of psychoanalysis, and is very much concerned 
with thinking, theorising and practising explicitly across the body-mind border. 
Both of the authors who were invited to comment on the paper “Psychosomatics 
Today” (Gubb, 2013a) gave very useful suggestions about other paradigms that 
work in the field of psychosomatics and which could usefully be combined with 
psychoanalysis in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
involved. Gottlieb (2013) makes the important point that although Freud was 
skilfully able to map the mind in the early 1900s, it is important that psychoanalytic 
thought about psychosomatosis keep abreast of the scientific developments of the 
twenty-first century. There has been a great deal of research in disciplines such as 
neuroscience and psychoneuroimmunology, and including and integrating 
learnings from these complementary disciplines into the psychoanalytic tradition 
would result in a more robust and richer understanding of the field. 
Frommer’s (2013) commentary on the same paper reviews work in 
psychosomatosis from a German perspective, and also identifies a split in 
disciplines.  He describes how, for historical reasons peculiar to Germany, 
psychosomatics and psychoanalysis are two different discourses in that country. 
He describes the difference between the focus of each discourse: Psychoanalysis 
appears to be interested in theorising the cause of psychosomatic illness whereas 
the psychosomatic discourse has abandoned that endeavour because of 
methodological problems involved in trying to establish causation, and has chosen 
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to focus instead on how patients cope with their illnesses. He concludes by 
helpfully suggesting that an integration of these two traditions might lead to a better 
understanding of the subject but also to better ways to treat patients with 
psychosomatic illnesses.  
Finally, since there is some indication that forms of psychosomatic illness such as 
hysteria may be diagnosed only under specific historical conditions, and therefore 
appear or fall out of the diagnostic repertoire, it is possible that such diagnoses 
may also be influenced by cultural differences. It could be useful to explore the 
understandings that other cultures have about physical symptoms which appear to 
have no biological origin if this research is to be developed in the future – 
especially in the South African context.   
 166 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
Having very recently read and written about how the analyst’s pregnancy affects 
the therapy in theoretical terms for the final paper, one of the most extraordinarily 
interesting, and in many ways enriching, experiences of doing this doctoral 
research was the fact that I fell pregnant at the very last stages of the project and 
watched with interest the impact that my changing body had on my patients. This 
event was a live example of the therapist’s body entering the treatment room and 
served to beautifully illustrate and highlight many of the arguments made in this 
thesis. Of course, the body in pregnancy is a particularly evocative phenomenon 
and is known to (re)awaken old internal conflicts and painful memories in patients 
(as discussed briefly in the final paper “Re-embodying the Analyst”). Because 
pregnancy has such a particular meaning, when the analyst’s body visibly changes 
during a pregnancy, it will evoke different responses in the patient to those that 
other physical changes in the analyst such as weight loss or gain, or illness might 
result in.  
It was clear that I should expect that my patients would react to the changes 
occurring in my body, but what was of particular interest was the observation that 
even though there was a mix of individual responses amongst my patients, in 
almost all cases the question of my pregnancy had a marked impact on the 
manner in which the patient engaged: almost without exception, my patients began 
to relate to me in a way that was far more ‘personal’. 
My growing belly and changing walk were profound and obvious physical changes 
which made the fact of the pregnancy and the changes it would bring to the 
therapeutic setting impossible to avoid. They also drew attention to more personal 
aspects of me such as my physicality and my private life. The curiosity of my 
patients was piqued regarding my life outside of the therapy room in an intense 
and profound way, and my patients began to voice thoughts and questions about 
me in a way that they had not done previously. While this ‘push to the personal’ 
occurred across the board, it appeared to me that the reactions fell into three 
general groupings. These groupings conveyed to me a sense of the modalities in 
which the patients’ perceptions of the analyst could emerge in the transference, 
and  I suggest were related to the patients’ internal dynamics as well as to the 
transference dynamics of the therapy which were at work at the time my pregnancy 
entered the frame.  
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The first grouping was patients who demonstrated a more ‘benign’, ego level 
response to me and my pregnancy. It was generally true that in these patients, the 
form the transferences took before my pregnancy was known and manifest, 
seemed to be much more metaphorical in nature, and the position I held as a 
‘person’ was previously far less verbalised and had certainly functioned much more 
unconsciously. From the start of their treatments, these patients would anticipate 
and experience my interpretations and responses as warm, understanding, critical, 
supportive or unhelpful depending on the transference-countertransference 
dynamics that were occurring at that point in the treatment, but in most cases, I 
was their therapist who ‘lived’ in the practice room and about whose private life 
they showed little manifest curiosity. In other words, I appeared to hold the role of 
the figure of my patients’ therapist, and our relationship occurred in the realm of the 
psychic. After becoming pregnant I became more embodied and more of a ‘person’ 
in the mind of these patients. They began to ask me direct questions about my 
marriage, other children I might or might not have, and my views on child rearing. 
They became much more aware of me as a physical presence and appeared to 
feel more entitled to comment on my appearance and the size of my belly. Some 
patients even tried to rub my belly as they walked past me when they entered or 
exited the room. I noticed a strong pull in myself to engage in a similar way. I was 
often very tempted to allow myself to be pulled into a personal interaction and to 
share my joy and excitement (and on occasion, my exhaustion or illness). It was 
important to hold the frame in those moments despite this desire in my patients 
(and sometimes in myself) to personalise the relationship. I observed that as the 
therapy continued in its usual manner that on the whole, this group of patients did 
not present with much new material or reveal conflicts which were very different 
from those they were already working with. Although I had become more of a 
human being rather than simply being the patient’s therapist, this shift appeared to 
be one that the patients were conscious of and could put into words, and it did not 
have a substantive impact on the treatment.  
In the remainder of my patients, the transference neuroses were either significantly 
intensified or vividly brought to the fore once they became aware that I was 
pregnant. The pregnancy provoked the return or escalation of the patients’ internal, 
unconscious conflicts and difficulties.  In the second group of patients I identified 
the transferential responses were strongly positive (even erotic), while in the third 
group they were powerfully negative and attacking, subject to the individual 
patient’s unconscious structures and how these became radicalised as I, as the 
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person of the analyst, changed shape and emerged more from the impersonal 
figure that I had previously represented. 
The patients who responded with a strong positive transference seemed to be 
reacting to the strong, life giving and feminine aspects of me as a pregnant woman. 
Some of my younger, adolescent patients experienced me as a nurturing and 
understanding mother who was much better than the one that they had. Other 
patients commented that they were pleased to have a ‘role model’ who had both a 
career and a child. Some male patients had fantasies about raising the child with 
me as their partner, and with some of these men, the transference became quite 
eroticised. On the whole though, with these patients there was a general increase 
in the dependency they felt for me, and the impending break in therapy due to my 
maternity leave was a painful subject.  
The group of patients in which my being pregnant provoked profound elements of 
the negative transference, revealed their hostility in demonstrations of envy, 
resentment and attack. Commonly it was issues relating to the body, fertility, 
pregnancy, sexuality and marriage which were central to these patients’ 
pathologies and were frequently raised in the material which they had brought to 
therapy from the start of their treatments. The negative transference enactments 
came to the fore in some extremely vivid, dramatic, and sometimes shocking, 
ways. Some of these patients were too angry with me for becoming pregnant, or 
found it too painful to watch as my belly grew, and chose to leave the treatment. 
Others remained in therapy but mocked and attacked me during sessions. These 
experiences were distressing and difficult for me and I had to work hard to balance 
my concern for my patient with my outrage and defensiveness regarding my 
unborn child. 
Whichever grouping a particular patient fell in, what was universally true was that 
working with the material the pregnancy brought up for them usually led to 
interesting and useful therapeutic advances within the context of the unique dyadic 
relationship, the patient’s interpersonal dynamics and my changing physical 
condition. The important point here, though, is that this material was only made 
manifest when I began to emerge as more of a person than simply as the figure 
which I previously had been.  
This experience with my patients highlighted and reinforced many of the thoughts 
which had germinated and grown through the process of the writing of this 
doctorate. Most importantly though, it cemented the conclusion which I had already 
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reached through the research: It has been clear since the very beginning of 
psychoanalysis that it is crucial to mind the body of the patient. What is now also 
clear is that it is just as important to mind the body of the therapist. 
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APPENDIX I 
PATIENT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
KAREN GUBB 
Clinical Psychologist 
MA (Clinical Psychology) (WITS) 
PRACTICE NO: 0860000200182 
Block 2, Fountain Grove 
5 Second Road, Hyde Park 
P.O. Box 784754, SANDTON, 2146 
E-mail: kgubb@worldonline.co.za 
Phone:  078 104 2251 
Dear ________________ 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT PROPOSED STUDY 
 
I am currently completing a doctoral degree (including publication) at the University 
of the Witwatersrand and would like to invite you to participate in the research. I am 
writing this letter to provide you with sufficient information about the study so that 
you are able to make an informed and consensual decision about participating. If 
there is any information that is not included in this letter, but which you require, or if 
you require any further explanation about anything contained in this letter, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. 
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If you are prepared to participate in the study after reading this letter and the 
attached informed consent form I will ask you to sign the attached form. I will then 
give you a copy of that same form for your records.  
My area of focus is how the body is used to reinforce and communicate 
unconscious anxieties, desires and memories in psychotherapy. When you 
contacted me and asked to enter into therapy with me, you became eligible to 
participate in the study as I am interested in using observations from my practice to 
explore ideas and make specific arguments.  
The study that I am completing includes case study research using illustrations 
from psychotherapy to explore specific ideas. That means that I will be including 
material that came up during therapy sessions to demonstrate and investigate 
certain features of the topic. I would like your permission to describe some of how 
our therapy sessions unfolded and to use any relevant content from the sessions, 
as the data for my research. I will make every effort to assure that you cannot be 
identified in any material that is published.  
I am ethically bound to protect your confidentiality and therefore if I refer to any 
aspect of the therapy, I will not reveal your identity by disclosing your real name or 
any details which might identify you.  To protect your confidentiality and anonymity 
further, I will disguise the case material, for example, by including some false 
information, or by combining features of several cases to create a composite case 
study.  
If you agree to participate in the study, the only requirement is that you complete 
this form. 
The professional services you will receive from me will be the same regardless of 
whether you choose to participate or not. I am committed to prioritising our therapy 
relationship at all times and that will continue whether you choose to participate or 
not. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can decline to 
participate at any time without stating any reason.  You may also withdraw your 
consent to be included in the study, without stating a reason, at any time. You will 
be offered the opportunity to read the report I produce. All names will have been 
removed to protect the identity of all those who have participated. 
I do not believe that there are any direct risks to you if you participate in this study. 
The possible benefit of your participation in this study is that you will be 
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contributing to building up the body of psychoanalytic knowledge. I would be 
completely willing to discuss with you any concerns or feelings that this request or 
the writing up of aspects of our therapy might bring up and to work with this 
appropriately in the psychotherapy. 
The protocol for this study has been submitted to the University of the 
Witwatersrand Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and written approval 
has been granted by that committee. Should you require any further information 
about your rights as a research participant, please visit either the University of the 
Witwatersrand’s website at www.wits.ac.za/Academic /Research/Ethics.htm or the 
Health Professions Council of South Africa’s website at 
http://www.hpcsa.co.za/hpcsa/default.aspx?id=152.  My final thesis for the 
doctorate will be stored in the Thesis Collection at the Library of the University of 
the Witwatersrand and some chapters of the thesis will be published in peer-
reviewed psychology journals.  
Please feel free to contact me if you require any further information. My contact 
details are provided in the letterhead above. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Karen Gubb 
 
  
 189 
 
APPENDIX II 
ETHICS CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE 
 
